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There is writing about how nineteenth-century churchgoers’ views of other countries 
were formed by church periodicals. And there is writing about how opinions of the Cing 
and Japanese Empires were changed by the “Cing-Japanese War of 1894–1895” (“First 
Sino-Japanese War”; “Jiá-wǔ War”), and the “Japanese-Táiwanese War of 1895.” But, 
there are no works making connections between these bodies of writing. This work 
makes such a connection through a comparison of writing about the wars in two church 
periodicals, the England-based  Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China , and the 
Táiwan-based “ Dāi-lám Capital Church News ” (“Dāi-lám Hu-siá n  Gào-hoê-be”). It makes the 
argument that the periodicals’ writers and editors were on the side of the Japanese, as it 
seemed to them that Japanese success against the Cing Empire, and Japanese rule in 
Tái-wan, would make Western ways commoner in these places, which would be good for 
the Protestant Churches there. But the writers and editors had to give their opinions 
differently, as their readers were in different positions with respect to the wars. The 
Monthly Messenger ’s readers were in England; nothing the writers said about the war 
would make them any less safe, and so in both wars the periodical gave its support to the 
Japanese loudly and frequently. But the  Church News ’ readers and writers were in 
Tái-wan. Openly supporting an attacking country could put them in danger, so the 
writers said nothing for or against any side in the first War, and were but quietly against 
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A note on names and languages 
 
In Tái-wan, there have for hundreds of years been many languages in use. As 
such, nearly every place on the island has at least two names; and some have 
many more. For example, in the island’s northwest is a city given the name 
“M e u-lit” by its makers. But to the Say-siyat, one of Tái-wan’s many groups of 
“aborigines,” the city’s name is “Ma:ih”; and to the  Ê -mńg users in the island’s 
south, its name is “Biāo-lêk.” When the Japanese took over Tái-wan in 1895, they 
gave the city a Japanese name, “Byōritsu.” And when the Republic of China took 
control from the Japanese in 1945, the city got yet another Chinese name, 
“Miáo-lì,” the name which is on most maps today. 
So, when writing about the history of Tái-wan, for each city, mountain, 
river, and so on, a writer must make a decision about which of their many names 
to give. The most common answer is to give the present-day names in the 
present-day “National Language” — “Guó-yǔ” (a sort of “Mandarin Chinese,” 
very like the “Pǔ-tong-huà” of the People’s Republic of China). There are good 
reasons for doing this: Guó-yǔ names are widely used outside of Tái-wan, and if 
the readers’ knowledge of Tái-wan is limited, they are more likely to have seen 
these names than any others. But it is a far from perfect answer: Guó-yǔ names 
were not common in Tái-wan before the 1950s, and if one is writing about an 
earlier time, there seems something not quite right about giving names for places 
that would have been strange to the persons living there. Would one give an 
account of “Istanbul” in the time of the Byzantine Empire? Or “London” in the 
time of the Romans? 
And so something different is done here. This work gives the place-names 
that were in common use at the time of the Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War. For most places in Tái-wan these are “ Ê -mńg” (“Amoy”) 
names; but for a small number of places they are names from one of the “Hak-gá” 
(“Hakka”) languages, or one of the Formosan languages. In theory, this could be 
done for other parts of the Cing Empire too. One could give the “Guǎng-jhou” 
(“Cantonese”) names for places in that city; and one could give the Mongolian 
and Uyghur names for places in the Empire where those languages were 
common. But this has not been done here. For the parts of the Cing Empire where 
Ê -mńg, Hak-gá, or the Formosan languages were not in use, the present-day 
Guó-yǔ names are given. As there was no agreement about the name of 
“Tái-wan” among the different language users living there, this work simply 
gives its Guó-yǔ name too. So, keep in mind that “Táiwanese” is here the name 
given to all persons living on Tái-wan at the time of the Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War, whatever their first language. 
To be sure, it would be better to give the “true” names of everywhere in 
the Cing Empire, but at present the only system able to put all the Empire’s many 
languages into writing is the International Phonetic Alphabet, of which the 
greater part of readers likely have little knowledge. In fact, even making use of 
Ê -mńg, Guó-yǔ, and Hak-gá in the same work is no simple thing: there are many 
different writing systems for the three languages; all do their work well enough, 
but many make use of the same signs for different sounds. For example, in 
Hàn-yǔ Pin-yin, the most common system for writing Gúo-yǔ and Pǔ-tong-huà, 
“ó” is the sign for /o˧˥/; but in Bêh-wê-̄rī, the most common system for writing 
Ê -mńg, it is the sign for /ə ˥ ˩ /. 
But, there is one group of systems that comes nearer than any other to 
not having this trouble. In the 1990s the government of Tái-wan made new 
writing systems for the island’s three Chinese languages: “Táiwanese,” Hak-gá, 
and Guó-yǔ. This work makes use of this family of systems, the “Tong-yòng 
(‘Universal’) Pin-yin” systems. There are two reasons for this: first, the 
Tong-yòng Pin-yin systems are simple for English users — by design they make 
use of letters in the same ways as English; and second, all three systems make use 
of letters in nearly the same way. In fact, the three systems are so much like each 
other, it is strange that the makers did not simply make one system for all three 
languages. But they did not, and so some small changes have been made here. As 
the Tong-yòng Pin-yin system for Guó-yǔ is the most like English, where the 
systems make use of different letters for the same sounds, the Guó-yǔ way or 
writing them is used. But, there are a small number of sounds for which the 
Hak-gá system has been put to use. For the details of why, and the three systems’ 
workings, see the chart on the next page. 
Some readers will doubtless be put off by seeing “Tainan” as “Dāi-lám” 
and “Taipei” as “Dāi-bak.” But at the time of the Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War, Japanese names had not yet come to the island, and 
Guó-yǔ names did not yet exist; giving a history of the War’s effect on Tái-wan 
using “Tainan” and “Taipei” would be giving a false idea of the time and place. 
What is more, this work has in part to do with the attempts of outsiders to 
remake the minds of others by giving them new names for the world around 
them, sometimes by force. This was done to Tái-wan a number of times, and it is 




In November of 1894, after three weeks of fighting, the Japanese Army took 
control of Wei-hǎi-wèi, a military base in the northern Cing Empire.  The best 1
fighting forces in the Empire had been broken, and the best ships of the Cing 
Navy were in the hands of the Japanese, before whom the road to the Cing capital 
was open — to many, it seemed that the old Empire’s end was at hand. In the 
south, British missionaries to the Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan gave 
Churchgoers the bad news. Writing in the Church’s monthly periodical, the 
Dāi-lám Capital Church News  (“ Dāi-lám Hu-siá n  Gào-ho ê -b e ”), they said that the island 
was in great danger, and that the Churchgoers must be ready for anything: 
We do not know where the situation will go; many people are rumouring 
that Tái-wan will be attacked, but we cannot know for sure. 
A o-lái ế sề-bhīn  m -zai bhêh g a o an-zoa n -yiū n . Z ê -zê ̄láng dêh hōng-sia n 
gòng bêh lái pah Dāi-wán; zong-sī yao-bhoê ̄tang zai.  (118: 4) 2
 
But, on the other side of the world, the Presbyterian Church of England’s flagship 
periodical, the  Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China , had a different view of 
things. Its makers were happy with the War’s development, for the Cing Empire’s 
loss could be the Cing Churches’ gain. And so it was that they said to readers 
“May it be, as some are hopefully predicting, that a humbled China will be more 
open to receive the salvation of Jesus Christ!” (588: 59). 
Given these different views, it may come as a surprise that the  Monthly 
Messenger and the  Church News were sister periodicals. The Presbyterian Church 
in southern Tái-wan had got its start with the help of the Presbyterian Church of 
1 The country’s complete name was “Great Cing Empire” (“Dà Cing Dì-guó”), but its government 
and persons had other names for it too, like “Central Civilisation” (“Jhong-huá”) — from its 
position as the centre of the civilised world — or “Central Country” (“Jhong-guó”) — from its 
position at the centre of the physical world. In English it was most often given the name “China,” 
but as this names has been given to many East Asian countries over the years, sometimes more 
than one at the same time, this work makes use of a less general name, “Cing Empire.” Take note 
that “the Cing” — that is, the persons of the Cing Empire, or their government — are not the same 
group as “the Chinese” — that is, users of one or more of the Chinese languages. The greater part 
of the Cing persons were Chinese, but there were other language groups in the Empire too, as well 
as Chinese living in other parts of the world. 
2 Translation mine, as are all translations from  Ê -mńg and Mandarin in this work. 
England, and in 1894 the Churches’ relations were still close. The English Church 
regularly sent money to the Táiwanese Church, and less regularly sent men and 
women to the “South Formosa Mission,” the organisation which gave the Church 
its pastors, doctors, teachers — and the editors and writers of the  Church News . 
And the missionaries were writers not only for the Táiwanese periodical, but for 
the  Monthly Messenger too. To it they sometimes sent pieces of writings specially 
for publication, and they regularly sent accounts of their work, with the 
knowledge that these would be made into material for the  Monthly Messenger .  3
The periodical’s editor might put complete letters into the periodical, take 
quotations from them, or simply take them as a base for his own accounts of 
things in Tái-wan. But whatever was done with the missionaries’ letters in the 
end, it was from them that the mission’s supporters in England got their news of 
events in Tái-wan. This was normally of the sorts of events usual at a mission 
Church: making new churches, teaching at the Church schools, and so on.  But in 4
1894 there took place a most unusual event, which was to have a great effect on 
the two Churches — the “Cing-Japanese War.” 
That it would be important to the Churches was not at first clear to 
everyone, for the causes of the War had nothing to do with Tái-wan. The 
Japanese Empire had been for many years hoping to get more control over the 
Joseon Kingdom, their nearest neighbour, but a vassal state of the Cing Empire.  5
In 1894 there was a rebellion in the Joseon Kingdom, and at the request of the 
Joseon King, the Cing Empire sent soldiers to put it down. This was the chance for 
3 In fact, these accounts were updates sent to the Church’s “Foreign Missions Committee, then 
given to the periodical’s editor. 
4 In this work, a “church” (with a small “c”) is a group of persons regularly coming together for 
organised worship, and a “Church” (with a capital “C”) is a number of such groups having their 
leaders in common. For example, the  Church of England has many  churches in London. 
5 The Joseon Kingdom’s complete name was “Great Joseon Kingdom” (“Dae Joseon Guk”). In 
English it was more commonly given the name “Korea.” But with this name there is the same 
trouble as with “China,” and so this work makes use of the less general name, “Joseon Kingdom.” 
The Japanese Empire’s complete name was “Great Nippon Empire” (“Dai Nippon Teikoku”); in 
English, it was usually given the name “Japan.” For the reasons given above, it would be better to 
make use of the name “Nippon Empire.” But the events of the twentieth century gave “Nippon” a 
somewhat dangerous flavour in English, which it still has to some degree today. For the reason, 
this work makes use of the name “Japanese Empire.” Take note that the groups “Japanese” (the 
persons of the Japanese Empire, or their government) and “Japanese” (users of the Japanese 
language) are the same. 
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which the Japanese government had been waiting. The 1885 “Tian-jin 
Convention” gave them the right to send their own soldiers into the Joseon 
Kingdom at such times, which they quickly did. Once there, the Japanese Army 
and Navy then made a number of quick attacks on their Cing opposites. The Cing 
were taken by surprise, and the Japanese quickly got control of the Joseon 
Kingdom, then took the War into the Cing Empire itself. In theory, the Cing had 
the advantage in numbers and materials, but on the battlefield they were 
overcome again and again by the Japanese. By the start of 1895, the Cing 
government had to make a request for peace. 
The price of peace was high. Among other things, the Cing Empire had to 
give the province of Tái-wan over to the Japanese. But the Táiwanese were not 
happy about this, and before the Japanese could take control, the Táiwanese had 
made a new government, the “Táiwanese Republic,” and had made clear in a 
Declaration of Independence that they were now free of the two empires.  So 6
there was a second War, the “Japanese-Táiwanese War,” between East Asia’s 
newest Empire and its newest Republic. It was surprisingly hard going for the 
Japanese, but they got the better of their enemy in the end, and by the start of 
1896 were in control of the island. 
These Wars were naturally of great interest to the Churchgoers in 
Tái-wan, and to the mission supporters in the U.K. And so, from the summer of 
1894 to the winter of 1895, the  Church News and  Monthly Messenger had many 
accounts of the Wars and their effects. This work is a comparison of what the two 
periodicals said. It makes the argument that the periodicals’ views on the Wars 
were very much alike, but that their ways of giving these views to readers were 




6 This country’s complete name in  Ê -mńg was simply “Dāi-wán Republic” (“Dāi-wán 
Bhin-zu-gek”). In English, its name is sometimes given as “Formosan Republic.” But, as this work 
makes use of the island’s Guó-yǔ name “Tái-wan” (see “Note on Names and Languages”), here the 




Before going into the details of this argument, it may be best to take a step 
back, and say something about the question to which it is an answer, and how 
this question came came to be of interest. Missionary periodicals have long been 
important tools for anthropologists, linguists, historians, and many researchers 
of many other sorts. And unsurprisingly, there have been many discussions in 
these groups of the troubles with making use of missionary periodicals. These 
have given birth to a great amount of writing about the ways in which 
missionaries — purposely and otherwise — made questionable accounts of the 
places were they were living, the work they were doing there, and the persons 
among whom they were working — usually in support of the missionaries’ own 
interests. These discussions, and the writings that have come out of them, are of 
great value, but at times too quick to make the jump from examples to general 
statements. Much about the missionaries account is still unclear, for example  did 
they give the same sorts of accounts to all the many persons with whom they were in 
touch ? 
This was the question which gave rise to this thesis. To put this to the test, 
it seemed best to make a comparison of the accounts in two missionary 
periodicals which had writers, but no readers, in common. For this purpose, few 
periodicals could be better than the  Church News and  Monthly Messenger : as they 
were in different languages, Ề-mńg and English, the missionaries in Tái-wan were 
free to give different opinions in the different periodicals, with next to no danger 
of discovery. As for the comparison itself, it was important that it be of 
something about which the missionaries would have had good reason to say 
different things. The Wars were used for this purpose, as it was clear from other 
writers’ works that the Western and Cing publics had very different views of the 
Wars, and that the Western and Cing periodicals’ opinions about the Wars were 
4
for the most part in line with these.  It seemed, in short, the missionaries would 7
have had good reason, and a good chance, to say different things to their Cing 
and British readers. 
To make the comparison clearer, three sorts of differences in the 
periodicals accounts of the Wars were put to the test: 
(1)  Were the periodicals neutral in the War? Did they openly take the side of 
the Cing Empire, Japanese Empire, or Táiwanese Republic? 
(2)  What were their opinions of the Cing, Japanese, and Táiwanese? Were these 
opinions positive, negative, or neutral? 
(3)  What effect did they say that the War would have on the Churches? Did they 
say that the Church’s future would be better or worse after the Wars? 
 
Those tests, and their outcomes, are at the heart of this work — Chapters 4, 5, and 
6. And from them, comes the thesis’ chief argument: that the opinions on the War 
given in the two periodicals were much the same, but how they gave these 
opinions was quite different. 
And so, in a sense, this thesis’ interests are very narrow: one question, 
three tests, and a small number of issues from two periodicals. It was designed to 
give us a more detailed understanding of missionary periodicals — and to put to 
the test the argument that some of them were purposely “untrue” in ways that 
were of use to the missionaries. But in doing so, it makes additions too to a 
number of others fields of knowledge, the three most important of which are 
given below:  
The first such field is that which is loosely named “post-colonial.” These 
are works about the relations between Western ideas of, and control over, the 
non-Western world, often taking as their starting point the works of Said, 
Bhabha, and Spivak — “the Holy Trinity of colonial-discourse analysis.”  Two 8
7 For example, see Paine’s  Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 , Tsai’s “First Casualty,” and Lǐ Jin-ciáng’s 
“Siang-gǎng’s Reaction to the Jiá-wǔ War (1894–1895)” (“Jiá-wǔ Jhàn-jheng Shií-ci [1894–1895] 
Siang-gǎng de ̊Fǎn-yìng”; brackets in original). 
8 Robert Young seems to have been the first to give them this name (163), which has since been 
put to use elsewhere, such in a John McLeod’s  Beginning Postcolonialism (29), Stella Nkomo’s 
“Postcolonial and Anti-Colonial Reading of ‘African’ Leadership and Management in Organization 
Studies” (367), and Adele Perry’s “ Historian and the Theorist Revisited” (145). For different 
suggestions about what writers make up — or should make up — the postcolonial “Holy Trinity,” 
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common interests of postcolonial writers are: (1) the growth of Western ideas in 
the non-Western world, and (2) the making of Western “knowledge” of the 
non-Western world. That missionaries had a hand in the first is not in doubt. As 
Brian Stanley puts it, “There can be little dispute that, for most of the nineteenth 
century, British Christians believed that the missionary was called to propagate 
the imagined benefits of Western civilisation alongside the Christian message” 
(157). Missionaries from others countries were no different, and so it was that 
Churchgoers, or would-be Churchgoers, were made to put on Western clothing 
(Beidelman 133-152), take up Western ways of household organisation (Roberts), 
or even publicly put to flame the signs of their old ways of living (Lutz and Lutz 
205). Yet, for all that has been said about how missionaries made Western ways 
more common in the non-Western world, postcolonial writers have given little 
attention to one of their most important tools — periodicals. One purpose of this 
work then, is to make clear — or at least clearer — some of the ways that 
missionaries put publishing to work in their “colonisation of consciousness” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 26). 
As for the second interest of postcolonial writers — how Western 
“knowledge” of the non-Western world was made — missionaries had an 
important part in this too. Not only are missionaries noted in a number of 
general works — for examples, Colin Mackerras’  Western Images of China (46–53) — 
there are works specially about the “knowledge”-making work of missionaries, 
such as Geoffrey Oddie’s  Imagined Hinduism , Eric Reinders’  Borrowed Gods and 
Foreign Bodies , and  Murray Rubinstein’s “Missionary Orientalism and the 
Missionary Lens.” But no writer has yet taken note of the  Monthly Messenger ’s 
place in this knowledge-making. This is somewhat strange, for the  Monthly 
Messenger , being one of the only periodicals regularly having accounts of Tái-wan, 
was an important instrument in the development of Western ideas about it.  And 9
see Richard Werbner’s “Introduction” in  Postcolonial Identities in Africa (7), and Chambers and 
Watkins’ “Editorial” in the  Journal of Commonwealth Literature (3). 
9 Other periodicals regularly having first-hand accounts of Tái-wan at the time of the 
Cing-Japanese War were the Presbyterian Church of Canada’s  Presbyterian Record , and the 
Dominican Order’s  El Correo Sino-Annamita . Though, naturally, other periodicals with an interest 
in the Cing Empire, such as the  Chinese Recorder , sometimes had first-hand accounts too. 
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so, while this work takes note of only a small part of the  Monthly Messenger ’s 
output, in taking note of it at all, it gives us a finer-grained account of how 
Western “knowledge” of the Cing Empire in general, and specially of Tái-wan, 
was made. 
It is not only writers of postcolonial history and theory who have given 
too little attention to the work of the  Monthly Messenger . Writers of mission 
history have in general given little attention to this periodical, and the 
organisation behind it. In fact, there seems to have been no general history of the 
nineteenth-century Presbyterian Church of England since A.H. Drysdales’  History 
of the Presbyterians in England in 1889.  It comes as no surprise then, that there is 10
even less writing about the Church’s periodicals. In fact, while some works about 
the Church’s missions make use of the material from the  Monthly Messenger , there 
seem to be no accounts of it, and the Church’s other periodicals, in their own 
right. So this work is an important step too in building our knowledge of the 
Presbyterian Church of England and its publishing history. 
Interestingly, things are somewhat better with the  Church News . In 
general, more attention has been given to the Presbyterian Church of England’s 
missions than to the Church itself. Of these the mission in Tái-wan has been given 
the most attention, as most of these writers about the mission in Tái-wan, or 
about the Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan, give some attention to the  Church 
News .  Another reason for there being more writing about the  Church News  is that 11
linguists and others with an interest in the Táiwanese language have made good 
use of its material in their works.  But our understanding of the  Church News and 12
10 S.W. Carruthers’  50 Years  — which came out in the 1930s — has a short account of the Church in 
the last years of the nineteenth century. The reason for there being so little writing about the 
Presbyterian Church of England may be in part that its separate existence came to an end in 1972, 
when it was joined with the “Congregational Church in England and Wales” to make the “United 
Reform Church” (Orchard). 
11 For example, histories of the nineteenth-century Churches and mission are given in Murray 
Rubinstein’s  The Protestant Community on Modern Tái-wan (14–19), Jhèng Lián-míng’s  Tái-wan Ji-du 
Jháng-lǎo Jiào-huèi Bǎi-nián Shiǐ (1–102), and Huáng and Syǔ’s  Tái-wan Ji-du Jhǎng-lǎo Jiào-huèi Lì-shiǐ 
Nián-pǔ (4–117). In fact, even some general histories of Tái-wan — such as Gau Míng-shiì’s  Tái-wan 
Shiǐ (149–150) and Wáng Yù-feng’s  Tái-wan Tú-jiê ̌Shiǐ (97–101) — have accounts of the Churches 
and mission. 
12 For example, Henning Klöter’s  Written Taiwanese , Chén Mù-jhen’s “Views on Civilization in 
Romanized Taiwanese Literature” (“Dāi-gù Bêh̄-w ê -rī Cêh̄ Sià diong ế Bhūn-bhếng Guan”), and Lǐ 
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South Formosa Mission is still far from complete. Much of the writing about the 
mission is more than fifty years old, and much of it was made by missionaries and 
others having connections to the Churches. And, again, little of this writing is 
about the  Church News itself. 
And so, there is a great amount of work still to be done on the 
Presbyterian Church of England, its mission in Tái-wan, and their publishing in 
and about the Cing Empire. This thesis is but a small addition here, but it is 
something; and if it does nothing else, it will at least make others conscious of 
the work still to be done. 
Writing about the Wars, and histories of such writings, are the third group 
to which this thesis is an addition. Of the above groups, this may be the one most 
in need of more work, for there is little English-language writing about the 
Cing-Japanese War, and even less about the Japanese-Táiwanese War.  What 13
works do give their attention wholly or partly to what was said about the Wars in 
the Cing and Western periodicals, have given it chiefly to the greatest-sized of 
these: the  Times of London, the  North China Herald , the Review of the Times 
(“Wàn-guó Gong-bào”), and so on. Smaller periodicals’ accounts of the War have 
been given little, if any, attention, even though these were for many persons in 
the Cing Empire and the West an important way — or even the only way — of 
getting news about the War. An account of what was said about it in the  Church 
News and  Monthly Messenger , then, is a start at making broader and deeper our 
knowledge of what was said about the Wars in general. 
Another trouble with English-language writing about the Wars: while 
some of the above works make note of the part that missionaries had in giving 
the Western public their ideas of the War, none give special attention to the 
Yù-lán’s “Tsai Pei-Huo and Vernacular Taiwanese Characters Movement” (“Cài Pèi-huǒ yǔ 
Tái-wan Bái-huà-zì Yùn-dòng”). 
13 There are a number of articles about the Cing-Japanese War, but few modern book-length works 
apart from Jeffrey Dorwart’s  The Pigtail War , Stewart Lone’s  Japan’s First Modern War , and S.C.M. 
Paine’s  Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 . As for the Japanese-Táiwanese War, nearly the only modern 
English-language accounts are George Kerr’s  Formosa and Harry Lamley’s “1895 Taiwan War of 
Resistance.” In comparison, there is a great amount of Chinese-language writing about the Wars, 
but an overview of that is outside the purposes of this work. 
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relations between missionaries’ account of War, and their work, in and hopes for, 
the Cing Empire. In other words, they say nothing about the effect that 
missionaries’ work had on their writing about the War. Yet there can be no doubt 
that such a relation did exist. As Greenlee and Johnston say: 
The war’s chastening effect on China’s rulers was hailed as providential 
because for a time it helped to discredit those conservative forces that had 
consistently set their face against the Chinese Westernizers who had 
warmed to the teachings of the missionaries. (105) 
 
This is surely something that should be of greater interest: the missionaries, who 
so often said they were friends of the Cing, were happy about its loss to the 
Japanese Empire. But even the writers who take note of this give it only a line or 
two in their works.  There are yet no detailed accounts of why the missionaries 14
saw the Cing losses as being in their best interests, or how this opinion was 
developed. About these things, this work has much to say, and it is to this body of 
work that it makes the greatest addition. 
So, in short, while this thesis’ focus is narrow, it nonetheless makes 
additions to a number of bodies of work. It is an addition to postcolonial history 
and theory, which has given too little attention to the part of missionary 
periodicals in making Western “knowledge”  of the non-Western world, and 
making Western ideas more common  in the non-Western world. It is an addition 
to the history of Protestant missions, which has given little attention to the 
Presbyterian Church of England’s missions, and none at all to its periodicals. And 
it is an addition to the history of the Cing-Japanese War, where no attention has 
been given to the ways in which Protestant missionaries made use of the War for 
their own ends. Naturally, the addition it makes to these bodies of work is small, 
and it is the writers’ hope that others will take what is said here as a base for 
future work. Suggestions on the forms this might take are given at the end of 
Chapter 7. 
14 For example, see Joseph Lee’s  Bible and the Gun (141), Lutz and Lutz’s  Hakka Chinese Confront 
Protestant Christianity (221), and Steven Maughan’s  Mighty England Do Good (207) . 
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The other parts of this chapter have more details about the above groups 
of writings — what they have done, what they have not done, and what this work 
will do in relation to them. It first gives an overview of the theory of language 
and value common in postcolonial writing, and how it is put to use here. The 
section then goes over some important writings about Western and Cing 
periodicals’ accounts of the Wars, taking note of what work still has to be done 
on these. Last, it goes over some writing about Church and missionary 
periodicals’ accounts of the world for Western and non-Western readers. At the 
Chapter’s end is a more detailed discussion of what this work does for the state of 
knowledge on nineteenth-century missionary periodicals and the two Wars. 
 
WRITING ABOUT POSTCOLONIAL THEORY 
Since the 1970s, much attention has been given to the relations between Western 
writing for and about the non-Western world, and Western control over it. But, 
as noted, no attention has yet been given to the place of the  Church News and 
Monthly Messenger in this. This section gives a simple overview of the theory of 
languages and value the heart of most postcolonial writings, and makes clear 
how it will be put to use in making sense of how two periodicals’ were shapers of 
knowledge in Tái-wan and the U.K.   
Many, likely the greater part, of postcolonial writings take as their 
starting point “constructionist” theories of language, as this work does.  These 15
theories say that a person’s knowledge and values are shaped by their languages 
— here, being any system of signs for making accounts of the world, such as 
words, maths, art, and so on. In other words, the states, qualities, relations, and 
so on for which the languages have signs  seem to the language-user natural and 
necessary parts of the world, and accounts of the world made with these 
languages  seem to be accounts of the world as it really is — but in fact, they are 
15 Many writers have come up with such theories, but Michel Foucault’s theory of “discourse” 
seems to have been the most important (Ashcroft et al. 83–85). The reason for this is likely that 
Edward Said made great use of Foucault’s theory in  Orientalism (McCarthy 47-55), one of the first 
works to put a constructivist theory of language to use making sense of Westerners’ writings 
about non-Western persons (Mongia 3–9). 
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only one possible way of making sense of the world. Values are a part of these 
languages too, so certain states and relations are seen as “naturally” better than 
others (Hall 26–35). Every person’s group of languages is different, so different 
opinions on what is “true” and “not-true,” or “right” and “not-right” are 
possible, and in fact common. But certain opinions are so completely fixed by the 
languages that the language-users are not conscious of having them: the 
existence of these states, qualities, and values are seen as facts of the world.   16
This, it is said, had an important effect when Westerners — the users of 
Western languages — made accounts of other parts of the world. In those places 
were users of completely different groups of languages, having very different 
experiences of the world. They had their own discussions of “true” and 
“not-true,” and “right” and “not-right,” but these were based on their “facts,” 
which were very different from the “facts” of Westerners. To the Western and 
non-Western language users, the other’s accounts of the world were strange: 
they seemed to be fictions, not accounts of the world as it really was. And, as the 
different groups had values based on their accounts of the world, their ways of 
living could seem not only strange, but “wrong.”  
Where the two groups had comparable amounts of power, this simply 
made discussions between them harder. But where Westerners had power over 
other groups of language-users, they not only did not have to make use of 
non-Western accounts of the world, they were able to make their own accounts 
more common. And, as Westerners saw non-Westerners as “worse” than 
themselves, it was not only possible, but necessary to take control of them and 
their lands. Once in control, Westerners were able to make even more detailed 
account of these persons and places. These accounts were “knowledge,” while the 
non-Westerners’ accounts of themselves and the world were not. In some places, 
Westerners were even able to make other groups of language users take up 
Western languages, for example, Western astronomy and geography, and by so 
16 It must be said that experience is only shaped by language, not fixed by it completely. 
Experience can make changes to language too, and so make “facts” into “opinions” (Gutting 
10–19). This, Homi Bhabha says, is the value of critical theory — making the “necessary” into the 
simply possible (45–56).  
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doing the non-Westerners’ ideas of the world were changed to be more like those 
of Westerners. In some places, they even came to see themselves as Westerners 
saw them — lesser persons (Barry 185–187). 
This was just what took place in the Cing Empire, whose persons had their 
own groups of languages, which gave them different “facts” of the world. The 
greater part of nineteenth-century Westerners saw Chinese accounts of the 
world as “false,” and many of their ways of living as “wrong.”  Colin Mackeras, 17
in  Western Images of China , says of this time: 
The rapid technological progress which resulted from the Industrial 
Revolution made most Westerners extremely sure of themselves and led 
them to look down on those they regarded as backward or inferior, who 
included the Chinese. The yardsticks of comparison, the criteria for 
judgement, were European. Many, even among their “friends,” were not 
sure whether the Chinese could rate as “civilised.” (65) 
 
To give just one example, “Chinese Medicine,” which is based on very different 
accounts of the human body than “Western medicine,” was seen by many 
Westerners as clearly false. Chinese accounts of the body may have been of some 
use in the past, but from the point of view of the Western languages — anatomy, 
chemistry, and so on — these Chinese accounts seemed worse than useless. Tao 
Feiya (Táo Fei-yà”) gives the details: 
The nineteenth century was the era of the triumphant advance of Western 
medical science. The development of the theories of cellular pathology 
and bacteriology provided more accurate explanations for the causes of 
disease. Research in chemistry brought the discovery of anesthesia and 
sterilizing chemicals, transforming external medicine and surgery into 
the forte of Western medicine. Developments in pharmacology spurred 
progress in the pharmaceutical industry. . . . Western medicine was seen 
as modern and scientific, while Chinese medicine was seen as traditional, 
unscientific, and even superstitious. (64–65) 
 
17 There is quite a lot of writing about Western opinions of the Chinese and Japanese in the 
nineteenth century and after. For overviews of Western opinions of the Chinese, see Jonathan 
Spence’s  Chan’s Great Continent , Raymond Dawson’s  Chinese Chameleon , and Colin Mackerras’ 
Western Images of China ; for the Japanese, see Hugh Cortazzi’s  Victorian’s in Japan , and Jean-Pierre 
Lehman’s  Image of Japan . 
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As in other places, some Westerners made attempts to get the Cing to make use 
of Western accounts of the world, and the Protestant missionaries were on the 
front lines of this battle. The ways of living that they would have the Cing take up 
— reading the Bible, praying, going to Church — were based on accounts of the 
world very different to anything then common in the Cing Empire. Naturally, it 
was possible to do these things without the “knowledge” on which they were 
based, but the missionaries did their best to see that every Churchgoer had at 
least some of the knowledge of the Church’s account of the world, and could say 
something about it when necessary. But for some missionaries, this was not 
enough. They were conscious of the connections between the different Chinese 
accounts of the world — science, medicine, and so on — and they were conscious 
too of the connections between the different Western accounts of the world. As 
Daniel Bays says: “one thing that the Protestant missions community continued 
to hold in common throughout the rest of the nineteenth century was the certain 
conviction that China needed not only Christ, but the norms of Western culture 
as well” (71). 
But Western power over the Cing Empire was far less complete than in 
other places. Westerners could make the Cing government do some things in a 
Western way — this was part of the reason for the “Opium Wars” — but never had 
the power to make great numbers of Cing persons take up Western accounts of 
the world. And for the most part, the Cing did not. In some ways, they were the 
mirror of the Westerners: they saw Western accounts of the world as strange and 
false, and Western ways of living as wrong. That they were happy to say as much 
to Westerners did not make Westerners’ opinion of them any better. Certainly 
there were Cing who saw value in “Western learning” (“Si-syuế”), and there were 
more who saw value in Western military technology, but even they did not 
necessarily see the connection between the Westerners’ technology and their 
accounts of the world — physics, chemistry, engineering, and so on (Kuo and Liu 
166–176). 
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On the Japanese islands, things were very different. From the start, 
Westerners had a better opinion of the Japanese than the Cing: quite by chance, 
Japanese ways of living were nearer to Western ways, and so were seen as 
“good,” or at least as “better” than the Cing. As Jean-Pierre Lehmann says in  The 
Image of Japan: 
Generally speaking . . . the Japanese received much more favourable 
treatment than would appear to have been meted out to most other 
non-Western peoples. No doubt part of the reason for this is that Japan 
was neither colonised nor defeated in a humiliating war (as the Chinese 
had been in the Opium war). Also, comparatively speaking, Japan had 
achieved a degree of prosperity and progress unparalleled in most 
non-European countries. Comparisons with China (numerous in view of 
the proximity of the two countries) tended to favour Japan. (45–46) 
 
It was a great help that the Japanese government saw value, or said they did, in 
Western ways. Their interest was chiefly in Western military technology, but 
unlike the Cing Government, purchasing it was not enough for the Japanese: it 
was their design to make their own arms, and they were conscious that they 
could not do this without a deep knowledge of the Western languages. And so, 
while the greater part of Cing persons, and Cing leaders, took little interest in the 
Westerners’ schools and books, the Japanese not only took advantage of these, 
but sent young men to the West for the purpose of learning more about Western 
accounts of the world. And while the Cing made only the smallest changes to 
their government, and only when the Western militaries made it necessary, the 
Japanese willingly re-made their government along Western lines (Beasley,  Rise 
84–101). 
As noted above, different opinions are possible within a group of language 
users. Some Westerners saw all things Western as better than all things Chinese 
or Japanese, and others saw certain Chinese or Japanese accounts of the world as 
“true,” or even better than Western accounts. But, in general, most Westerners 
saw their own accounts of the world as more true than Cing and Japanese 
accounts, and their own ways of living as “normal” or “right” in comparison to 
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Cing and Japanese ways. And, the nearer the Cing and Japanese came to doing 
things in a Western way, the better the opinion Westerners had of them. 
As will be seen, the missionaries in Tái-wan were very much a part of the 
group that made value judgements based on how nearly the Cing and Japanese 
were like Westerners. And this had an important effect on their accounts of the 
Cing-Japanese War and the Japanese-Táiwanese War in the  Church News and 
Monthly Messenger . 
 
WRITING ABOUT MISSIONARY PERIODICALS  
Writers of postcolonial theory have given their attention chiefly to Westerners’ 
making accounts of the non-Western world that were only “true” from a certain 
point of view, writers about the history of missionaries have given more 
attention their  purposely making accounts that were not true even to them. As 
Terry Barringer says in “From  Beyond Alpines Snows to  Homes of the East ,” 
“committees and editors back home were acutely aware of the need to rally 
supporters and encourage financial contributions. . . . Periodicals were used 
blatantly as a public relations tools” (169–170). And so, the accounts in 
missionary periodicals must be taken with care. 
For example, in  Missionary Encounters , David Arnold and Robert Bickers 
make the argument that missionary periodicals’ accounts of the non-Western 
world could be different not only from the accounts of the persons living there, 
but from the accounts that missionaries themselves sent to the periodical: 
As fund-raising organisations, mission societies distributed a great deal of 
publicity material, or printed propaganda. But the missionary letter 
reprinted and circulated as a pamphlet by a grassroots workers might be 
the product of several blue pencils and publicists’ rewrites. It is no sure 
guide to the thoughts of that individual, but it is sometimes the only 
surviving indicator of them. (4) 
 
Jeffrey Cox, in  The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700 , is in agreement with the 
above writers that “missionary societies seem to have regarded their periodicals 
as instruments of propaganda . . . ” (115), but also makes the point that the 
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missionaries did not necessary send in “true” accounts of their experiences and 
ideas in the first place. Missionaries, and especially the early nineteenth-century 
missionaries, were conscious that that public did not necessarily see their work 
as important, and that they had to make to make an argument for their teaching 
non-Western persons about the Churches’ ideas. To this end, they made use of 
“defamatory synecdoche” — making much of non-Westerners’ actions that were 
“wrong” in Western system of values, while saying little of the actions that were 
“right.” 
Not all missionaries did this, but in Cox’s view is was common enough that 
by the end of the nineteenth century even other Westerners saw missionary 
accounts as likely to be “false”:  
the rhetorical use of unflattering images, in an early nineteenth-century 
context, was almost always unfair, which is why missionaries gained a 
reputation in the early twentieth century for being ethnocentric cultural 
absolutists dedicated to the destruction of the cultures they were trying 
to convert. . . . Even as they in some ways invented the modern genre of 
ethnography, they were also attempting to find ways to defame foreign 
cultures for their own specific ends. (118–119) 
 
And there could be other reasons for giving “false” account of non-Western 
persons. In  Missions and Media , Felicity Jensz and Hanna Acke say that it was 
sometimes simply good business to do so: “sensationalism indeed sells, and 
missionary periodicals, like non-devotional religious tracts, were intended to 
reach large audiences as well as to be commercial [sic] viable” (9). The outcome 
of missionaries’ giving purposely “false” accounts of their experiences, and 
periodical editors purposely making these more “false,” was that the material in 
periodicals sometimes had more to do with the readers’ ideas of what the 
non-Western world should be like than the writers’ experiences of it. 
But in this work, there will be little discussion of the periodicals’ accounts 
being different from the missionaries “real” opinions. This is simply necessary: 
for one thing, is it often not clear what person or persons made a given piece of 
writing; for another, there is no way of seeing what the editors may have done to 
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the writings.  For the reasons given above, the opinions in the periodicals were 18
likely less complex than what the writers, editors, or readers would have said for 
themselves, but did not contradict their “real” opinions.  They are, in effect, a 19
mix of the missionaries’ and editors’ opinions. 
That being said, the mix of ideas is taken to be a bit different in the two 
periodicals: the accounts in the  Church News  are taken to be an even mix of the 
writers’ and editor’s opinion; and the accounts in the  Church News are taken to be 
chiefly the missionaries’ views, changed somewhat for the tastes of the 
Táiwanese readers. The reason for this is the different amount of power between 
writers, editors, and readers in the two periodicals. The position of the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s editor in the Presbyterian Church of England was not higher than 
that of the missionaries. If the missionaries did not like what was said about them 
in the periodical, they could, and would, have the Foreign Missions Committee do 
something about it.  But, the editors of the  Church News  were not simply a part of 20
the Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan, they were its leaders. As will be 
seen, one of the chief purposes of the  Church News  was teaching Churchgoers 
about the Church’s ideas, and Western accounts of the world more generally. 
Naturally, they could not simply say anything at all — the Táiwanese could give 
up on the Church at any time — but they were more free to give their own 






18 At this time, William Dale was the editor of the  Monthly Messenger , and William Ferguson the 
editor of the  Church News (Band 570, 134). But, it is unlikely that they did all the work themselves, 
and the periodicals are better taken as the work of an editor overseeing an unnamed group of 
writers. 
19 Some of the missionaries’ letters to the  Church News are still in existence, but many were 
damaged beyond the point of use in a V2 attack (Band ix–xi;  Guide 12). To the best of this writer’s 
knowledge, none of the letters to the  Church News are still in existence today. 
20 An example of this will be seen in Chapter 3. 
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WRITING ABOUT THE WARS 
While little attention has been given to the part of missionaries in the 
Cing-Japanese War — and what they said about it in their periodicals and 
elsewhere — a number of writers  have done work on other periodicals’ accounts 
of Wars. Interestingly, few of these openly make use of constructionist accounts 
of language, but their reasoning about why certain periodicals gave certain 
opinions has much in common with writings that do. For example, Jeffery 
Dorwart’s  The Pigtail War takes note of twenty American periodical’s accounts of 
the War, in order to make sense of “public attitudes and discussions of the War in 
the United States” (91). Based on these, Dorwart makes the argument that the 
American newspapers took the side of the Japanese, and that the reason for this 
was the Japanese government and military’s being nearer to Western ideas of 
what they should be: 
Assuming that Japan represented progress and a better world, most 
writers supported the island empire from the beginning. In a theme which 
recurred throughout the war, Americans equated Japan’s national 
experience with that of their own country and the Japanese people with 
their U.S. counterparts. . . . Though the Asian nation looked to an emperor 
for leadership, it had a constitution and representative form of 
government believed to be just like that in the United States. Even 
Japanese dress appeared strikingly familiar, as businessmen attired in 
Western suites and top hats hurried about the bustling cities. (92–93) 
 
The Cing were very different. In the American periodicals they were said to be 
“primitive, superstitious, corrupt, unprogressive, and the antithesis of their East 
Asian neighbor” (95). In other words, the writers of the American periodicals saw 
Western account of the world as “true” and Western ways of action as “right.” 
The Japanese had taken up many of these ways, but the Cing had not, and so the 
American writers, employing their Western “yardstick,” naturally saw the 
Japanese as the better of the two. 
Another such work is Kenneth Hough’s “The Brazen Throat of War,” 
which is based on the accounts of the War in four California newspapers. Like 
Dorwart, Hough makes the argument that the California newspapers were 
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strongly on the side of the Japanese, again by reason of their making greater use 
of Western ways: 
If the California press was quick to label China as the imminent loser of 
the Sino-Japanese War because of its ubiquitous corruption and 
ill-mannered militaries [sic], then it was just as swift in proclaiming Japan 
as the rightful victor because of it [sic] enlightened and modern 
attributes. From the beginning of the conflict, Japan was recurrently 
described as an advanced or advancing nation, one that, upon her first 
encounters with the West, had taken the lessons of modernisation to 
heart, and, unlike China, had committed herself to an extensive 
programme of Westernization. (51) 
 
But, Hough says that there was a dark side to this. To some in the U.S., the 
Japanese were still not Western enough in their ways of thought and action, and 
a Western military in the hands of a non-Western government was a dangerous 
thing: “China despite her size and once-great stature, was no longer the Asian 
nation to be feared. Japan had taken her place, and after the indignity handed 
her by Europe, might just be brimming for a fight” (144). And so, respect for the 
Japanese military would be the seed of twentieth-century anti-Japanese feeling in 
the U.S.  21
Other writers have given their attention to the Cing periodicals, where, 
they say, the opposite took place. Cing writers’ accounts of the Wars were based 
on Chinese accounts of the world and Chinese values, and so naturally these 
writers had very different opinions of the Wars. Weipin Tsai’s “First Casualty,” is 
interested in the accounts of the Cing-Japanese War in the Shàng-hǎi periodicals, 
but gives special attention to the competition between two of these, the  Shàng-hǎi 
News  [“Shen-bào”] and the  News [“Sin-wén-bào”]. Tsai makes note that the 
periodicals strongly took the Cing side. Nearly all their writings made us of the 
derogatory name “dwarves” (“wo”; “wo-rhén”) for the Japanese, and far from 
giving their approval to the modern arms and strategies put to use on the 
21 Alena Eskridge-Kosmach says that this was taking place in the Russian Empire even at the time 
of the Cing-Japanese War. But other writers say that the fear of the Japanese was not common in 
other Western countries till the Japanese-Russian War of 1905 (Klein, “Yellow Peril”; Lone 163; 
Owens 32–36).  
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Japanese side — and to a lesser degree on the Cing side — they went on about the 
value of the classical Chinese ways of war. For example, in the periodicals’ 
writings and picture: 
Chinese troops still appeared in traditional Qing military dress, they win 
battles through adopting ancient Chinese military tactics, such as an 
unexpected midnight attack spearheaded by an armoured herd of bulls. 
The Chinese woodblock images reflect strong beliefs and expectations 
among the Chinese public, and these sentiments are precisely what we see 
reflected in the competition between  Shenbao [Shen-bào] and  Xinwenbao 
[Sin-wén-bào]. (161) 
 
Chén Jhong-chún’s “Research into Newspaper and Public Opinion on the 1895 
Resistance to the Cession of Tái-wan” (“Bào-kan Yú-lùn yǔ Yǐ-wéi Fǎn Ge-Tái 
Dòu-jheng Yán-jiòu”) takes up the story of what was said in the  Shen-bào about 
the Japanese-Táiwanese War. This war was widely seen as “illegal” in the West, 
and simply a way for the Cing Government to keep control of the island after 
legally giving it up to the Japanese. But the  Shen-bào ’s accounts of the War were 
from the point of view of Chinese political theory, in which the Táiwanese were 
doing a good thing. as Chén says: 
praising the courage and great deeds of the Táiwanese resisting the 
Japanese, and comparing them to the Mainlanders’ uninterrupted defeats 
by the Japanese, they said that the outcome of a war rested not on the size 
of the country, but the determination of the people to resist . . . 
zàn-yáng Tái-mín kàng-rhiì de ̊yǒng-cì hàn gong-jí, bǐ-jiào dà-lù duèi 
Rhiì-jyun jiế-jiế bài-tùei, kě-jiàn jhàn-jheng de ̊shèng-fù, bù zài dì jhii 
dà-siǎo, ér zài mín-jhòng de ̊kàng-dí jyuế-sin . . . (48–49) 
 
Things were no different in other parts of the Cing Empire. In “Siang-gǎng’s 
Reaction to the Jiá-wǔ War” (“Jiá-wǔ Jhàn-jheng Shií-ci [1894–1895] Siang-gǎng 
de ̊Fǎn-yìng”; brackets in original), Lǐ Jin-ciáng makes note that the writers of the 
Chinese Daily (“Huà-ziì Rhiì-bào”) said from start to end that the Cing Empire was 
in the right, and that the cause of the War had been the Japanese “coveting gain 
and neglecting rightness, taking no account of the country’s or people’s good” 
(“tan lì wàng yì, wǎng-gù gúo-jì mín-sheng”; 15). And so it was in the view of 
20
Chinese political theory, in which the master-vassal relations between the Cing 
and Joseon were simply the natural order of things. As such, the only good 
outcome to the War would be the Cing overcoming the Japanese, putting the 
world back in order. 
The above writers have given their attention chiefly to the writings in 
Cing newspapers, but Judith Frölich’s “Pictures of the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894–1895” takes account of of the pictures from two periodicals: the Cing 
Empire’s  Illustrated Lithographer (“Diǎn-shií-jhai Huà-bào”), and the Japanese 
Empire’s  Cing-Japanese War Illustrated  (“Nisshin Sensō Gahō”). Frölich says that the 
two periodicals pictures make “their” soldiers out to be better than their enemy, 
which they do using the languages of their different sorts of art. But, only the 
Japanese were able to make Westerners see their soldiers in this way too. The 
reason for this was that the pieces in the Cing periodicals made use of the usual 
language of Chinese woodblocks, of which most Westerners could make no sense, 
and which in any case was out of keeping with their values —  for example, Tsai’s 
“armoured herd of bulls.” But the pictures in the Japanese periodicals made use 
of a mix of the Western and Japanese languages of art, and had a great effect on 
the Westerners who saw them. In Frölich’s words, they “adopted more of the 
available discourses significant in the West at the end of the nineteenth century, 
which ultimately lead not only to the military victory of Japan but also to its 
victory in the ‘picture war’” (215). 
One cannot say anything about such writings without taking note of Sarah 
Paine’s  The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 — still the the most complete work on 
periodicals’ accounts of the War. Paine’s book takes account of twenty-three 
periodicals in seven languages — English, French, German, Russian, Japanese, and 
“Literary Chinese ” (“Wén-yán-wén”). Based on these, Paine makes the argument 
that the Cing-Japanese War was the cause of a great change in Westerners’ 
“images” of the Japanese Empire: 
In the space of one year, the Western image changed from perceiving 
Japan primarily as an insignificant land populated by horticulturists, 
rickshaw drivers, trinket makers, and geishas. Suddenly, the Western 
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press started regularly referring to it as a great power and one belonging 
to that very select club of the so-called “civilized nations.” (19) 
 
In short, in their fighting and their ruling of the lands they took, the actions of 
the Japanese had been “good”; that is to say, like those of a Western country at 
war. Like enough, in fact, that many Westerners were now ready to say that the 
Japanese were “civilised.” Meantime, the Cing Empire had done things in their 
own ways, which were very different from the ways of Western countries, and 
had got the worst of the War besides. And so, the Western image of the Cing 
Empire, which had never been very good, got even worse. 
The accounts of the War in the  Church News and  Monthly Messenger had 
much in common with these noted above. But, they were not completely the 
same. The purpose and interests of the missionary periodicals, which had 
purposes and interests somewhat different to the greater-sized newspapers, and 




In the above sections it was seen that there are bodies of writing about the 
relations between language and value, general periodicals accounts of the 
Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War, and missionary periodicals’ 
account of non-Western places; but that none of these take account of the 
writings in the  Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China and the  Dāi-lám Capital Church 
News . The work is a comparison of these periodicals’ accounts of the Wars, and by 
so doing makes an addition to all three groups of writings. Before coming to the 
end of this chapter, it may be best to go over three tests at the heart of this work, 
and make clear their relation to these fields of knowledge: 
(1)  Were the periodicals neutral in the War? As Sarah Paine and Lǐ Jin-ciáng 
have noted, at the start of the Cing-Japan War many Western periodicals, even 
the ones made in the Cing Empire, were neutral, seeing no outcome as clearly 
better than another. But most Cing periodicals, even those made by Westerners, 
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were of the opinion that the Japanese Empire was in the wrong, and that the 
Japanese being overcome by the Cing would be a good outcome. As the War went 
on, and the Japanese military kept getting the better of the Cing, many Western 
periodicals gave their support to the Japanese, but the Cing periodicals were on 
the side of the Cing Empire to the War’s end. The  Monthly Messenger was a British 
periodical made by and for British persons; the  Church News a Cing periodical 
made by British persons for Cing persons. The question, then, is did they take the 
same sides as other Western and Cing periodicals? This work makes the 
argument that that the  Monthly Messenger and  Church News were more like 
Western periodicals: they were neutral at the start of the War, but by the end 
were on the side of the Japanese. 
(2)  What were the periodicals’ opinions of the Cing, Japanese, and Tái-wan? As 
seen above, nineteenth-century Westerners had in general a better opinion of the 
Japanese than the Chinese. There were two reasons for this: Japanese ways of 
living were nearer to Western ways, and the Japanese had been quicker to take 
up Western accounts of the world, and even to remake their country along 
Western lines. But the greater part of Cing had a very bad opinion of the Japanese 
even before they took up Western ways; and an even worse one when they were 
remaking themselves to be more like the Western “barbarians” (Paine 99-100). 
This had a great effect on what was said about the Cing and Japanese in Western 
and Cing periodicals. So, which way did the  Monthly Messenger  and  Church News 
go? Here again, the two periodicals were more like the Western periodicals than 
Cing: in the War, they gave a better opinion of the Japanese than the Cing. But, as 
will be seen, the ways they did this were somewhat different. 
(3)  What effect did they say that the War would have on the Churches? It must 
be kept in mind that the  Monthly Messenger and  Church News were not newspapers. 
They did have news from around the world, but were chiefly tools for giving 
accounts of Church events. As such, their interest in the War was different from 
general periodicals. So, how did this make their accounts of the War different 
from general periodicals? It will be seen here that the periodicals gave space to 
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the question of what effect the War would have on the Churches. And, that they 
were of the opinion the Wars would be good for the Cing and Táiwanese 
Churches. In their view, there was a connection between the commonness of 
Western ways, and the growth of the Churches; and the Wars would make 
Western ways commoner in the Cing Empire and Tái-wan. 
Apart from making an addition to our knowledge of writing about the 
Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War, this work makes use of a new 
system for giving accounts of the periodicals writings. One of the troubles with 
writing about periodicals’ accounts of something is that the relations between 
the material in the periodicals and the writers’ general statements is often 
unclear. So, for example, in “What Mrs Jellyby Might Have Read,” Terry 
Barringer, after a long quotation from the  Children’s Missionary Record in 
Connection with the Church of Scotland about the “bloodthirsty savage” in Africa, 
says of the writing in children’s missionaries periodicals, “By the end of the 
century, the tone had softened . . .” (50). But Barringer gives none of the details 
behind this general statement. For this statement to be of any use, it is necessary 
to have an idea, at a very least, of what makes the “tone” of a piece of writing 
“soft” or “not-soft.” Such troubles, of which there will be more discussion in 
Chapter 3 are common in writings about periodicals accounts Cing-Japanese War 
and Japanese-Táiwanese War. In this work is a new way of giving the amount of 
writing of different sorts in periodicals, which, if taken up more generally, will be 
a great help in making clearer writing about accounts of the Wars. 
The structure of this work is as follows. Chapter 2 is an overview of the 
history of Protestant missions to the Cing Empire, the place of periodicals in 
these, and how the Presbyterian Church of England, and the Presbyterian Church 
in Southern Tái-wan, were like and unlike the Empire’s other Churches and 
missions. Chapter 3 is an account of the system by which the two periodicals’ 
writings answer put into groups of different sorts, and makes clear why this is 
better way of writing about the Wars than the general statements in others 
writings. The three middle chapters take up the questions given above: Chapter 4 
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is about the question of the missionary periodicals’ neutrality; Chapter 5 is about 
their opinions of the Cing and Japanese; and Chapter 6 is about their view of the 
Churches’ future after the Wars. Chapter 7 makes clear the relation between the 
theory in Chapter 1 and the material in the middle chapters, and makes some 
suggestions for future work. 
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2 — Protestant missionary writing for and about the Cing 
Empire 
 
The  Monthly Messenger and  Church News were far from the only periodicals of their 
sorts. In the many parts of the Western world, Churches put out monthly and 
even weekly periodicals, and some of these gave news of overseas missions. 
Periodical-making was not as common in the Cing Empire’s Churches, but the 
Churches that did make periodicals got a good amount of power through these. 
The reason was that there were few periodicals in the Cing Empire at all, and so 
missionary periodicals were one of the chief ways Cing persons, even if they were 
not themselves churchgoers, got accounts of goings-on in other countries. While, 
the Western and Cing periodicals had somewhat different purposes, but they had 
one in common — supporting the missions. As such, it is important to have an 
idea of how Protestant Churches and missions came to have periodicals in the 
first place, what hopes they had for these, and how they went about seeing that 
these hopes came true. 
This chapter first gives a history of Protestant missions to the Cing 
Empire. This is done in three parts: 1807–1843, before the “First British-Cing 
War”; 1843–1860, between the British-Cing Wars; and 1860–1895, after the 
“Second British-Cing War.” Those reason for these groups is that the Treaties by 
which the two Wars came to their ends were the causes of great changes to the 
conditions of missionary work, and so the nature of that work was different in 
the three periods. The Chapter then gives an overview of Western Church and 
missionary periodicals. This too is done in three parts. There is first a discussion 
of what missionary periodicals did, then more detailed discussions of their two 
most important purposes: giving news of the missions, and making money for the 
missions. The Chapter then gives a short history of Church periodicals in the Cing 
Empire. It goes through the different sorts of periodicals made from 1813 to 1895, 
and what they did for the missions, then gives a short overview of their 
competition — Cing newspapers and other periodicals. Last, the Chapter gives an 
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account of the two periodical of interest here, the  Monthly Messenger and  Church 
News . It goes quickly through their histories and purposes, and gives examples of 
their organisation, and the sorts of writing they had in 1895. 
 
PROTESTANT MISSIONS IN THE CING EMPIRE 
Early Days, 1807–1842 
In 1807, the London Missionary Society sent Robert Morrison to the Cing Empire. 
Morrison was hardly the first Westerner to go to there, but he was the first 
Protestant missionary, and for five years the only one. But, more and more 
Protestant Churches were taking an interest in Missions, and more and more 
Mission societies were coming into existence. Before long, some of these took an 
interest in the Cing Empire too, and by 1839 some fifty Protestant missionaries 
had been sent there. But few stayed for long: sickness sent many back to their 
countries, or to an early death, while others quickly gave up on the work. 
The work itself was very limited, for in those days only two parts of the 
Cing Empire were open to Westerners: the city of Ào-mén (“Macau”), which was 
under the Kingdom of Portugal’s control, and a little part of the city of 
Guǎng-jhou (“Canton”), where Western traders did business. If a Westerner went 
outside of these places, the Cing government could send them away, or put them 
to death. Even in Ào-mén and Guǎng-jhou, teaching about Protestant ideas was 
against the law. The Portuguese let some Roman Catholic mission work take 
place in Ào-mén, but they would not let the Protestants do any of their own. And, 
while the open part of Guǎng-jhou was under the control of Western traders, 
some of whom were Protestant, they were conscious of the Cing laws, and would 
not put their business agreements in danger. It was not that the traders did 
nothing, but what help they gave had its limits: for example, the British East 
India Company gave Robert Morrison help getting a language teacher, and let 
him make use of their presses for printing his dictionaries and grammars; but the 
printing of his tracts and Bibles had to be done somewhere else (Bays 43–44; Daily 
107–109; Rowe 138–148). 
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In the face of all this, the early Protestant missionaries did what they 
could. Some gave their attention to the languages of the Empire: at that time, 
there was little material for learning any of the Chinese languages, so some 
missionaries made dictionaries and grammars, hoping that future missionaries 
might have less trouble with language learning. Others made tracts and Bibles in 
one or more of the Chinese languages, then sent these writings outside of 
Ào-mén and Guǎng-jhou in the hands of Cing helpers: their hope was that simply 
reading God’s word would be enough to get Cing persons into a church. And still 
others simply took their chances, and went into the Empire. 
But to a number of missionaries it seemed that the best thing they could 
do was give up on the Cing Empire for the time being. There were many Chinese 
living in other parts of East Asia, and some missionaries went to do mission work 
among them. For example, William Milne, the L.M.S.’s second missionary in the 
Cing Empire, only did three years work there before going to Melaka (“Malacca”), 
were there were many Chinese persons. The idea was that the overseas Chinese 
could take the message where the missionaries could not, and that the 
experience of working with them would be of use when and if the Cing Empire 
was ever open to mission work (Bays 43–46; Daily 154; Rowe 137–138).  
 
Between the Wars, 1842–1860 
The missionaries were in time able to do their work in other parts of the Cing 
Empire. This was done with the help of the very persons who had to that point 
given so little support to Mission work — the Western traders. For a long time the 
traders had had trouble with their Cing counterparts. Many Cing goods were of 
interest to Westerners: silks, spices, porcelain, and above all — tea; but, nearly 
the only things that the Cing would take in trade were silver and opium. There 
was at least a great need for opium — by the end of the nineteenth century, some 
ten percent of Cing persons would be opium users; but opium use was against 
Cing law, and the government was more and more unhappy about Westerners 
sending it into the Empire (Crossley,  History 240). 
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By 1839, they had had enough: Cing government representatives were 
sent to Guǎng-jhou, where they took the Western traders’ opium, and put it to 
flame. Word of this soon got to the United Kingdom, whose government sent its 
navy to put a blockade on the Cing Empire until some agreement between the 
governments could be made. The Cing would not have limits put on their trade, 
so sent their own navy to make an attack on the U.K. ships. The U.K.’s answer was 
war. For three years the two countries made war off, and sometimes on, the Cing 
Empire’s southern edge. But in the end, the British military was able to take 
control of Guǎng-jhou and Shàng-hǎi, two of the Empire’s most important cities, 
and the Cing Empire had to make peace. In 1843 the two powers signed the 
“Treaty of Nán-jing” (Beeching 23–163; Rowe 167–170). 
Among other things, the treaty opened five cities to Westerners: Fú-jhou, 
Guǎng-jhou, Shàng-hǎi,  Ê -mńg, and Níng-bó. This was the chance for which the 
missionaries had been waiting. Many who had been working among the Chinese 
in other parts of Asia came back to the Empire, and many new missionaries were 
sent out East. They all took up their work in the newly opened cities, the “Treaty 
Ports.” But having at last got into the Cing Empire, the missionaries now had to 
get the Cing to take an interest in the Churches. The trouble was that the 
Protestant account of the world was very different from the accounts common in 
the Cing Empire; getting Cing persons to take it seriously, much less take up a 
way of living based on this account, was not a simple thing. 
The missionaries went about doing this in a number of ways. Some went 
around the Treaty Ports giving spoken accounts of their church’s ideas to anyone 
they came across. Others made schools, where Cing persons could get an 
education: the idea was that learners would come for the free education, but get 
interested by the Church teachings which came with it. Still others made 
hospitals, where they put their Western medical knowledge to use healing the 
Cing persons’ sicknesses. Even so, for many missionaries the old idea that reading 
God’s word might by itself be enough was still strong. These missionaries gave 
their time to making Bibles and tracts in the common language of whatever part 
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of the Empire they were working. But the missionaries were still not completely 
happy. for the people of their five cities were but a small part of the Cing Empire. 
And so, some missionaries did what they could to get knowledge of the churches 
to persons in the closed parts of the Empire. They sent Bibles, tracts, and others 
church materials into the heartland in the hands of their helpers, and in the 
company of the missionaries own prayers; but it would still have been better to 
go themselves (Bays 47–52; Rowe 172–173). 
 
Into the Heartland, 1860–1895 
Their chance for this soon came. In 1856 the Cing government took some 
persons, who were said to be pirates, from a ship with a U.K. flag. This act, the 
U.K.’s representatives said, was against the rules of the Treaty of Nán-jing. The 
Cing said differently, and before long the argument was a war. Things again went 
badly for the Cing, and after the loss of more cities, including their capital, they 
had to again make peace with the British. The “Treaty of Tian-jin,” and the 
“Běi-jing Convention,” were important developments for the Cing Churches, for 
among other things they made all of the Empire open to Westerners (Beeching 
206–331; Li 83–88; Rowe 190–193). 
The missionaries were quick to make their way into the heartland, were 
they went to work making new churchgoers. There were a number of different 
theories about how best to do this, which were based on their earlier work in the 
Treaty Ports  — where, naturally, some of the missionaries went on working. 
Different churches and missions had different ideas about the right combination 
of ways, but nearly all of them made use of one or more of the following: 
(1) Preaching — Some missionaries would go from place to place giving 
spoken accounts of their church’s ideas, sometimes to great groups of persons at 
temples or in the open, other times to small groups in homes. But, to do this well, 
it was necessary to have a very good knowledge of one or more Chinese 
languages, and a number of missionaries said that this sort of work was best 
given to Cing churchgoers. 
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(2) Writing — Nearly all churches made some use of Chinese-language 
tracts, books, or periodicals, and writing these was the chief work some 
missionaries did. Others gave their time to accounts of the Chinese languages, 
which would be of use to new missionaries in their language learning. And still 
others did work on making new and better translations of the Bible. To do this, it 
was necessary to have an even better knowledge of the Chinese languages, as 
they did not have words for certain ideas, such as “spirit,” “soul,” and even 
“God,” without which making a translation of the Bible would not be possible 
(Chan; Zetzsche 82–90). 
(3) Education — Many churches had free or low-cost schools. These could 
be for very young persons, adults, or any group in between. The education itself 
was often a mix of Chinese and Western accounts of the world. For example, a 
learner might get teaching in the Chinese “Classics”  — a good knowledge of 
which could get a person a government position — as well as Western science. 
Giving this non-Church teaching was the only way to get non-churchgoers into 
the schools, but the schools’ purpose was naturally to make those person into 
churchgoers, and so teaching about “right and wrong,” the existence of the 
“soul,” and so on were based on the Church’s own accounts of these things (Bays 
69–70). 
(4) Medical Work — Some churches gave out free or low-cost medical care. 
This could be as simple as a single missionary doing tooth extractions when out 
preaching, or as complex as a hospital where Western doctors did surgeries 
impossible for Cing doctors. Apart from their good works, the purpose of these 
hospitals was to give sick persons some preaching with their healing, and to 
make clear that Western medicine, based on Western accounts of the world, was 
better than what the Chinese had (Tao 68–70). 
The above works had the hoped-for effect, and the number of Cing 
churchgoers went up and up. Even so, the growth of the Cing Churches was never 
quite quick enough for the Western Churches and mission organisations. There 
were a number of reasons for its being slow. Maybe the most important was that 
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to be part of a church, one had to give up many ways of living that were “normal” 
for most Cing persons, such as working on a Sunday, going to the temples, and 
giving money for certain village or city events; and this could put one at odds 
with one’s neighbours (Lutz 204–211). For example, in some places it was normal 
to give gifts to the “spirits” (“shén-míng”), normally unseen beings who 
nonetheless could give help or do damage to persons and things. To a Cing 
person who had taken on the Protestant account of the world, there was no 
reason to give the spirits anything: the Western God had more power than the 
Chinese spirits, and could keep the person safe. But, to that person’s neighbours, 
who still kept to their Chinese accounts of the world, the Western God was 
nothing, and by not giving those usual gifts to the spirits, the churchgoer was 
putting not only themselves, but the every person in the village in danger. 
In short, to be a churchgoers, one had to do damage to one’s relations 
with a great many persons, maybe even one’s family (Bays 77–79). But some 
persons were taken enough with with what the missionaries said to take this 
chance, and by 1890, there were some 37,287 churchgoers across the Empire 
( Records 735). 
 
WRITING FOR THE SUPPORTERS 
As seen above, the Cing Empire’s first Protestant churches were started by 
Western missionaries. But these missionaries did not get out to the Cing Empire 
on their own. The greater part of them were sent by Churches and missionary 
societies in the West, from whom the missionaries got money and support for as 
long as they were working in the Empire. Besides giving the missionaries 
payment for their work, the Churches had to give them money for purchasing 
the tools of the their trade: medical tools for the hospitals, printing presses for 
the publishing houses, buildings for churches, and so on. And so, the sending 
organisations had to have money coming in regularly, so they could go on giving 
it out regularly to their missionaries and “their” Churches. 
32
This money came from Churchgoers in the West, but they would not give 
money to a cause of which they had no knowledge. And so, many Churches and 
missionary societies regularly put out accounts of their mission work in different 
sorts of publications, like books, pamphlets, and periodicals. These periodicals 
had a number of purposes, but the most important was get Churchgoers to give 
money to the missions. The Churchgoers would do this only if they had the idea 
that the money would be put to good use, and they would go on doing it only if 
they had the idea that their last gift  had been put to good use. So in addition to 
whatever work they were doing for the Cing Churches, many missionaries in the 
Cing Empire had to regularly send accounts of their work to the Churches and 
missionary organisations in the West.  
Likely the editors and missionaries were all conscious that the missions 
could do their work only as long as people went on giving them money, but they 
sometimes had different opinions on how this could best be achieved. Accounts 
that would make the readers give money were not necessary the same as 
accounts that were “true” accounts of goings-on in the mission field. As will be 
seen, this had some important effects for the writing in nineteenth-century 
missionary periodicals. 
 
An Overview of Missionary Periodicals 
There were Protestant Church periodicals well before there were Protestant 
missions to the non-Western world, and as soon as such missions were in 
existence, the Church periodicals had news of them. But it was not till the very 
end of the eighteenth century that there were periodicals whose chief purpose 
was giving news of overseas missions (Jensz, “Origins” 237–238). The number of 
Churches with overseas missions, and missionary organisations, went up quickly 
in the nineteenth century, and as it did, so too did the number of missionary 
periodicals. While some Churches, like the Plymouth Brethren, had overseas 
missions and no missionary periodical, this was quite unusual: the greater part of 
missionary organisations or church had at least one missionary periodical, and 
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some had more than one. In fact, by some counts, over 500 different periodicals 
were started between 1800 and 1960 (even if many were not around for long; Cox 
114–115). 
When Churches or missionary organisations had more than one 
periodical, the reason was normally that they were made for different groups of 
readers. For example, the Religious Tract Society put out three:  The Religious Tract 
Society Reporter , a general periodical having news of many things, missions among 
them;  Women’s Magazine , a periodical having mission news for women; and  Boy’s 
Own Paper , a periodical having mission news for boys, and in language for young 
persons (Tiedemann 206). Having these three sorts of periodicals was in no way 
unusual: in fact, after general purpose missionary periodicals, periodicals made 
specially for women, or made specially for young persons, were the next most 
common sorts. 
Whoever their readers, the periodicals’ range of interests could be wide or 
narrow. Some, like the China Inland Mission’s  China’s Millions , had chiefly news of 
their organisation’s own work, while others, like the  Pictorial Mission News , gave 
news about the work of many different missions. And, while some missionary 
periodicals’ material was all to do with one mission field, others had material 
about many different fields. For example, the Anglican Church had missions in 
many places, and had many periodicals for these:  The Gleaner had accounts of the 
many different Anglican missons, but  The Land of Sinim had accounts only of 
Anglican missions to the northern Cing Empire (Barringer, “What” 47). 
While missionary periodicals could give news from all over the world, 
which was put together from many letters, the periodicals themselves were often 
quite small organisations. Many were the work of only one editor, who had little 
or no money for writers. But, however great the number of persons making the 
periodical, and however wide the periodicals’ interests, their reading material 
came chiefly from the same places. Naturally, the editors of the periodicals did a 
good amount of writing themselves, but they also had material sent in by 
missionaries, church leaders, and churchgoers. And if they did not have enough 
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of this by the end of the month, they sometimes simply took material from other 
missionary periodicals, or even newspapers. 
But the best material came from a church’s own missionaries in the field. 
Some of this was specially made for the periodicals, but some of it, like lectures, 
pictures, letters, and yearly reports, was made for other purposes, then given a 
new one in the periodical’s pages. The missionaries were conscious of this: they 
would sometimes send writing specially for the purpose of going in the 
periodical, and they would sometimes say in their letters that they did not want 
some piece of writings put to this use. For example, Thomas Barclay, of the 
Presbyterian Church of England’s “South Formosa Mission,” said in one letter to 
the Church’s Foreign Missions Committee “Excuse the length to which this letter 
has run on. I need scarcely point out that very little, if any, is suited for 
publication” (letter to Matheson). 
But wherever they got their material, the periodicals’ editors had two 
purposes in mind when putting together a given month’s issue: first, giving the 
readers news about the missions; and second, making readers give money to the 
missions. Seeing to these two purposes was not necessarily simple, and doing 
them at the same time could be very hard (Barringer, “What” 48; Jensz and Acke 
9). 
 
Giving News of the Missions 
Naturally, a periodical was of no use if it had no readers, so it was very important 
that the periodicals have stories that would be of interest to the churchgoers. But 
coming up with such stories was sometimes no easy matter. The missionaries 
regularly sent in accounts of their work, but these were sometimes of little use to 
the editor. There were a number of reasons for this. Sometimes the material in 
the missionaries’ account was simply too much for the gentle Western reader to 
take in. Accounts of actions that were, by the Church’s system of values, violent 
or sexual “sins” were sometimes present in the missionaries’ writing about their 
work, but these were kept out of the periodicals. For example, Thomas Barclay, in 
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one of his letters to the editor of the  Monthly Messenger , gave an account of one of 
their theological students being engaged to a woman who was not a Churchgoer: 
The girl turned out to be altogether unsuited for a preacher's wife. The 
mother probably came to know that we would not be sorry to see it broke 
off, and being a heathen probably urged the young man to intercourse, so 
as to make drawing back impossible. At any rate he fell, though he 
continued to deny it until the birth of his child . . . It is the third fall of a 
student since my return less than two years ago. (letter to Dale)  
 
But in the  Monthly Messenger , nothing was said about these “falls.” There, if 
anything bad was said about the Táiwanese churchgoers at all, it was very 
general, giving no details of the trouble. This way of writing about missions was 
common in missionary periodicals. As Andrew Porter, writing about Scottish 
missions to India, says: “the information available at home about the realities of 
missionary enterprise was sorted, censored and sanitized for consumption by the 
majority in the churches. Missionary publication became an art form in its own 
right. It was often bland and comfortable, often remote from reality because of 
the conflicting interests it attempted to reconcile” (45). 
Editors more commonly had a different sort trouble with the accounts 
that the missionaries sent them — they were not interesting. It was the nature of 
missionary work to go over the same ground again and again  — physically, in 
their journeys, and mentally, in their teaching about the the Churches’ accounts 
of the world, for a great amount of this teaching was of “facts” about the world 
that would have been clear to the youngest Western churchgoer. And quite a lot 
of the missionaries’ time to went to went to the business of keeping accounts, 
making translations, and other such actions that made for uninteresting reading. 
These “prosaic accounts of institution building” may have been “true,” but they 
were of little interest to churchgoers hoping for stories of missionaries bravely 
doing battle with the forces of Satan (Cox 116–117). Campbell Moody, another 
missionary to Tái-wan, made note in one of his books that the work of 
missionaries was not at all like many Western persons’ idea of it, and in some 
ways was exceptionally  un likely to be of interest to them: 
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As regards news from abroad, it ought to be understood that remarkable 
events are not occuring every day, and one must not look for an 
ever-flowing stream of curious facts and fresh ideas . . . People forget the 
monotony and dreariness and prose of life in a Heathen land, and “the 
numbing influence of heathenism” and thus they are surprised when 
Christ’s ambassadors prove tedious in public speech, and even appear to 
have dull, narrow, stunted minds. (228) 
 
The editors of the missionary periodicals were conscious of this, but they could 
only make these points to the readers so many times before the readers simply 
gave up on the periodical. They had, or so it seemed to them, to give the reader 
what they were after, and they did this in a number of ways. One was to simply 
take material from other places: if the missionary of one church sent in an 
interesting enough piece of writing, it might be reprinted in many different 
Churches’ missionary periodicals. Another, maybe more common, way of getting 
the right sort of material was rewriting when the missionary had sent in: with 
the right cuts and additions, even the most “prosaic” account could be made 
interesting. The missionaries were conscious that this took place, and were not 
necessarily happy about it. As Emily Moffat, an L.M.S. missionary to the North 
Ndebele said: 
There is so much bosh written and printed . . . so much that is calculated 
to mislead minds and to give the wrong impressions, that I am disgusted 
over and over again, while I feel I may do the very same thing myself. The 
editor’s pencil, identifying those passages that are fit for publication, can 
still be seen on many letters from the field. On one occasion he even 
writes “on no account publish this.” (qtd. in Barringer “From  Beyond 
Alpine Snows ” 170) 
 
But there was little that the missionaries could to about it. Overseas missions 
were not free: the missionaries had to be given payment, places for living, and 
material for doing their work; and some Western churches gave other sorts of 
support to overseas churches too, such as money for schools, hospitals, or 
workers. The money for these things came from the Churchgoers, and if the 
Churchgoers had no interest in the work of a mission, then that mission could 
not do its work for long. 
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Making Money for the Missions 
So this was the other purpose of missionary periodicals — giving readers the 
feeling that their money was being put to good use. To do this, the missionary 
and editor had to come up with the right balance of stories about the work of the 
missionaries, and the needs of the overseas churches. The trouble was this: if the 
missionaries said that things were going very badly for them — for example, that 
there was a loss of interest in the Church  — the Churchgoers in the West might 
get the idea that their money was not being put to good use, and not give any 
more. But if the missionary said that everything was going well for the mission  — 
for example, that there was a great amount of new interest in its teachings — the 
Western Churchgoers might see no reason to give more money: why should they 
when the Mission was doing well enough with what it had (Jensz and Acke 
10–11)? The editors were clearly in a better position than the missionaries to 
make decisions about what sorts of stories would keep the Churchgoers giving. 
And so, as with keeping the missionaries’ story interesting, the editors 
sometimes made changes to the missionaries writing, to make sure that the 
Churchgoers had the feeling that their money was not going to waste. 
The danger here, was that the editors might go farther with their 
statements than the missionary themselves would have done. For example, the 
Presbyterian , the Presbyterian Church of England’s weekly periodical, at one time 
said that Campbell Moody — he of the “numbing influence of heathenism” — was 
doing great things in the Jiāng-ho a part of Tái-wan. Thomas Barclay quickly sent 
a letter saying that it was not so:  
I was very sorry to see that the Report of the Synod meeting in the 
“Presbyterian” makes Mr. Moody say that the Chianghoa region is 
‘saturated’ with Christianity. I hope Mr. Moody did not say 
anything that would give even the appearance of justification to 




But, here again the important thing was to keep the money coming. And not 
every missionary was as interested in giving the “truth” of their situation as 
Thomas Barclay. Some of them sent accounts specially designed to be interesting 
to their readers, even if some “defamatory synedoche” or other changes were 
necessary to make them so (Cox 116–117). Even so, and for all the editors’ 
attempts make the readers to give money, they often did not have enough for the 
periodical itself to make a profit. In fact, many missionary periodicals were made 
at a loss to the Churches and mission organisations, so that their missions could 
be kept going (Barringer, “What”). But at this at least, the missionary periodicals 
seem to have done well, for the number of overseas Protestant Churches, and the 
missionaries working at them, kept going up through the nineteenth century. 
 
WRITING FOR THE CING 
As noted in the section before last, to get people interested in their ideas, the 
Cing Churches and their missionaries made use of many tools, such as preaching, 
teaching, and healing. Another common tool was writing: nearly all Churches 
gave out tracts and Bibles, and many put out monthly periodicals as well. In some 
ways these were very like the periodicals of the missionaries’ own churches in 
the West. This should not be a surprise: few of the missionaries had any 
experience in publishing, but most of them had seen Church and missionary 
periodicals in their own countries. But in other ways, the Western and Cing 
periodicals were necessarily very different. The Western Church periodicals and 
missionary periodicals were made for persons whose ideas of the world were 
much the same as the periodical-makers’ — persons who had been part of a 
Church for many years, and for whom the Church’s account of the world was not 
an “account,” but “knowledge.” But the Cing periodicals were made for persons 
who were newly conscious of this account of the world, and may have had little 
idea of its details. 
Another way in which they were different was Western Church 
periodicals’ and missionary periodicals’ having a far narrower group of interests 
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than their Cing counterparts. The reason was that there were many other 
periodicals in the West, and the missionary periodicals were in competition with 
newspapers and the like for the readers’ attention. To get readers at all, the 
missionary periodicals had to do something that the other periodicals were not 
doing. But in the Cing Empire, at least at first, there were no other periodicals at 
all, and the best way to get readers’ interest was to do a bit of everything. So it 
was necessary for Cing Church periodicals to do things that a Western Church 
periodical would not have done, such as giving accounts of Western science, and 
of political events in other countries. But the Church and mission periodicals 
would not have the Cing Empire to themselves for long. Cing and Western 
business-persons quickly came to see that there was money to be made in 
periodicals, and by the end of the nineteenth century the missionary periodicals 
had quite a lot of competition for readers.  
 
Church Periodicals, 1807–1838 
Protestant Missionaries made use of periodicals from the very start of their work 
in the Cing Empire. For some, like Robert Morrison and William Milne of the 
London Missionary Society, publishing was an important part of their theory of 
mission. But for others, there was simply little else they could do: as noted above, 
in the early days of Protestant missions to the Cing Empire, going outside of 
Ào-mén and a small part of Guǎng-jhou, was unsafe; and openly doing mission 
work of any sort was unwise. So some missionaries took to printing accounts of 
their Church’s ideas in periodicals, and sending these into the Empire, in the 
hope that they would make Cing persons interested in the Churches. 
But then, in 1812, the Cing government made a law against printing 
Church material in the Empire. If the missionaries would go on making 
periodicals, they would have to to it outsede the Empire. For this purpose, 
William Milne went in 1815 to Melaka, which was then under British control. 
Within a year, Milne had put together a Chinese-language missionary periodical 
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— the  Chinese Monthly Magazine (“Chá Shiì-sú Tǒng-jì-jhuàn”).  When, in 1818, 1
control of the city was given over to the Dutch East India Company, they let 
Milne go on working, which he did until his death in 1837, at which time the 
periodical came to an end (Britton 17–21; Daily 71–75, 53–154). 
But by this time there were other periodicals. In 1817 the London 
Missionary Society sent Walter Medhurst to Melaka, where he got experience 
working with Milne. When, in 1822, Medhurst went to Jakarta (“Batavia”), 
another city under Dutch control, he quickly made a periodical of his own — the 
Chinese Magazine  (“Tè-syuǎn Cuo-yào Měi-yuề Jì-jhuàn”). It was made for only 
three years, but was the first missionary periodical to do something that would 
later be common — writing in a sort of Chinese nearer to everyday speech than 
the “Literary Chinese” (“wén-yán-wén”) of the Cing Empire’s writing. 
Other periodicals were started at around this time too, but few were in 
existence for very long. Robert Morrison, for example, made two attempts at a 
periodical, first in Melaka, then in Ào-mén; but only a few issues of these were 
made. Another L.M.S. missionary in Melaka, Samuel Kidd, put out the  Universal 
Gazette (“Tian-sià Sin-wén”) from 1828 to 1829. And a missionary for the 
Netherlands Missionary Society, Karl Gützlaff, made the  Eastern-Western Monthly 
Magazine (“Dong-Si Yáng Kǎo Mêǐ-yuề Tǒng jì-jhuàn”) at Guǎng-jhou in 1833. This 
was against the law, and Gützlaff was taking a great chance, but his relations with 
the Chinese were unusually good, and in the end, the Cing government did 
nothing about his periodical (and may not even have been conscious of what 
Gützlaff was doing). Even so, Gützlaff gave up on the periodical after about a year 
 — it was too much work for one man with other things to do. And last, Walter 
Medhurst made a second periodical, this one with the help of Charles Batten 
Hillier, at Guǎng-jhou in 1838. But, again, only a few issues were made (Britton 
21–25). 
1 Sometimes, a periodical’s English and Chinese names had only a loose relation. For example, 
Milne himself said that the complete English translation of his journal’s Chinese names was “A 
General Monthly Record, containing an investigation of the opinions and practices of society” 
(Britton 18). This work makes use of the periodicals’ shorter English names. 
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In the months before the First British-Cing War, all this came to an end. 
Many missionaries were sent away from Guǎng-jhou and Ào-mén, which put an 
end to the small amount of periodical-making in these places, and made it much 
harder for periodicals made in other places to be sent into the Cing Empire. But 
when the War was at last over, everything was different: the missionaries could 
now do their work openly in five Cing cities, and in the new British colony of 
Siang-gǎng. Quite a number of old missionaries went to these places, some of the 
missionaries who had been working overseas, like Medhurst, came back to the 
Cing Empire, and new missionaries were sent to give them help. They did much 
work in the five “Treaty Ports,” some of it printing. The missionaries could have 
gone back to making periodicals, but one of the chief reasons for doing so was 
now gone, and none some to have done so (Britton 34; Zhang 41). 
 
Missionary Periodicals, 1853–1895 
Periodical-making was re-started in 1853, when Walter Medhurst, now in 
Siang-gǎng, came out with another periodical, the  Chinese Serial (“Siá-ěr 
Guàn-jhen”). He soon gave control of it to Charles Hillier, who in 1856 gave it to 
James Legge. By the end of that year it was no longer being made, but by this 
time many other missionaries in Siang-gǎng and the Treaty Ports had come out 
with their own periodicals (Britton 34; Zhang 41–43). These had in common the 
purpose of getting Cing persons interested in the Churches’ work, but they went 
about it in a number of different ways: 
(1) Giving “the good news” — This could be writing from or about the 
Bible, accounts of theology, sermons, or stories. Whatever the writing ways 
about, its purpose was to give the reader knowledge of a Church’s ideas. Some 
such writing was in nearly all missionary periodicals, and it was nearly the only 
sort of writing in some. 
(2) Promoting the power and value of Western ways — As noted, some 
missionaries took the view that the Churches would get nowhere as long as the 
Cing were unconscious of, uninterested in, or simply against Western ways of 
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doing things. To this end, they made periodicals giving the reader an education 
in Western science, medicine, government, and the like. 
(3) Giving news of events in the Empire and the world — The Cing had 
ways of getting news from around the Empire and the world. But these had their 
limits, and not all persons were able to make use of them. So some missionaries 
put into their periodicals account of news from other parts of the world, or the 
Empire itself. 
(4) Giving news about Church events — Nearly all the periodicals had a 
connection to a church, and for some the connection was very close. These had 
accounts of events in the Church, such as births, deaths, marriages, and news of 
upcoming church events, like services, meetings, and tests. 
Some periodicals did only one of these things. For example, John Kerr’s 
Western Medical Journal (“Si-yi Sin-bào”) had only accounts of Western medicine. 
Others, like the the  Church News , did all of them. That being said, periodicals 
having more than one purpose did not necessarily give the same amount of space 
to every sort of writing. For example, Daniel Jerome McGowan’s  Chinese and 
Foreign Gazette (“Jhong-Wài Sin-bào”) was made by the American Baptist Mission, 
but had chiefly news of events in the Cing Empire, and little in the way of 
material about the Church (Britton 56). 
 The periodicals were in a number of different languages. Some, like 
Young John Allen’s  A Review of the Times (“Wàn-gúo Gong-bào”) and N.J. Plumb’s 
Trans-Mountain Messenger (“Syún-shan Shií-jhě”) made use of Literary Chinese, 
which was then the most common written language of the Cing Empire (Britton 
57). But no more than three to five percent of Cing persons had enough education 
in Literary Chinese to do reading of any sort, and many of these with only able to 
make sense of quite simple material (Ramsey 104–106; Smith,  Heritage 110–112). 
So, other missionaries made their periodicals in the “Plain Languages” 
(“Bái-huà-wén”) — “Amoy” (“ Ê -mńg-wē”), “Cantonese” (“Guǎng-dong-huà”), 
“Shanghainese” (“Shàng-hǎi-huà”), and so on. Some of these, such as J.M.W. 
Farnam’s  Bible News (“Shèng-shu Sin-bào”) and George F. Fitch’s  Gospel News 
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(“Fú-yin Sin-bào”), both in “Guan-huà” (“Mandarin”), were written in Chinese 
Characters (Britton 57). But the time necessary for learning this way of writing, 
even if one was already a speaker of Guan-huà, was very long; so other 
missionaries made use of the Latin Alphabet in their periodicals. Examples of 
these are G. Reusch’s periodical in the Hak-gá language, Plumb’s and Hubbard’s 
in the Fú-jhou language, and J.C. Gibson’s in the Shan-tóu language (Britton 
56–58). 
 
Newspapers in the Cing Empire 
The Cing Empire was not without its own news. Most important of these was the 
Jing-bào (“Capital News”), which was made up of public notices put out by the 
government. It was printed in Běi-jing, and sent out across the Empire so persons 
of education could get news of government decisions. Some provincial 
governments put out such papers too, the yuán-mén-bào (“yuán-mén” being the 
house of a government representative; Britton 7–15). But, again, these were made 
up chiefly of material given to them by the government. Somewhat more like the 
Western idea of newspapers were the sin-wén-jhiǐ (“news papers”). These were 
accounts of interesting goings-on, for example “an earthquake, a famine, 
invasion, or battle, or the illegal acts of a mob, anything, in fact (save criticism on 
political or government matters)” (qtd. in Britton 5). They did not come out at 
fixed times, but were made when a printer got word of some story which would 
be purchased in printed form. 
So the Cing Empire had newspapers, but their uses were very limited. The 
Jing-bào and yuán-mén-bào had accounts only of government matters, and then 
only when these were made public. The sin-wén-jhiǐ could be about nearly 
anything, but their makers had no way of regularly getting news from other 
parts of the Empire, much less overseas. And, as all three sorts of papers were in 
Literary Chinese, they were of use to only a small part of Cing persons. This gave 
the first missionary periodicals a great amount of power. Naturally, they were 
better able than the Cing papers to get news from West and the rest of the world: 
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their makers were in touch with persons in many places, and could make use of 
Western newspapers which were sent out East. But, often they were better able 
to get news from other parts of the Empire too. Not only were the missionaries in 
touch with other missionaries around the Empire, they could make use of the 
Western-language newspapers in the Cing Empire, which had news from all over. 
The missionaries soon had competition from other Westerners in the Cing 
Empire, who had more interest in making money than making churchgoers of 
the Cing. These business-minded Westerners soon made the discovery that 
periodicals were a good way to do this, and the missionary periodicals came to 
have competition in the form of for-profit periodicals like R. Alexander 
Jamieson’s  Shang-hǎi News  (“Shàng-hǎi Sin-bào”), and Henry Balfour’s  Shàng-hǎi 
News (“Hù-bào”; Tsai 150–152). The missionary’s competition was not only 
Western: it did not take the Cing long to come out with their own Western-type 
periodicals too. The  Sino-Foreign News (“Jhong-Wài Sin-bào”) , for example, was 
made on George Ryder’s presses in Siang-gǎng, but the writing in it was by and 
for Cing persons. And Wáng Tao’s “ Universal Circulating Herald ” (“Syún-huán 
Rhiì-bào”), which came out in 1873, was completely under Cing control, and 
made specially as a counterpoint to the Western missionary periodicals (Britton 
42–45). 
The development of for-profit periodicals in the Cing Empire greatly 
reduced the power of the missionaries periodicals. Many missionary periodicals 
were quite small organisations, and the editors and writers had to do other sorts 
of work for the Church. While, they may have been better than the  Jing-bào and 
sin-wén-bào at getting news from the West and around the Empire, they could 
not do these things as well as a periodical whose editors did nothing but. What 
was more, the for-profit periodicals gave all their space to news, which to some 
readers, this was a great advantage: it was not necessary to make one’s way 
through church material to get to the stories of interest. And so, by the end of 
the nineteenth city, the missionary periodicals had already had their day, and by 
the 1920s, their readers were chiefly churchgoers (Zhang 2). 
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THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES OF ENGLAND AND TÁI-WAN 
To this point, this chapter has been about churches, missions, and periodicals as 
a group, and so the statements about these have been necessarily general. But 
arguments of this work are not about missionary periodicals in general; they are 
about the writings of two Churches’ periodicals: the Presbyterian Church of 
England’s  Monthly Messenger , and the Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan’s  Church 
News . The rest of this chapter gives more detail on these. This section goes over 
the histories and and relations of these two Churches to 1894, and then goes into 
more detail about the two periodicals. At the end, it gives an account of these 
periodicals’ purposes, their organisations, and the writings that were common in 
them before the war. 
 
The South Formosa Mission 
At the end of the nineteenth century, there were a number of Presbyterian 
churches in the Cing Empire’s southeast — in  Ê -mńg, Dāi-lám, Shàn-tóu, and 
Wǔ-jing-fú — having among their workers missionaries from the Presbyterian 
Church of England.  Their relations went back as far as 1847, when the 2
Presbyterian Church in England had first sent missionaries to the Cing Empire. 
These missionaries did their work well, and by 1849 a number of Cing churches 
had been started in and around  Ê -mńg with their help. Over the next tens of 
years, more and more churches were started in the Empire’s south-east. 
The Táiwanese Church had come about in 1865 through the work of three 
evangelists from the Church in  Ê -mńg: Gó Bhūn-sùi, Nǵ Gā-di, and Tán Zu-lō. 
They went to work on the island’s south-west coast, taking with them a British 
medical missionary, James Maxwell. The group quickly got the islanders 
interested in their Church, and on 12 October 1866 the first Táiwanese 
churchgoers were baptised (Band 1–28). But the young church was quickly in 
2 This church had come into being in 1876, through the joining of the United Presbyterian 
Church’s “English Synod” and the “Presbyterian Church in England.” The second of these had had 
the relations with the four Cing churches, which had been taken up by the new Church (Drysdale 
625–628). 
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trouble. Tái-wan was opened to Westerners by the 1860 Treaty of Tian-jin, which 
had come about through the Second British-Cing War, and in the 1860s, many 
were still angry about this. This came to a head in 1868: there were a number of 
attacks on Westerners and their trading houses; the Church in Bī-táo was burnt; 
and two churchgoers were put to death by angry groups. The attacks only came 
to an end when the British Royal Navy took control of the city of Ān-bếng. The 
Cing government at once gave the Westerners all they were after: much of this 
had to do with Western traders, but the Church did not go away with nothing. 
They were given money for their losses; what had been said against the church 
was publicly taken back; and it was publicly made clear that the missionaries had 
the right to work in Tái-wan. 
To put these developments to good use, at the end of 1868 Gó Bhūn-sùi, Ge 
Diòng (an Evangelist from Tái-wan), and James Maxwell went to Dāi-lám, the 
island’s capital. By June of the next year, there was a small Church there. From 
that time, Da n -gào and Dāi-lám were the church’s bases. From them, evangelists 
and missionaries would go out into the country, sometimes for days, sometimes 
for weeks. Where they came across a city, town, or village, they would give an 
account of the church’s teachings. If the village’s persons took to these ideas, 
they would be given more education in them. And when they could give a good 
enough account of these, they would be given Baptism by a minister, and let into 
the Church. In places where there were enough such persons, they would be 
made into a new congregation. Over the next few years, the number of 
churchgoers went up quickly; by 1875 there were over 900 (Band 47–126). 
But all was not well. The church’s leaders, all Westerners, were more and 
more unhappy with the development of the churchgoers knowledge, and their 
way of living. Their answer, which was put into effect from 1875, was to put more 
effort into education, and less into getting new churchgoers. They gave up the 
base in Dā n -gào, and made a number of new organisations in Dāi-lám: a 





The Monthly Messenger and Gospel in China 
While this was going on, the missionaries’ sending Church was putting out a 
number of periodicals giving accounts of their work. There was  The Presbyterian , a 
weekly periodical for all persons, and  The Children’s Messenger , a monthly 
periodical for young persons; but the church’s chief periodical was the  Monthly 
Messenger and Gospel in China . It had been started in 1844 by the Presbyterian 
Church in England, at which time the periodical’s name was  The English 
Presbyterian Messenger . There had been many changes to the periodical’s name 
and organisation in the years since, but its purpose was the same: “Reporting 
church work, mission work, religious movements, and . . . corresponding on our 
own family matters while at the same time fostering the devotional and studious 
life of the church” (Carruthers,  Fifty Years 22). 
From its start, the  Monthly Messenger  had carried news about missionaries. 
At first this had been about other Church’s missionaries, but, over time, news of 
the church’s own missions took up more and more space. By the 1890s it was, for 
persons in the U.K., the chief source of news about the Presbyterian Church of 
England’s missionaries. The periodical was not, though, completely made up of 
news about the Church’s missions. In fact, only two of the eleven sections in most 
issues of the  Monthly Messenger had news of the missions. The chart below, giving 
the organisation of the October 1895 issue ( Monthly Messenger 595), gives some 






● From Month to Month 
● Readings in Practical Religion 
● Our Own Missions 
○ Personal and General Notes 






○ Chips from the Reports (continued): The Printing Presses 
○ Eng-chhun Region : Light and Shade 
○ Chin-chew: Threatened Riot 
● The Social Significance of the Advent of Christianity 
● A Border Puritan 
● A Home Pastorate 
● Children’s Portion 
○ “I Believe in Jesus Christ“ 
○ The Impatient Flower 
● Church Talk 
● New Books 
● Contributions Not Previously Acknowledged 
● Congregational Contributions (from 1st January to 16th September 1895) 
 
Some of these sections, like “A Border Puritan,” had one piece of writing in them. 
Others, like “Readings in Practical Religion,” had many smaller pieces of writing. 
While some pieces, chiefly the longer ones, gave the writer’s name, many did not 
(likely, many of these were the editor’s work). 
As can be seen from the above, much of the material in the  Monthly 
Messenger had to do with the Church’s history and theology, but there were two 
sections that always had some news of the missions: “From Month to Month,” 
and “Our own Missions.” The first was made up of short accounts of goings-on in 
the church. These were chiefly events in the U.K., but when something specially 
important to the missions was taking place, like the Cing-Japanese War, there 
would be accounts of it in this section too. Many of these were editorials, but if a 
missionary’s own writing did go into the periodical, it went into one of these 
sections. As a rule, these writings were simply accounts of what the missionary 
had been doing for their church. For example, the January 1895 issue had a letter 
from John Steele, of the Shàn-tóu Mission: 
In the city we have quite outgrown the accomodation at Tiger-tail Lane, 
our old dispensary. People come every day to the chapel and dispensary 
for treatment. Some come such distances that they have to remain in the 
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city overnight. Dr. Cousland is now in the city, superintending the 
building of the part of the new hospital” (587: 35). 
 
It is from “Our Own Missions” and “From Month to Month” that the accounts in 
this work come. 
 
The Dāi-lám Capital Church News 
The  Church News was started in 1885, as part of the missionaries’ attempts to give 
the Táiwanese churchgoers a better education in the church’s ideas. As noted, the 
Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan’s growth had been very quick, at least in 
comparison to the other Cing Churches with which the Presbyterian Church of 
England had relations. The few evangelists and missionaries in Tái-wan were not 
enough to see to the education of the many new churchgoers, between whose 
small churches were many kilometres of bad roads and numerous dangers. The 
purpose of the  Church News , then, was to take the church’s teachings to the 
villages when the evangelists and missionaries could not go to them. It would 
also give the Churchgoers a feeling of being part of the greater church, in 
Tái-wan, and the world. For the little groups of churchgoers in the deep 
mountains, whose neighbours had not entered into in the church, or were even 
against it, this was an important thing to have. To this end, the periodical was in 
the island’s commonest “plain language,” the language of  Ê -mńg, and made use 
of an alphabetic writing system.  It seems to have been popular with the 3
churchgoers. In 1895, there were 1,297 churchgoers, to whom around 700 copies 
of the  Church News went out every month ( Church News  131: 55, 141: 91). 
The periodical itself was simple in comparison to the  Monthly Messenger . It 
had no front cover, only a simple banner across the top of the first page, giving 
the periodical’s name, the date, and a table of contents. Just below this was the 
start of the first piece of writing. Like the  Monthly Messenger , the writings were in 
sections and subsections, which might be made up of one piece of writing, or 
3 For the history of this writing system, see Klöter (89–130); for the place of the Ê-mńg language in 
nineteenth century Táiwanese, see Heylen (16–21). 
50
many. This, for example, is the organisation of a September 1894 issue,  Church 
News 113: 
● News (“Siāo-sīt”) 
○ Brother Cīm-hé writes (“Cīm-hō-hia n  sià”) 
○ Deacon Nǵ Liàn of Ghū-dā n -wan writes (“Ghū-dā n -wan ế jip-sū Nǵ Liàn 
sià”) 
○ Diē Sī-hoế of D o -gūn-êng writes (“D o -gūn-êng Diē Sī-hoế sià”) 
○ Nǵ Sìn-gí writes (“Nǵ Sìn-gí sià”) 
● Differentiating wisdom and knowledge  (“Biān cōng-bhếng dì-hūi”) 
● An announcement about benefitting the blind (“L i -êk̄ cī n -mī-láng ế gè-bêh ”) 
● Seals (“Hai-gào”) 
● The church is like a boat (“Gào-hoē bi-pên̄g zún”) 
● Raising babes  (“Boê-̄yiù n  Ghin-nà”) 
● Sabbath Scripture (“Zu-rit Sīn-lióng”) 
○ This month’s questions (“Bun-ghoêh sin ế mn̄g”) 
○ The answers to last month’s questions (“Dêng-ghoêh mn̄g ế 
yìn-dap”) 
● Bible Questions and Answers (“Sềng-cêh̄ Mn̄g gāp Yìn-dāp ”) 
● An invitation to prayer and thankgsiving (“Cià n  d a i-gê hāp-sim gī-dè 
si a -yin”) 
○ Ask God (“Gī-giú Si o ng-d ê ”) 
○ Thank God (“Gam-siā Si o ng-d ê ”) 




As can be seen, the greatest part of the writings in most issues, even in wartime, 
were accounts of church events around the island, and teachings about the 
Church’s ways and ideas. These writings came from evangelists, missionaries, and 
even churchgoers, but writing by the missionaries, who were based in Dāi-lám, 
and oversaw the editing and printing of the  Church News , was most common.  
News of the Cing-Japanese War was in the “News” section, or a special 
section — “War News” (“Gāo-ji a n ế Siāo-sīt”). News of the Japanese-Táiwanese 
War was in these sections too, as well as in sections giving news about some part 
of the island, for example “Bê-̄ó News” (“Bê-̄ó ế Siāo-sīt”), which gave news of the 
islands, or “Church News” (“Gào-hoē ế Siāo-sīt”), which gave news about a 
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number of Táiwanese churches. And, sometimes very important war matters 
would get their own special sections, as did the missionaries’ translation of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, “Conditions of the Treaty” (“Hē-yēk ế Diāo-koà”;  Church 
News  122: 46; ). These are the materials of interest here.  
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3 — Taking the measure of the periodicals’ writings  
 
In Chapter 1 it was noted that writers in Mission Studies and Media Studies have 
given some attention to missionary periodicals, and the Cing-Japanese War. As 
far as missionary periodicals go, this has chiefly taken the form of essays, such as 
those by Terry Barringer, Felicity Jensz, and Hugh Morrison — all of which can be 
seen in the bibliography. There are a small number of books putting together a 
group of such essays, the outstanding example being Felicity Jensz and Hanna 
Acke’s  Missions and Media , a group of essays on missionary periodicals by leading 
scholars of mission in history and media studies. Another, older, example is 
Robert Bickers and Rosemary Seton  Missionary Encounters , a group of essays on 
many different sorts of missionary writing, among which are a number of 
arguments for the value of missionary periodicals. At present there are few 
book-length works on missionary periodicals in their own right, but periodicals 
are given a good amount of space in some works on missionary work more 
generally, such as Jeffrey Cox’s  British Missionary Enterprise since 1700 (Chap. 6), 
Anna Johnston’s  Missionary Writing and Empire (Chaps. 4, 7, 9), and throughout 
Andrew Porter’s  Religion versus Empire? 
As for the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War, here too most 
of the English-language writing has taken the form of essays, such as those by 
Alena Eskridge-Kosmach, Judith Frölich, and Weipin Tsai — again, these can be 
seen in the bibliography. There are, though, no “edited collections” of such 
essays. The only book-length work about media accounts of the Cing-Japanese 
War is Sarah Paine’s  Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 , but media accounts are given 
attention in a number of more general works on the War, such as Jeffrey 
Dorwart’s  Pigtail War (Chap. 6) and throughout Stewart Lone’s  Japan’s First Modern 
War .  
These are the base on which this work is building, and without them it 
would not be possible. Even so, these works are not without their troubles. Chief 
among these is that that nearly all the work on missionary periodicals and the 
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Cing-Japanese War has been qualitative: to the writer’s knowledge, there have 
been no attempts to put quantitative methods to use in making sense of the 
material in missionary periodicals, or accounts of the Cing-Japanese War. This is 
somewhat strange, given that qualitative methods are not uncommon in Media 
Studies. The one which can be of greatest help in making sense of the material in 
missionary periodicals is  content analysis — “a research method that uses a set of 
procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber 9). To do this, a group of 
“coders,” or a computer, put one or more pieces of writing into “units,” then take 
note of how many are examples of “categories.” Based on the number of units of 
each sort of category,  they can make general statements about the writings; 
from these, they can make “valid inferences.” 
To give a simple example, a researcher might have the idea that the 
writings in a newspaper give an idea of what is important to its readers at any 
given time. The researcher might then put together a project to see at what times 
in the last five years “money” was unusually important to readers. The project 
might take this form: the researcher would get five years of issues from one or 
more newspapers, then have coders take note of articles — the “unit” of project 
— having “money words,” such as “income,” “savings,” “budget,” and so on.  The 1
researcher would then make a comparison of the number of examples with the 
month in which they came out. From this, the researcher would be able to say at 
what times of the year articles about money were most common — for example, 
in January. And from this general statement, the researcher could make 
inferences — for example, that money was of greatest interest to readers when 
they had little of it — after Christmas.  
Naturally, real content analyses can be much more complex than this. For 
example, Feng Yang and Milton Meuller’s content analysis of internet regulation 
in China take account of four different things: “year of policy issuance,” “issuing 
government agency,” “type of policy,” and “policy theme.” From these, they 
1 If it is not possible to go over every issue, the researcher would make use of “sampling,” that is, 
taking note of the articles in a statistically representative number of issues (Weerakkody 
148–149). 
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make the discovery that the greater part of the regulation were made by the 
government ministries: only about sixteen percent were the work of the 
higher-level “National People’s Congress” and “State Council.” But, the 
regulations made by the last two were some of the first regulations made. Based 
on this, Yang and Mueller make these inferences: 
the Chinese government was more concerned with technology 
development during the early development of the Internet. Conversely, 
because the Internet is relatively new in China, numerous legal issues 
arising from the Internet have not been thoroughly explored. Some of 
these problems stem from the various conflicts of interest among 
different ministries and agencies. This disagreement is indicative of an 
underdeveloped Internet policy regime, in which fundamental laws were 
the core legislations and administrative regulations served as 
supplements. (454) 
 
The value of doing this in this way is that after reading a content analysis, it 
should be possible to go over the materials used in the analysis with the same 
coding rules, and come up with the same measurements. Arguments between 
users of content analysis are still possible — for example, about the value of the 
coding rules, or the inferences based on the measurements — but the 
measurements themselves should be unquestionable. 
But few researchers of missionaries periodicals and the Cing-Japanese 
War have taken advantage of this tool. The works noted above — and others, 
which will be noted later — give few, if any, detail about the relations between 
writer’s general statements about these periodicals, and the writings on which 
they are based. Yet all of them must at one time have done something like the 
first steps of a content analysis. At the very least, when taking account of what a 
periodical said about the War, a writer must make decisions about which pieces 
of writing are “about the War” and which are not. And having done this, the 
writer must make decisions about which writings “about the War” are of use in 
answering the writer’s research question. All of the above writers most have 
done this, but none give the rules by which they made these decisions. And if the 
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reader has no knowledge of these rules, they get no sense of how strong the 
writer’s arguments are, and sometimes cannot even make sense of them. 
This chapter puts forward a new way of writing about periodicals which 
does not have these troubles, and which is used in this work. Is is to some degree 
based on content analysis, but different enough that it is not given that name. 
That is, there are three reasons that it cannot be said to be content analysis: 
First, in this work the “units,” the “smallest element of the message 
examined” (Weerakkody 150), are complete pieces of writing. This is possible in 
content analysis, but in the view of many, it is not a good way of doing things, for 
it gives a “coarse” analysis (Weber 21–24). In this work though, it was not 
possible to do things any other way: as the structures of the  Ê -mńg and English 
languages are very different, it was not possible to make a comparison of units 
smaller than complete pieces of writings. But, to make the analysis a bit finer, 
this work makes use of a tool common in older — that is pre-computer —  content 
analysis: “page space” measurements.  The details of this tool are given later in 2
the Chapter.  
Second, in this work the coding has been done by hand. Today, content 
analyses are often done by computer. The advantages of this are clear: unlike a 
human coder, a computer will never get tired, and will always give its complete 
attention to the work. But, for an analysis which put writings into groups based 
on their value judgements — as this one does — a computer is not the best tool. A 
computer programme, can be given a list of “value words” — for example, 
“good,” bad,” and so on — and an advanced programme can even be given 
directions to take note of units value words near other words of interest — a 
“keyword in context” search. But, even the best computer is unable to make 
sense of figurative language, and so will take no notice of many value 
judgements.  3
2 For other examples of “page space” being used for this purpose, see Broome and Reece’s 
“Political and Racial Interest,” Awojobi and Adeokun’s, “Content Analysis of Agricultural Issues 
Reported in Two Nigerian Daily Newspapers,” and Granner et al’s “Newspaper Content Analysis in 
Evaluation of a Community-Based Participatory Project to Increase Physical Activity.” 
3 For a discussion of the limits of computer content analysis, see Mike Conway’s “Subjective 
Precision of Computers.” 
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Third, there was only one coder — the writer. In the view of many 
researchers, if coding is done by hand, it is important that more than one coder 
go over the same material. In fact, the more coders go over the material, the 
greater the value of their measurements. The single coder may not see 
something, or more make sense of the coding rules in  very different way than 
most persons would; a group of coders were more likely to see everything, and 
statistical tests can be done to see if they are making sense of the coding rules in 
the same way (Stemler). But in this work, the writer has done all the coding 
themself. Nothing else was possible: first, there was no budget for a team of 
coders; second, there were no persons to hand with a reading-knowledge of 
nineteenth-century  Ê -mńg. But, the writer has done the next best thing: going 
over the material many times, in many different orders, and making a 
comparison of the different measurements. 
The first section of this chapter goes into more detail about the trouble 
with other writings about periodicals and the Wars, and gives some more 
detailed examples of these. The second section makes clear how the writings in 
the  Church News and the  Monthly Messenger have been put into groups “about the 
War” and “not about the War” for this work. It then says how the writings “about 
the War” have been put into smaller groups for the purpose of getting answers to 
the questions in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The third section gives details on the the 
size of writings “about the War,” and makes a comparison of the amount of 
writing about the War in them at different times. 
 
THE TROUBLE WITH GENERAL STATEMENTS 
A general statement is a statement about more than one thing — what they do, 
what they are, or what qualities they have.  Statements that are not “general” are 
“singular statements” — statements about what  one thing does, is, or what 
qualities it has. For example, this is a singular statement: “A sentence in  Monthly 
Messenger 587 gave a negative opinion of the Cing Government.” And this is a 
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general statement: “The  Monthly Messenger gave a negative opinion of the Cing 
Government.” 
General statement may be “weak” or “strong.” This has to do with the 
number of examples on which they are based. For example, if any statement 
anywhere in the  Monthly Messenger gave a negative opinion of the Cing 
government, then the statement “The  Monthly Messenger gave a negative opinion 
of the Cing Government” is true. But if thousands of sentences did this, then it is 
strongly true, and if only one sentence did, then it is only weakly true. 
Nearly all the writers who have said anything about Cing and Western 
periodicals accounts of the Cing-Japanese War have made general statements 
about them. But few are clear about the number of examples on which these 
statements answer based.  
A number of troubles are common in accounts of what periodicals said 
about the Cing-Japanese War, and Japanese-Táiwanese War. The commonest are: 
(I) Not saying how the periodicals’ writings were put into the groups “about the 
War” and “not about the War”; (II) not saying which of the writings “about the 
War” have to do with the writer’s research questions; and (III) not saying what 
part of the periodical’s overall output was made up of writings about the War. 
Below is given more detail about the nature of these troubles, and examples — 
real and fictional — of why they can give trouble to readers. 
 
1. Writings “about the War” and “not about the War” 
Few periodicals were made only for the purpose of giving accounts of the 
Cing-Japanese War, Japanese-Táiwanese War, or the two Wars together. The 
greater part of periodicals that did give accounts of the Wars had been made to 
do other things, and many went on doing these while the Wars were ongoing. So, 
when taking account of what a periodical said about the Wars, it is necessary to 
put its writings into two groups: (1) writings about the Wars; and (2) writings  not 
about the War. But, many works about periodicals do not give the rules by which 
the writer did this. They simply give general statements about the periodicals’ 
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War-writings, without saying what qualities made them “war-writings” in the 
first place. The trouble with this is that the writer’s rules may not be the same as 
the reader’s. And if the reader’s idea about the qualities of a “war-writing” are 
different, then the reader could make sense of the writer’s general statements in 
the wrong way.  4
A simple, and fictional, example will make this clear. Say that some writer 
takes account of the  Pittenweem Weekly ’s opinions about the Cing Empire’s 
leaders. The writer would put the material into three groups: 
1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War 
1.1. Writings giving an opinion of the Cing leaders 
1.2. Writings  not giving an opinion of the Cing leaders. 
2. Writings  not about the Cing-Japanese War 
 
The rules by which the writer puts the material into (1) and (2) have an effect on 
what can be said about (1.1). Say that for the writer’s purposes, “Writings about 
the Cing-Japanese War” are only accounts of battles, and that the  Pittenweem 
Weekly ’s accounts of battles say nothing about the Cing Empire’s government 
leaders. No account would be taken, for example, of a piece of writing about 
government leaders far from the front lines putting up taxes as a way of 
supporting the War. So, the writer’s general statements about Cing leaders will 
really only be about only the Cing  military leaders. And if, for example, the 
Pittenweem Weekly had only positive things to say about the military, but only 
negative things to say about the government leaders, the writer would end up 
making the discovery that “The  Pittenweem Weekly had only positive things to say 
about the Cing leaders.” Now, this does not make the writer’s statements “false”: 
by  their narrow understanding of “writings about the Cing-Japanese War,” it is 
true that only negative things were said about Cing leaders. But, if the reader is 
not conscious of how the writer put the material into (1) and (2), they will take 
the writer to be saying something very different than they really are. 
4 Users of content analysis have given a good amount of attention to this matter. The purpose of 
content analysis is to do a statistical analysis of a piece of writing, and for this to be possible, it is 
necessary that there be clear rules, so that no unit can be a member of more than one category 
(Weber 12–24; Weerakkody 152–153).  
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This trouble does not exist only in theory. In  The Pigtail War , Jefferey 
Dorwart says that as the War went on, there was a change in the interests of 
American writing about the War: “After early discussions of the people, 
supplemented by continuous propaganda releases by Japan, coverage of the War 
turned to a comparison of the military strength of each country” (98). In other 
words, the first accounts of the War were “cultural comparisons of the 
combatants,” but later accounts were chiefly comparisons of the two countries’ 
soldiers and arms. The trouble with this statement is that Dorwart does not say 
how he put the periodicals’ writings into “coverage of the War” and “coverage 
not of the War.” Say, for example, that there were “cultural comparisons” of 
Chinese and Japanese from start to end, but at the start of the War they were 
chiefly of soldiers, and by the end they were of Chinese and Japanese 
non-soldiers’ feelings about the Wars. If Dorwart’s “coverage of the War” is  only 
accounts of the non-soldiers, then he is right: by the end of the War “cultural 
comparisons” were no longer a part of “coverage of the War.” But if the reader is 
not conscious of this, they might get the idea that after the fighting’s start, there 
were no “cultural comparisons” at all in the American periodicals. Without a 
knowledge of how Dorwart put the periodicals’ writings into “coverage of the 
War” and “coverage  not of the War,” it is hard to do very much with his general 
statement about the change in the American periodicals’ War-writings. 
 
2. Putting writings “about the War” into smaller groups  
The reason for taking account of a periodical’s War-writings is normally to make 
some general statement about them — what they do, what opinions they give, or 
what qualities they have. The trouble is that many writers do not give clear rules 
for when a piece of writing “about the War” is an example of one or more of 
these things: they do not say how they have put the writings into groups. And 
without a knowledge of how a writer has done this, general statements about the 
writings in the periodical are of little use to the reader. 
60
Take again the  Pittenweem Weekly . The writer’s purpose is to see what 
opinion the periodical had of the Cing leaders. So the writer puts this material 
into these groups: 
1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War 
1.1. Writings giving an opinion of the Cing leaders 
1.1.1. Writings saying something positive about the Cing 
leaders 
1.1.2. Writings saying something negative about the Cing 
leaders 
1.2. Writings  not giving an opinion of the Cing leaders 
2. Writings  not about the Cing-Japanese War 
 
Now, say that there are two examples of (1.1), each having one of the following 
statements:  
a. “The Cing General at Yá-shan was an incompetent coward.” 
b. “The Cing General at Pyeongyang was slow to send his soldiers into 
battle.” 
 
The writer, and most users of English, would take (a) as an example of (1.1.2), 
“Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders.” But for (b), the 
decision is less clear: to one who is of the opinion that the General should have 
sent the soldiers in more quickly, it is a bad judgement; but to one who is of the 
opinion that the General’s slowness was simply good sense, it is a good 
judgement.   If it seems to the writer that that statement-maker was of the second 
opinion, then the writer would take it as an example of (1.1.2), and could say that 
“The  Pittenweem Weekly had only bad things to say about the Cing Empire’s 
leaders.” But, it is important that the writer give their rule for making decisions 
of this sort, or better still, an account of why they made the decision that they 
did. If they do not do this, then readers may get the wrong idea about the 
Pittenweem Weekly opinion of the Cing military leaders. 
Now take a real example. In “Pictures of the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894–1895,” an account of Japanese woodblock prints of the War, Judith Frölich 
says “The Japanese War prints usually do not explicitly denigrate the foe” (22). 
Making sense of this statement is hard for at least two reasons. First, Frölich does 
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not give a rule for putting the prints into the groups “not denigrating the foe” 
and “denigrating the foe.” They could have been so grouped by taking account of 
the actions of the persons in the pictures, the writing in the prints, how nearly 
the prints were like other accounts of the battles, or some mix of these. If it was 
done by the actions of the persons, or the words in the prints, then it is necessary 
to have a knowledge of what actions and what sorts of statements Frölich takes 
as examples of “denigrating the foe.” Second, Frölich does not give a rule for 
putting the “denigrating the foe” prints into the groups “explicitly denigrating” 
and “non-explicitly denigrating.” There seem to be at least two degrees of 
“denigrating,” but it is not clear by what rules prints are put into these two 
groups. It likely has something to do with the details of the pictures or the 
language of the statements with them, but without a knowledge of how Frölich 
put the pictures into groups, her statements about them are of of little use. 
 
3. Not giving the amounts of writings “about the War” 
Many periodicals having War-writings had writings about other things too. This 
is especially true of missionary periodicals, whose chief purpose was giving 
mission and Church news. But, writers about periodicals often do not give the 
amount of writing “about the War” and “not about the War.” This is an 
important detail, for how strong their general statements are has to do with the 
amount of the periodical given over to War-writing: the greater the amount of 
writing a periodical has about something, the stronger a general statement about 
what it said will be. 
One last time, take the  Pittenweem Weekly . Say that from the start to the 
end of the Cing-Japanese War, forty issues of the periodical came out, all of which 
were ten pages in length. And say that four issues had one-page pieces of writing 
about the War, but only one issue said anything about the Cing military leaders. 
The writer could say, “The  Pittenweem Weekly had chiefly bad things to say about 
the Cing Empire’s leaders.” This is true, but not the complete story. Writings 
about the War were only ten percent of the  Pittenweem Weekly ’s output, and 
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writing about the Cing military leaders was only half this, or five percent of the 
overall output. In short, the  Pittenweem Weekly may have said bad things about 
the Cing military leaders, but these were a small part of its output, and a general 
statement to the effect that the periodical had chiefly bad things to say about the 
Cing leaders is a weak one. 
Other details are important here too. For example, some parts of a 
periodical might normally have got more attention than others: nearly all 
readers take in the first page of a periodical; fewer take in the last pages. If its 
makers were conscious of this, they could make decisions about how many 
readers would see a given writing. For example, if the  Pittenweem Weekly ’s editor 
put their opinions about the Cing military leaders on the front page, then these 
statements were made more strongly than if they were deep inside the paper. 
The structure of the pages is important too: a piece of writing with a 
greater-sized font is more likely to get readers’ attention than one with a smaller 
font. And a picture can make the reader more likely to give their attention to the 
story with which it has a connection. 
But, again, many writers do not give these details when making general 
statements about periodicals. Take, for example, Sarah Paine’s account, in  The 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 , of what newspapers said about the Japanese 
military’s putting unarmed persons to death in Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu: 
The London  Times was among the first papers to allude to the massacre. 
On November 26 it published a one-sentence paragraph stating, “Great 
slaughter is reported to have taken place.” In early December The  Pall Mall 
Gazette and  Le Journal des debats politiques et litteraires mentioned a 
massacre, but the foreign press at home gave the matter little or no 
coverage. American newspapers gave much more press to the Armenian 
atrocities being perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire. (213) 
 
Paine is better than most, making note of the amount of writing about the battle 
in different newspapers, and even giving the length of one piece. But, without 
knowledge of the size of these periodicals, the value of Paine’s statements is still 
limited. A “one-sentence paragraph” seems like a small part of the London  Times , 
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but it would surely be better to say just what part of the newspaper this made up. 
And to say that the American newspapers “gave much more press to the 
Armenian atrocities” is interesting, but it would be of more use to say how many 
pieces of writing there were about these two events, and what their sizes were. 
These are very serious troubles, for they make it harder for a reader to 
make sense of a writers’ general statements about different periodicals’ account 
of the Wars. Worse, they make building on these accounts nearly impossible. It 
would be of interest to see if, for example, British periodicals too had more 
“cultural comparisons” at the start of the War, and more “military comparisons” 
at the end, but no comparison with  The Pigtail War will be useful without 
Dorwart’s definition of “coverage of the War.” And it would be interesting to see 
if European newspapers too gave more “press” to the Armenian Genocide than 
the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, but this is of little use without knowledge of how 
Paine put the American newspapers writings into groups “about the Armenian 
Genocide” and “about the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu,” and better yet, having some 
knowledge of these groups sizes. 
But there is a way forward, and in the next section is given an account of 
how these troubles may be at least partly got around. 
 
DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS 
When giving an account of what a periodicals said about the Cing-Japanese War, 
the Japanese-Táiwanese War, or anything else, it is best to give clear rules for 
putting the periodicals’ writings into groups, and rules for making a comparison 
of these groups with the other writings in the periodicals. In this section are 
given the rules for putting the  Monthly Messenger ’s  and  Church News ’ writings into 
“not-accounts” and “accounts,” how these are put into accounts “of the war” and 
“not of the War,” and and how the measurements of the first are taken, so that a 




Writings “about the Wars” 
The pieces of writing of interest here are “accounts of the War.” So, the first 
thing to be clear about is how “accounts” are different from other sorts of 
writing. For present purposes, an “account” is a piece of writing having at least 
one “statement”: “the utterance by a certain speaker or writer of certain words 
(a sentence) to an audience with reference to an historic situation, event or what 
not” (Austin 87–88). For the purposes of this work, an addition is made to this 
definition: the statements must have a subject and a predicate; it cannot be 
simply a noun phrase or verb phrase. As such, no account is taken of statements 
like captions, titles, tables of contents, and so on. And, naturally, the “historic 
situation, event or what not” must have a connection with one or more of the 
two Wars —  more will be said about the nature of this connection farther down. 
Take note too that the statement need not be about the past: a statement can be 
about the present or future, as long as it has somewhere in it a “reference” to a 
something in the past. 
Now it is necessary to be clear about which of these accounts are “about 
the War.” For present purposes, an account may be “about the War” in one or 
more of three ways: 
(1)  Names for the War — An account may have somewhere in it the name 
“Cing-Japan War” or some synonym of this, such as “Sino-Japanese War,” 
“Chino-Japanese War,” and so on. For example, “ Passing to the consideration of 
the ultimate effects of the  Chino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Peace, Mr. Shaw 
remarked that the policy of England in the matter had been one of strict and 
almost severe neutrality ” ( Monthly Messenger 591: 137–138; emphasis mine). 
(Naturally, for the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the writing may have this name or 
its synonyms.) Take note that these may be as simple as “the War,” if it is clear 
from the rest of the writing that the “war” in question is the Cing-Japanese War 
or Japanese-Táiwanese War. 
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(2)  Actions having a connection with the War — An account may have in it a 
statement giving an account of an action which  was ,  is , or  will be undertaken for 
the purpose of putting an end the the War. For example, this statement: 
the Japanese soldiers were going to Giām-zùi harbour, but when they got 
to R i -dêk̄-wí village, several hundred people gave a great shout, rushed 
the Japanese, and began fighting them. 
Rīt-bun-pêng bhêh̄ k i Giām-zui-gàng, g a o R i -dêk̄-wi-zng, bêh̄-s ê n  dān-lé 
hoāh-hiu, wū gui-nā bāh-láng dī hīd-tāh gap yin sa n  tái.  Church News  128: 
109) 
 
Take note that the action’s  having the hoped-for effect is not important; what is 
important is the  hope that it would make the War’s end nearer. Take note too that 
the Wars could come to an end in a number of ways: the Cing — and later 
Táiwanese — could overcome the Japanese; the Japanese could overcome the Cing 
— and later Táiwanese — or some outside group could put a stop to the fighting. 
(3)  States having a connection with the War — An account may have in it a 
statement about an state which came into being through one of the actions of the 
sort given in (2). For example, “ At present a regiment of Mandarin-speaking 
soldiers  is down from Chao-chow-fu [Cháo-jhou] for the protection of the forts” 
( Monthly Messenger 586: 14; emphasis mine), or even  “At present  rice  is very 
expensive in Hu-siá n   (“Hi a n-sí dī Hu-siá n  bhì jin g u i”;  Church News 127: 93; 
emphasis mine). Both states came into being through actions undertaken for the 
purpose of making the War come to an end: the soldiers were sent to Cháo-jhou 
to keep it safe from Japanese attack; and the price of rice went up from the 
Japanese not letting new rice be sent to the enemy government in Hu-siá n . 
 
The Wars’ starts and ends 
The accounts of interest here are those that were made while the Wars were 
taking place. But, there are some questions about the starting and ending times 
of the two Wars. The Cing Empire made a declaration of War against Japan on 01 
August 1894, and the Japanese Empire made its own declaration of War the same 
day (Sun 68–69). But, the Cing declaration was in answer to a Japanese attack on a 
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Cing ship, which took place on 25 July. There were arguments even at the time 
about which of these days was the start of the War. The Japanese position, which 
was based on British legal theory, was that the attack on the Cing ship  was their 
declaration of War, and the written declaration was simply a restatement of this 
(Howland, “War” 190–192). This work takes the same position: the start of the 
War was the Japanese attack on 25 July 1895. 
There is trouble too about the time at which the Cing-Japanese War came 
to an end. The last fighting was on 26 March 1895; the Treaty of Shimonoseki was 
signed on 17 April; and its ratification was on 08 May. Any of these dates could be 
taken as the end of the War. But, Article 00 of the Treaty says, “All offensive 
military operations shall cease  upon the exchange of the ratifications of this act ” 
(Kajima 266; emphasis mine). For this reason, 08 May is taken as the end of the 
War, and accounts of the Cing and Japanese actions before this time, of which the 
treaty discussions are part, are still writings “about the War.” 
The Japanese never made a declaration of War against the Táiwanese 
Republic. As noted above, they did not see written declarations of War as 
necessary, and in any case they saw the “Republic” as simply a rebellion, not a 
real government. The Táiwanese too never made a declaration of War. But, they 
did make a declaration of independence, which said this: 
The Japanese have affronted China by annexing our territory of Formosa, 
and the supplications of us, the People of Formosa, at the portals of the 
Thrones have been made in vain. We now learn that the Japanese slaves 
are about to arrive. 
If we suffer this, the land of our hearths and homes will become 
the land of savages and barbarians, but if we do not suffer it, our 
condition of comparative weakness will certainly not endure long. . . . 
Now therefore we, the people of Formosa, are irrevocably resolved 
to die before we will serve the enemy. . . . (Davidson 279–280) 
 
This is, in effect, an ultimatum, which in the legal theory of the time was the 
same as a declaration of War. So, in this work the time of the first Japanese attack 
on Tái-wan, 29 May 1895, is taken to be the start of the Japanese-Táiwanese War.  
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The end of this War too is unclear. There was no treaty between the 
Japanese Empire and Táiwanese Republic: at some point the existence of the 
Republic simply came to an end. On 01 June the Japanese military took control of 
Dāi-bak, the capital city of the Republic, and many Táiwanese leaders gave up 
and went to the Cing Empire. But, another group of leaders made a new capital at 
Dāi-lám, and went on fighting. The Japanese military took control of this city on 
21 October 1895, and more Táiwanese leaders went to the Cing Empire. But still 
other groups went on fighting against the Japanese until 1902. Again, any of 
these dates could be taken as the end of the War. But, while some of the groups 
fighting the Japanese after 21 October had been soldiers of the Republic, and 
some may even have been fighting in its name, they no longer had a President, a 
capital, or any sort of island-wide organisation (Lamley 55; Weng 6–7). For the 




The above rules give a way of putting the periodicals’ writings into parts “about 
the War” and “not about the War.” But as noted, a comparison of the numbers of 
these writings is not of much use. For example, if in an issue of the  Church News 
there were four one-sentence pieces of writing about the Japanese-Táiwanese 
War, and in an issue of the  Monthly Messenger there were two thousand-sentence 
pieces, then to say that the first periodical had more pieces of writing than the 
second gives the wrong idea completely (and even these numbers give no sense 
of how much of the issues these writings took up). To get an idea of the amount 
of writing “about the War” and “not about the War,” it is necessary to make a 
comparison not only of the number of writings, but of their sizes, and how much 
of the issue they took up. 
This work makes use of “line numbers” to take the measure of the 
periodicals and their pieces of writing. The printing presses which made the 
periodicals could put only a certain number written lines on one piece of paper, 
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so the product of the greatest possible number of lines on a page, and the number 
of pages in an issue, gives the greatest possible number of lines in an issue. For 
example, the  Church News was printed in two columns of up to forty-eight lines. A 
page could have up to ninety-six lines, and a twelve-page issue could have up to 
1,152 lines. The size of a piece of writing is the number of these lines it takes up. 
For example, the piece of writing in  Church News No. 127 giving the price of rice 
in Hu-siá n  was five lines in length. By taking these measures, it is possible to give 
the size of any piece of writing about the War, or all of them together. For 
example, all fifteen pieces of writing about the War in  Church News No. 127 
together were 130 lines in length. A comparison of the number of lines of writing 
about the War with the number of possible lines in an issue gives the percentage 
of lines taken up by writing about the War.  Church News No. 127 had twelve pages, 
so the piece of writing about the price of rice took up 0.43 percent of the issue, 
and all the writings about the War in the issue together took up 11.28 percent. 
With these numbers, it is possible to make a comparison of the amount of writing 
about the War in the two periodicals. 
It must be said that this way of doing things is not without its troubles. 
For one thing, “one line” could be a line completely taken up by words, or a line 
having only one word, when in fact the length of the one piece of writing is many 
words greater than the other. For another, it was not normal for the  Monthly 
Messenger or  Church News  to have writing on every possible line: some of their 
lines were taken up by pictures, line breaks, charts, titles, and so on. One way 
around these troubles would be a make a comparison between the number of 
lines of writing in a issue, and the number of lines of writing about the War. An 
even better way is to make a comparison of the number of words in the issue, and 
the number of words in pieces of writing about the War. But, as the two 
periodicals have not been digitised, at present it is necessary to do all counting of 
lines, and words, by hand and by eye. So, the better system of measure are not 





The amounts of writings about the Wars 
In the above sections it was said that the writings in the  Monthly Messenger and 
Church News can be put into “accounts” and “not-accounts” by noting which have 
statements “with reference to an historic situation, event or what not.” These 
accounts can be put into the groups “about the War” and “not about the War” by 
noting which have one or more of these: (1) names for the War; (2) actions having 
a connection with the War; (3) states having a connection with the War. And the 
measure of these writings can be taken by noting how many lines they take up. 
These measures will now be given for the periodicals in question. This section 
gives the measures of the writing about the Cing-Japanese War and the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War in the  Monthly Messenger and  Church News . It first goes 
through the amounts of writing about the Wars in the two periodicals, and then 
makes sense of why these were different. 
 
THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE  MONTHLY MESSENGER 
While the Cing-Japanese War was taking place, ten issues of the  Monthly Messenger 
came out: “September 1894” to “June 1895.” The  Monthly Messenger ’s issues came 
out at the start of the named month. For example, the September issue had news 
only up to the end of August. The ten issues could have had up to 21,640 lines or 
writing. In them were twenty-one accounts of the Cing-Japanese War, which 
together were 888 lines in length — 3.94 percent of the  issues, an average of 3.92 
percent an issue. But take note too that the amount of writing about the War was 
different from issue to issue. In issue number 588, there were only nineteen lines 
of writing about the War, but in number 591, there were 332 lines. If the outliers, 
numbers 586, 588, and 591, are taken out, then the average amount of writing 




ISSUE NUMBER  ABOUT THE WAR  NOT ABOUT THE WAR  PERCENT 
582 58 2246 2.52% 
583 36 2268 1.56% 
584 71 2233 3.08% 
585 54 1738 3.01% 
586 149 2155 6.47% 
587 63 2241 2.73% 
588 19 2285 0.82% 
589 55 2249 2.39% 
590 51 2253 2.21% 
591 332 1972 14.41% 
 888 21640 3.94% 
 
THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE  CHURCH NEWS  
While the Cing-Japanese War was taking place, the  Church News too put out ten 
issues: 7 ghoêh Gōng-sū 20 ní (“01 Aug. – 30 Aug. 1894”) to 4 ghoêh Gōng-sū 20 ní 
(“25 Apr. – 23 May 1895”). In these were thirty-four accounts of the War, which 
together took up 575 lines. The issues could have had up to 8,958 lines, so 6.42 
percent of the War-time  Church News was taken up by accounts of the War — an 











112 59 727 7.51% 
113 12 774 1.53% 
114 82 704 10.43% 
115 57 1095 4.95% 
116 49 737 6.23% 
117 45 1107 3.91% 
118 53 733 6.74% 
119 51 735 6.49% 
120 65 721 8.27% 
121 102 1050 8.85% 
 575 8383 6.42% 
 
 
THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE  MONTHLY MESSENGER  
While the Japanese-Táiwanese War was taking place, five issues of the  Monthly 
Messenger  came out: “July 1894” to “November 1895.” But, in the charts below, 
and in the later chapters, account is taken of the issues up to “January 1896.” The 
reason for this is that the December and January issues had accounts made just 
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before the War’s end, which did not get to England until some time later. These 
seven issues could have had up to 16,616 lines of writing. In them were 
twenty-eight accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War, which together took up 
926 lines of writing — 5.93 percent of the space, an average of 5.93 percent an 
issue. But, the amount of space was unusually great in one issue, No. 598, which 
had the missionaries’ accounts of the taking of Dāi-lám. Without this outlier, the 
average amount of writing about the War was 4.59 percent an issue. 
 
ISSUE NUMBER  ABOUT THE WAR  NOT ABOUT THE WAR  PERCENT 
592  99  2205  4.30% 
593  125  2179  5.43% 
594  81  2223  3.52% 
595  104  2200  4.51% 
596  85  2219  3.69% 
597  109  1683  6.08% 
598  323  1981  14.02% 






THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE  CHURCH NEWS 
The  Church News put out eight issues while the Japanese-Táiwanese War was 
ongoing: 5 ghoêh Gōng-sū 21 ní (“24 May – 22 Jun. 1895”) to 11 gāp 12 Gōng-sū 20 
ní (16 Dec. 1895 – 12 Feb. 1896). These issues could have had up to 8,064 lines. In 
them were eighty-six accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War, which took up 
2,366 lines. So 29.34 percent of the issues were taken up by accounts of the War. 
The average amount of writing about the War was 31.76 percent an issue. 
 
ISSUE NUMBER  ABOUT THE WAR  NOT ABOUT THE WAR  PERCENT 
122 467 685 40.54% 
123 420 348 54.69% 
124 136 1016 11.81% 
125 325 827 28.21% 
126 186 966 16.15% 
127 130 1022 11.28% 
128 449 319 58.46% 
129 253 515 32.94% 




From the above numbers, it is clear that the amount of space given to writing 
about the Wars was different from periodical to periodical, and from War to War. 
The rest of this chapter is a discussion of why this was so. 
 
The  Monthly Messenger : The Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War 
In the  Monthly Messenger the Japanese-Táiwanese War took up an average of 4.59 
percent of the periodical’s space, but the Cing Japanese War took up an average 
of only 2.20 percent. For this, there were at least two reasons. First, the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War had a much greater effect on the Presbyterian Church 
of England’s missions. The Cing-Japanese War took place chiefly in the Joseon 
Kingdom and the Cing Empire’s northeast. While there were Churches there, and 
the periodical gave the odd account of the War’s effects on these, the 
Presbyterian Church of England did not have any missions of its own in these 
places. In fact, their own missionaries even made note of how little effect the War 
was having on their work in the Empire’s south ( Monthly Messenger 587: 35). But 
the Japanese-Táiwanese War was taking place in one of the Church’s mission 
fields. The War was not only having an effect on the Church in Tái-wan, it would 
be the cause of great changes in that Church’s future. 
Second, the Monthly Messenger could get more detailed accounts of the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War than many of the U.K. newspapers. There had been little 
reason for the periodical to give detailed accounts of the Cing-Japanese War: 
many U.K. periodicals had writers over there, and their accounts were sent to the 
U.K. nearly every day. But things were different with the Japanese-Táiwanese 
War, at the start of which there was few Western newspaper writers in Tái-wan 
(Davidson 258). The Church’s missionaries not only had a good knowledge of 
Tái-wan’s geography and languages, the churchgoers were sending them 
accounts of the War’s effects from all over the island; these went into the 
missionaries’ own accounts, which were sent to the periodical in London. Not 
only did the  Monthly Messenger have very good accounts of the 
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Japanese-Táiwanese War, the War itself was important to the Church’s future too. 
And so, more space was given to accounts of it than to the Cing-Japanese War. 
 
The  Church News : The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War 
Accounts of the Cing-Japanese War took up an average of 6.49 percent of the 
Church News , and accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War took up an average of 
31.76 percent. The reasons there was more writing about the Japanese-Táiwanese 
War are very like those seen with a  Monthly Messenger : the Japanese-Táiwanese 
War had a greater effect on the island’s churches, and the  Church News ’  makers 
had more material for the periodical. Before the attack on the Bê ̄n -ó n  Islands, in 
the last days of the Cing-Japanese War, there had been no fighting anywhere near 
Tái-wan, and the War had seemed unlikely to have any effect on Tái-wan at all. 
So, for the greater part of the War, it was not seen as a very important matter, 
and was given only a small amount of the periodical’s space. 
Naturally, the Japanese-Táiwanese War was different: not only was the 
fighting having a great effect on the Churchgoers, the War’s outcome would have 
a great effect on their futures. So, the  Church News  gave far more space to 
accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War. This was simple for them, as they had 
many more accounts of the second War. The periodical did not often say from 
where its accounts of the Cing-Japanese War had come, but they were likely 
word-of-mouth and accounts from Cing newspapers. With the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War, things were very different. As noted in Chapter 2, one 
of the periodical’s purposes was to give the little groups of Táiwanese 
Presbyterian churchgoers, who saw other churchgoers infrequently, a way of 
having knowledge of each other, and of the Church’s leaders in Dāi-lám. So the 
Church News’ makers had a system in place for getting knowledge of events in 
Tái-wan, and sending account of these to their readers. When the War came to 




The Cing-Japanese War: The  Monthly Messenger and the  Church News 
As seen above, accounts of the Cing-Japanese War were not a great part of the 
Monthly Messenger or the  Church News . They were, though, a somewhat greater 
part of the Táiwanese periodical — an average of 6.49 percent — than they were 
of the English periodical — only 2.50 percent. Likely, there were two things at 
work here: the relations of the readers to the War, and the numbers of other 
accounts of the War. To the readers of the  Monthly Messenger , the Cing-Japanese 
War was something taking place half a world away, and having next to no effect 
on them. The readers may have had some idea of the Cing Empire, but the 
nearest thing they had to a personal connection with it was the missionaries, 
who were safely away from the fighting. 
Likely, few, if any of the  Church News ’ readers had much knowledge of the 
Joseon Kingdom or northeastern Cing Empire — as will be seen, the periodical’s 
makers were certainly of this opinion — but Tái-wan was still a part of the Cing 
Empire, their home — and so, they too were at War with the Japanese. The  Church 
News ’ makers were conscious of this, and gave their readers more accounts of the 
War than did the  Monthly Messenger . Another reason was the different amounts of 
other reading material for the two groups of readers. Readers of the  Monthly 
Messenger could make use of a number of periodicals, some of which had news of 
War-events only a day or so after they had taken place. The Cing periodicals did 
the best they could, but as noted in Chapter 2, the greater part of the 
churchgoers in Tái-wan were unable to make use of reading material in anything 
but the  Ê -mńg language. As will be seen in later chapters, this had an effect not 
only on the amount of writing that the  Church News gave its readers, but the 
qualities of that writing. 
 
The Japanese-Táiwanese War: The  Monthly Messenger and the  Church 
News 
The  Monthly Messenger and the  Church News both gave more space to accounts of 
the Japanese-Táiwanese War than to accounts of the Cing-Japanese War. But in 
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the English periodical this was only a little more space, an average of 4.59 
percent, while in the Táiwanese periodical it was a great amount more, an 
average of 31.76 percent. Again, the likely causes were the War’s having a greater 
effect on the Táiwanese readers, and the  Church News ’ makers having more 
material on the War. As noted, the Japanese-Táiwanese War was clearly going to 
have a greater effect on the Church in Tái-wan than the Cing-Japanese War had. 
But, to the readers of the  Monthly Messenger , this made it only a little more 
important. True, they were likely more conscious of the Church in Tái-wan than 
of Churches in other parts of the Cing Empire, but the War still had no effect on 
the readers themselves. 
In comparison, the War had a very great effect on readers of the  Church 
News . The fighting was taking place near, and sometimes in their houses, and 
before the end a number of churchgoers would be killed. What was more, their 
futures would be shaped by the War’s outcome: whatever this was, they would be 
living under a new government. The makers of the periodical were conscious of 
this, and gave a greater amount of space to accounts of the War. The two 
periodicals had more material about the Japanese-Táiwanese War than they had 
had for the Cing-Japanese War. But the makers of the  Church News had many 
times the amount of material that the  Church News ’ makers had. The  Monthly 
Messenger was sent accounts of the War from Tái-wan, but this was only a small 
part of what the missionaries in Dāi-lám were getting. And so, for these reasons, 
the two periodicals gave more space to the Japanese-Táiwanese War, but of the 
two the  Church News gave much more. 
 
Summary 
Many other writers on periodical’s accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War have made general statements about them without 
giving clear rules for the relations between these statements and the writings 
themselves. For example, they do not say how they put the periodicals’ writings 
into the groups “about the War” and “not about the War”; they do not say how 
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they put the writings “about the War” into smaller groups; and they do not give 
details on the sizes of these groups. Doing things in this way makes it much 
harder for the reader to make sense of the writer’s arguments, or to make them 
the base for future work.  
In this chapter was put forward a different way of doing things. Clear 
rules were given for putting the writings in the  Monthly Messenger and  Church 
News into groups “about the War” and “not about the War,” and for taking the 
measure of their sizes. Then, an account of the sizes of these groups was given. It 
was seen that the  Monthly Messenger and  Church News gave more space to writings 
about the Japanese-Táiwanese War than writings about the Cing-Japanese War. 
But while in the  Monthly Messenger the amount of space given to the two Wars was 
quite small, in the  Church News only the amount of space given to the 
Cing-Japanese War was small; the space given to the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
took up about one third of the periodical’s possible lines. The reason put forward 
for this was that the Japanese-Táiwanese War was the more important for the 
two periodicals, but for the  Monthly Messenger it was only a little more important, 
as it was having more of an effect on the missions, but no real effect on the 
readers. For the  Church News it was much more important: the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War was not only having an effect on the periodical’s writers 
and readers, it would have a great effect on Tái-wan’s future. 
In the next Chapter will be seen just what the periodicals said about the 
two Wars, and what they said that these effects would be.  
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4 — “Now the Cing will sue for Peace”: the periodicals’ 
neutrality 
 
This chapter takes up questions of the periodicals’ neutrality. What were the 
Wars’ best possible outcomes? And, were these outcomes likely? It makes the 
argument that the  Monthly Messenger was at first neutral in the Cing-Japanese 
War, then took the Japanese side after the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu; but in the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War, the periodical was with the Japanese from the start. As 
for the  Church News , it did not openly take sides in the Wars, but nonetheless 
made readers aware that a Cing loss was likely in the first War, and that the 
Táiwanese Republic had little chance against the Japanese in the second. 
 
Overview 
At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the  Monthly Messenger said that the 
outcome would be a Japanese loss. But the periodical was not on anyone’s side: it 
said that the War’s best possible outcome was one or more Western countries 
putting a stop to it. This opinion, though, was quickly changed. The periodical 
may have been against the War, but its writers had respect for good fighting. As 
the Japanese got the better of the Cing in battle after battle, the writers’ opinions 
were changed, and by November of 1894 the  Monthly Messenger was saying that 
the War’s outcome would, and should, be a Cing loss. 
Meantime, in Tái-wan, the  Church News was quiet about these things. In 
most ways, its writing about the War had more detail than the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s, and from the many accounts of Cing losses, readers could have got 
the idea that the War would not go well for the Empire. But for a long time the 
writers themselves did not say anything about the War’s likely outcome. Only 
after the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, in which the Cing Empire gave up control of the 
North China Sea, did the periodical come out with a statement about the War’s 
likely end — a Cing loss. 
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The  Monthly Messenger , having come around to supporting the Japanese 
Empire, went on doing so in the Japanese-Táiwanese War. In fact, they were even 
more strongly on the side of the Japanese: the Cing Empire may have been a weak 
country, but it was a country, while the “Táiwanese Republic” was a nothing but 
a rebellion. When the little Republic did what the Empire could not — putting a 
stop, for a while, to the Japanese attacks — the periodical’s writers were 
surprised and angry. Even so, they went on supporting the Japanese Empire till it 
did at last make an end of the Republic. 
While the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers were reading about the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War in the newspapers, the  Church News ’ writers were living 
through it. In the pieces that these writers sent to the  Monthly Messenger , it is 
clear that they gave the Republic no chance against the Japanese Empire, but 
they did not openly give this opinion in the  Church News . Even so, in a way their 
opinions still got through: as in the earlier War, the  Church News had many 
detailed accounts of the fighting, which made much of the Táiwanese losses. 
Likely, readers had little doubt about the War’s outcome. 
 
Definitions and divisions 
In Chapter 3 was a discussion of the the trouble with making general statements 
about the writings in periodicals. One of those troubles was with “putting 
writings ‘about the War’ into smaller groups” — that is, not giving the rules by 
which a piece of writing is said to be or not be an example of the sort of thing 
interesting to the researcher. This chapter is about the question of the 
periodicals’ being neutral about the Wars, and so it is necessary to be clear from 
the start what sorts of writings are taken as examples “being neutral” and “not 
being neutral.” The first thing about which to be clear is the possible outcomes of 
the War. The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War could, in theory, 
have had many different outcomes, but this chapter takes account of two: for the 
Cing-Japanese War, the  Cing overcoming the Japanese , or  the Japanese overcoming the 
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Cing ; for the Japanese-Táiwanese War,  the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanese , or t he 
Táiwanese overcoming the Japanese .  1
Take note that these outcomes are are logically contradictory: it is not 
possible for the Cing-Japanese War to have the outcome “ the Cing overcoming the 
Japanese  and the Japanese overcoming the Cing .” But, going outside logic, such things 
are said, and in at least two ways. First, a writer could make use of hypotheticals 
to say in what conditions “ the Cing  would overcome  the Japanese ,” and in what 
conditions the opposite would take place. Second, a writer can say that one side 
literally overcomes the other, but is  figuratively overcome itself. These sorts of 
writings were not common in  Monthly Messenger and  Church News , and the few of 
them are given their own discussions below. Take note too that it is possible for a 
writing to say nothing about the War’s outcome, and or to say something about 
outcomes of sorts other than the ones given above. For present purposes, such 
writings are put into their own group. 
So, making use of the above definitions, the pieces of writing “about the 
War” can be put into three groups: 
1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War 
1.1. Writings saying the Cing will overcome the Japanese 
1.2. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Cing 
1.3. Writings saying nothing about the War’s outcome  
2. Writings  not about the Cing-Japanese War 
 
3. Writings about the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
3.1. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Táiwanese 
3.2. Writings saying the Táiwanese will overcome the Japanese 
3.3. Writings saying nothing about the War’s outcome  
4. Writings  not about the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
 
About these outcomes, many opinions are possible. Here, this opinions are put 
into two groups: “ good (or better) ,” and “ bad (or worse) .” There is, in theory, a third 
1 For present purposes, “overcoming” can take place in two ways. First, one government may 
send the other a request for an end to the War, or at least for a discussion about putting an end to 
the War. If this takes place, the government sending the request has been “overcome.” Second, 
one government can take control of all the land over which the other had control at the start of 
the War. If this takes place, the government no longer having control over its old lands has been 
“overcome.” 
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group, “ not-good  and  not-bad ”: these writings will be put into the groups “writings 
saying nothing about the War’s outcome.” This makes the ordering somewhat 
simpler: normally, “good” and “bad” are contrary qualities — something 
“not-good” is not necessarily “bad” — but taking away this third group makes 
them contradictory, so a writing saying “the Cing overcoming the Japanese is a 
good outcome” is the same as one saying “the Japanese overcome the Cing is a 
bad outcome.” But take note that it is possible, and even common, to say that 
some outcome is figuratively “ good  and  bad .” When this is said, the writer is 
normally saying that the outcome is good “from a certain point of view” but bad 
from another, or that it was good “in some ways” but bad in others. A more 
complex ordering of the writings would be necessary to take account of these, 
but, as it is, there were not any writings of this sort in the  Monthly Messenger’s and 
Church News ’ writings about the Wars. The complete ordering of writings is given 
below: 
1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War 
1.1. Writings saying the Cing will overcome the Japanese 
1.1.1. Writings saying this is good outcome  
1.2. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Cing 
1.2.1. Writings saying this is good outcome  
1.3. Writings saying  nothing about the War’s outcome  
2. Writings  not about the Cing-Japanese War 
 
3. Writings about the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
3.1. Writings saying the Cing will overcome the Japanese 
3.1.1. Writings saying this is good outcome  
3.2. Writings saying the Japanese will overcome the Cing 
3.2.1. Writings saying this is good outcome  
3.3. Writings saying  nothing about the War’s outcome  
4. Writings  not about the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
 
This chapter is made up of four sections. The first two are about the  Monthly 
Messenger’s and  Church News ’ accounts of the Cing-Japanese War. The second two 
are about the periodicals’ accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War. At the start of 
the sections is a discussion of the numbers and sizes of writings, making use of of 
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the groups given above. There is then a discussion of the details of these writings: 
when the periodicals took sides in the Wars, what reasons they gave for taking 
the side that they did, and what is interesting or unusual about the language of 
these statements. 
 
THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE  MONTHLY MESSENGER 
At the Cing-Japanese War’s start, the  Monthly Messenger was not on anyone’s side. 
The periodical’s editors and writers were against the War completely, saying that 
its effects on the two countries would be all bad. They were, though, very sure of 
how the War would go. It seemed to them, as it seemed to many Western 
periodicals, that the Cing Empire, having more soldiers and ships than their 
enemy, was sure to get the better of the Japanese. But it was not so. The Japanese 
got the better of the Cing at Gasan, then at Pyeongyang, and then at at Ya-lù 
River. After the Japanese took control of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, opinions at the  Monthly 
Messenger were changed: it now seemed to them that the War’s most likely 
outcome was a Cing loss. They were not unhappy about this. From the writers’ 
point of view, the Cing Empire had had everything going for them at the War’s 
start. But the Cing military’s leaders had been foolish, and their soldiers had 
given up too quickly. In comparison, their Japanese opposites have been clever 
and brave. They had been the better fighters, and it was right that they got the 
better of the Cing. 
 
Numbers 
The chart below gives the amount of writing saying that the Japanese 
overcoming the Cing (“J. OVCMG C.”) was a good thing. The left-most column 
gives the issue and page numbers of the writings.  The “LINS” column gives the 2
number of lines in the issue; and the “PER” column gives the percent of the 
periodical’s “writings about the War” that the writings taking the Japanese side 
took up. 





J. OVCMG C. (GOOD) LINS PER 
585: 274–275 38 4.28% 
586: 15 73 8.22% 
590: 22 11 1.24% 
590: 23 22 2.48% 
590:23:00 22 2.48% 
TOTAL: 5 166 18.69% 
 
As can be seen above, the  Monthly Messenger was at first neutral about the 
Cing-Japanese War, and did not come out on the Japanese side until issue number 
585, in December of 1894. But, once it had done, writings taking the Japanese side 
were an important part of the periodical’s “accounts of the War,” taking up 18.69 
percent. In the sections that follow, will be given an account of why the 
periodical took the Japanese side, and what these writings said. 
 
Feng Island to Lyŭ-shùn-kŏu 
The  Monthly Messenger first made note of the Cing-Japanese War in September of 
1894, at which time the War was nearly a month old. It had been started on 25 
July, by a battle between Cing and Japanese ships near Feng Island. Nothing much 
had come of the battle, but later that day, the Japanese Navy had sent a Cing 
troop transport, and 1,000 soldiers, to the bottom of the North China Sea. Then, 
two days later, the Japanese Army had attacked the Cing-controlled city of Gasan, 
in the Joseon Kingdom. The Japanese had taken it from their enemies without 
much trouble, and by so doing, had got control of the Southern Joseon Kingdom. 
On 01 August, the Cing Empire made a declaration of War; shortly after, the 
Japanese Empire did the same. For the next month, the two powers made ready 
their armies on opposite sides of the Joseon Kingdom. Sooner or later, one side 
would have to make an attack on the other. 
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The September issue of the  Monthly Messenger said nothing about the 
coming fighting, or about any of the fighting to that point. It had one piece of 
writing about the War, which was chiefly a discussion of the politics that had 
been its cause. The writer of the piece said that it was hard to be sure of the War’s 
“real cause,” but made note of the two Empires’ political designs: 
China is bent on keeping the Japanese away from the continent; the 
Japanese are determined not to be pent up in their own islands. The 
Japanese Government, it is suspected, are not unwilling, besides, to divert 
popular attention from parliamentary difficulties (somewhat acute at the 
present time) by plunging into War. (583: 199) 
 
But, if the cause of the War was unclear, its likely end was not. To the writer it 
seemed that the Japanese had no chance against the Cing Empire: “If the two 
combatants are left to fight to the end, Japan must suffer defeat. China’s immense 
population and dogged persistence are sure to bring ultimate victory to her 
forces” (583: 199). 
This was not a brave opinion. In September of 1894, many other 
periodicals were saying the same (Dorwart 98–99). It made sense on paper — the 
Cing Empire simply had more soldiers and ships than the Japanese. But things 
were somewhat different in the field, for while the Cing military did have more 
men than the Japanese, these were all over the Empire, and under the control of 
different military leaders. In fact the Cing Army keeping control of the Northern 
Joseon Kingdom was nearly the same size as the Japanese Army that had been 
sent to take it (Fung 1026–1029). But of this fact, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers 
had no knowledge. It seemed to them that the little Japanese Army had no 
chance: the War’s only possible end was a Japanese loss, and by making War on 
the Cing Empire, the Japanese leaders were putting their country in great danger. 
Even so, the writer said nothing about this outcome’s being good or bad. In fact, 
in the writers’ view, the best possible outcome to the War would be the Western 
countries’ not letting things get to that point, and the quicker they did so, the 
better: “Europe would no doubt intervene to prevent the ruin of Japan; and it 
seems a pity that such interference should be longer delayed” (582: 198-199). 
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On 15 September, the Japanese made an attack on Pyeongyang. To the 
surprise of many in the West, the Japanese did great damage to the Cing army, 
who quickly took themselves away over the Cing-Joseon line. The Joseon 
Kingdom was now under Japanese control. Two days later, the Japanese Navy and 
the Cing Navy’s “North Sea Fleet” (“Běi-yáng Jiàn-duèi”) had a battle at the 
mouth of the Ya-lù River. This too, went badly for the Cing. Their ships took 
heavy damage, and had to go back to port; for the time being, the Japanese had 
control of the North Sea too. The  Monthly Messenger ’s October issue made note of 
“The great battle at Ping Yang [Pyeongyang], north from Seoul, in which the 
Japanese, by superior discipline and generalship, have apparently annihilated a 
large Chinese army,” but their opinion on the War’s most likely outcome was 
unchanged: “if the War goes on, the hundreds of millions in China must 
ultimately overcome the thirty millions of Japanese” (583: 222). Again, the 
Monthly Messenger was not alone in their view that the Cing Empire was sure to 
get the better of their enemy. At this time in the War, many Western newspapers 
were saying the same. What is more, the Cing losses had kept unchanged their 
opinion that the War was simply a bad thing for everyone, and that “The thing to 




After the battle of Pyeongyang, the Japanese military was quiet for a month. New 
soldiers were sent from Japan, and a new army put together to make an attack on 
the Cing Empire itself. The Cing government had knowledge of this, and sent 
their own soldiers to the Empire’s northeast, across the border from the Joseon 
Kingdom. But, being unsure if the Japanese had designs on other parts of the 
Empire, they sent soldiers to the south too. An editorial in the November issue of 
the  Monthly Messenger made note of this: 
Our missionaries tell us of excitement regarding the War with Japan, even 
in the far south of China. Reinforcements for Formosa [Tái-wan] are being 
sent from the mainland, and the recruiting and drilling bring the War 
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home to the consciousness of Chinamen in Amoy [ Ê -mńg] and Swaton [sic; 
Shàn-tóu]. (584: 251) 
 
But it said nothing about the War’s likely, or best, outcome. The editor did make 
clear that there was unlikely to be any fighting in the south: 
It was deemed advisable to ask our missionaries (by cablegram) if the 
return of the ladies should be delayed, or if they might safely go out at 
once. Mr. Gibson telegraphed in reply that there was no apprehension of 
danger in Swatow, nor any reason for postponing the departures of the 
ladies. (584: 251) 
 
This was, in effect, saying that the War might have been going badly for the Cing 
Empire, but it was not a serious danger. 
The next Japanese attack came in November. It was made against the city 
of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu (“Port Arthur”), a base of the North Sea Fleet, and for that 
reason an important target. Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu was a fortress of great power, a chain 
of Western-designed forts armed with the latest weapons, and was said that even 
a Western Army would have trouble making an attack on it. So, it came as a great 
surprise when the Japanese got complete control of the city in only two days 
(Paine 197–199). 
It was at this point many Western periodicals made the discovery that the 
Japanese Empire might get the better of the Cing after all. The  Monthly Messenger 
was one of these. Its December issue said “The War between China and Japan has 
resulted in the collapse of the Chinese forces,” and gave a number of opinions on 
the War’s likely outcome (585: 274). Hur Mackenzie, a missionary at the 
Presbyterian Church of Shàn-tóu, was of the opinion that the War might well be 
the end of the Cing Empire: 
If the Chinese were badly defeated in this War, and if the Japanese were to 
make a successful advance on Moukden [Shèng-jing] or Pekin [Běi-jing], 
there is no saying what might happen. All China might then be in a state 
of rebellion against the present dynasty, and dire confusion might for at 
time prevail. (585: 274–275) 
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But he did not say if this outcome was likely, or if it was a good or bad outcome. 
The  Monthly Messenger ’s editor took a happier view of things. He said that the 
Cing Empire would come out of the War in one piece, and that its loss to the 
Japanese could even be a good thing. The reason the Cing Empire was doing so 
badly was simply “the indolence and conceit of advisers at the imperial court,” 
but this was certainly as clear to the Emperor as it was to the writer, and after 
the War something would surely be done about it: “when the War ends in a peace 
humiliating to China wiser councils may (should) prevail in Pekin . . . Her failure 
to hold her own may give overwhelming force to the party of progress” (585: 
274). 
The fighting went on through May of 1895. Over four months the Japanese 
took the city of Wei-hǎi-wèi, made an end of the North Sea Fleet, and did great 
damage to every Cing army that went up against them. They then took the War 
South. They took control of the Bê ̄n -ó n  Islands in the Strait of Tái-wan, and 
seemed to be making designs on Tái-wan itself. But in the end it was the editor, 
not Mackenzie, who was right. The Japanese did not take Shèng-jing; they did not 
take Běi-jing; and the Cing Empire’s existence did not come to an end. In March 
the Cing Government sent a group of persons to the Japanese Empire with a 
request for peace. It took two more attempts before the Japanese gave their 
agreement to discussions, but by April these were at last underway. The two 
powers made peace with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which would, the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s editor said, “in all likelihood be accepted without much demur by the 




At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the  Monthly Messenger was certain that the 
Japanese Empire had no chance. The Cing Empire was simply too great in size; its 
soldiers and ships were simply too great in number. In the view of the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s editor, “If the two combatants are left to fight to the end, Japan must 
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suffer defeat” (583: 199). This opinion was not unusual. At the War’s start, many 
periodicals in England were saying the same thing. The “superior discipline and 
generalship” of the Japanese military in its early battles with the Cing had little 
effect on their opinions. In the view of the  Monthly Messenger ’s editor, numbers 
were all important, and “if the War goes on, the hundreds of millions in China 
must ultimately overcome the thirty millions of Japanese” (583: 222). But while 
the periodical had strong opinions about the War’s likely outcome, it was neutral 
about the value of this outcome. That is, the  Monthly Messenger ’s  editor and 
writers did not say that the Cing Empire’s overcoming the Japanese would be a 
good or a bad outcome, and they did not say that the opposite outcome — even if 
it then seemed impossible — was good or bad. It seemed to them that only good 
outcome would be for the War to be stopped before anyone had the chance to 
overcome their enemy. They even had a suggestion about how that could be 
done: “The thing to be desired is, undoubtedly, the interference of Europe to 
compel peace” (583: 222). 
But all this was changed after the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, in which the 
Japanese military quickly took over what was said to be one of the best military 
bases in East Asia. From the first battles, the periodical had been of the opinion 
that the Japanese military had good generals and soldiers; now it seemed to them 
that the Cing military was impossibly weak. In view of this discovery, the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s views on the War were changed. Like many other English periodicals, 
they now said that the Japanese were certain to get the better of the Cing. The 
brave Cing fighting at Wei-hǎi-wèi had no effect on this opinion, and to the end 
of the War, it was the  Monthly Messenger ’s position that the Japanese would 
overcome the Cing. 
What was more, after the battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the  Monthly Messenger 
was no longer politically neutral. Their position was now that the Japanese 
overcoming the Cing was a good thing. The reason for this was that the War had 
made clear there were serious troubles in the Cing military, and that the 
government was in bad condition from “the indolence and conceit of advisers at 
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the imperial court” (585: 274). Now that these were out in the open, the Cing 
government could make them right. The editor’s hope was that the War would be 
a learning experience for the Cing government, and that it might be the cause of 
“a great and happy peaceful revolution” (590: 105). 
 
THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN THE  CHURCH NEWS 
In the  Church News , discussions of the War’s likely outcome were not common. 
And, in the few places were the writers did say something about this, they simply 
made suggestions, not the strong statements of the  Monthly Messenger . The 
suggestions themselves were the same as those made in most Cing and Western 
periodicals: the Cing would get the better of the Japanese. But, like other 
Western-made periodicals, the views of the  Church News ’ writers were changed by 
the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu. After the seemingly impossible Cing loss, they now 
said that the Japanese would most likely get the better of the Cing Empire. But, in 
another way, the  Church News was quite unlike the Western and Cing periodicals. 
The Cing periodicals said from start to end that the Cing overcoming the 
Japanese was the best possible outcome. The Western periodicals said different 
things at the start, but after Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu many said that it was better the 
Japanese overcome the Cing. But the  Church News said nothing about these 
outcomes. From start to end, it said that the War was a bad thing for everyone, 
and that the best possible outcome would be for it to come to a quick end. 
 
Numbers 
Unlike the  Monthly Messenger , the  Church News never openly took sides in the War. 
It never openly said that one side overcoming the other would be a good thing; 
for this reason, there are no numbers to give. But, as will be seen below,  not doing 
this made it different from Western and Cing periodicals, and so what follows is 




Hong Island to Lu-s u n-kào 
In the  Church News , writing about the War’s outcome was not common, and what 
little writing there was took the form of suggestions, not the strong statements of 
the  Monthly Messenger . But, even these suggestions were not at first a part of the 
periodical’s writing about the War. In fact, the periodical’s accounts of the War’s 
start, and the early battles, said nothing at all about War’s likely outcome. For 
example, this is how the  Church News first gave readers news of the War between 
the Cing and Japanese Empires: 
On 30 July, the Circuit Attendant and Garrison Commander jointly 
published a notice saying that the Japanese have attacked Cing Warships 
in the Joseon Kingdom, and the two countries are now at War. 
Lāk-ghoêh 28, D e -dái cam Dìn-dái wū gōng-gê cut jit diu n  gè-sī dêh̄ gong-kì 
hi a n-zāi Rīt-bun-gēk láng dī Gē-lế d ê -hng pāh Diōng-gēk bên̄g-zún, 
liong-gēk ji a n  dêh̄ gāo-ji a n. (112: 74) 
 
This statement was at the end of a long piece of writing giving the history of the 
events which had been the War’s cause. It made note of the the geography of 
north-east Asia, the relations between the Cing, Joseon, and Japanese, and the 
two Empire’s reasons for going to War. But nowhere in this otherwise very 
detailed piece of writing was anything said about the War’s likely outcome. What 
was more, the  Church News  did not take sides. The periodical simply said that the 
War was a bad thing, and the only good end would be a quick one. The writers 
said that this should be the readers’ position too. As the editor put it in “An 
Invitation to Prayer and Thanksgiving”: “Ask God too, that the War might soon 
be ended, and everyone again at peace” (“Yā giú Si o ng-d ê hō gāo-jiàn ế sū gīn 
sōah, d a i-gê geh-zài hē-bhek”; 112: 80). 
It took time for news of the War’s early battles to make its way to Tái-wan, 
but by November the periodical was at last able to give readers an account of the 
Battle of Pyongyang: 
On the moonlit night of 14 September, the Japanese attacked Pyeongyang 
successfully. About 20,000 Cing soldiers were stationed there; it is said 
that over 10,000 are now killed, injured, or captured. Another four or five 
thousand have scattered in retreat. 
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Bêh-ghoêh 15 gn̄g-ghoêh mí Rīt-bùn bêng k i pāh Bếng-yōng-yá n , wū 
dek-s ê ng. Hit-diap d i -hia zak Diōng-gēk bêng cā-but-de 2,0000. Ji a o láng 
dêh̄ gòng hit-sí sīt wū bh a n-ghoā láng; wū-ế sì, wū-ế diēh-siong, wū-ế hō 
yin liah--k i . Gī-wú cun sì-ghō cêng láng dē-zào sì-so a n . (115: 106) 
 
From this account, it is clear that the War was not going well for the Cing Empire. 
But, nowhere does the periodical outright say this; it simply gives the numbers, 
saying nothing about the cleverness of the Japanese Army and Navy, or the 
weakness of the Cing. The writers simply gives the reader facts about the battle, 
and lets them make their own decision about the War’s likely outcome. And, the 
periodical said again that they were neutral in the War, and that that reader 
should be neutral too. In “An Invitation to Prayer and Thanksgiving,” the editor 
again says that readers should be praying “That the War will soon be ended” (“Hō 
gāo-ji a n ế sū gìn hé”; 115: 108). 
But, in time the  Church News did make a suggestion about the War’s likely 
outcome. This came at the end of a piece of writing about the Japanese military’s 
making its way into “Manchuria,” the Empire’s northeastern provinces. The 
periodical had this to say about them: 
Winter has already come to Manchuria; soon the weather will be bitterly 
cold, and waging War will be much more difficult. It will likely make the 
Japanese’s suffering great. 
Dī Bhoan-jiu yi-gêng wū leh dāng-tī n  ế sēh, ji u -sī danger do a -goá n  ế sí g a o, 
so-yì d i -hia sī eh-dit z e gāo-ji a n. Ga n -sī ê ̄hō Rīt-bùn ế láng gān-kò do a . 
(116: 111) 
 
These statements do not openly say that the Japanese will likely be overcome in 
Manchuria; is simply says that there would be “suffering” (“gān-kò”) in their 
future. Were this statement part of a different piece of writing, it might even 
been taken as saying that the readers should be feeling sorry for the Japanese 
soldiers. But coming where it does, at the end of a piece of writing about attacks 
on Cing cities in Manchuria, it seems to be doing something very different: 
making the suggestion that the Japanese attempt to take control of Manchuria 
will go badly for them. Even so, the periodicals position on the War’s best 
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possible outcome was unchanged. Readers were given these directions: “Pray to 
God:—That the War might soon end. That the two sides might accept the Gospel 
and submit to God” (116: 120; “Gī-giú Si o ng-d ê :—Hō gāo-ji a n ế sū gìn soāh. Hō 
liong-gēk siū gà-sī lái hāng-hek Si o ng-d ê ”). 
 
Lu-s u n-kào to Shimonoseki 
After the War was taking place in the Cing Empire itself, the  Church News at last 
came out with a suggestion about the War’s likely outcome — a Japanese loss. But 
then came the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, which was the cause of so many changed 
minds in the West. Unusually, after the Battle the  Church News gave two opinions 
on the War’s likely outcome: they again made the suggestion that the Cing would 
overcome the Japanese, and they said outright that the Japanese would, even 
had, overcome the Cing. The suggestion about the first outcome was made after 
an account of the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu. The  Church News made note that the 
Japanese were putting up new houses at An-dong, a city near the Cing-Joseon 
line. The periodical was of the opinion that this was unwise, saying “The Japanese 
seem to be planning for a long stay; they really have too high an opinion of 
themselves” (“Da n  yin gềng-rián  a i gu-dńg di a m hia ki a -kì, zê yā jin būt zū liōng 
lāh”; 117: 121). The aphorism “to have too high an opinion of oneself” (“būt zū 
liōng lāh”) is said of persons who see themselves as more able than they really 
are — stronger, quicker, cleverer, and so on.  The writer did not give any detail 3
about which, or how many, of these things were true of the Japanese, but the 
suggestion is clear enough: the Japanese will still be overcome. They might have 
been able to take control of An-dong, but they would not be able to keep it. 
This was the position of many Cing periodicals, which went on saying the 
the Cing would get the better of the Japanese right up till the discussions in 
Shimonoseki were taking place (Tsai 153–158). But, the next piece of writing in 
the same issue gave a very different opinion on the matter, much nearer to the 
opinions being given by the Western periodicals: 
3 In Guó-yǔ and Pǔ-tong-huà, the saying is “bù ziì liàng lì” (Siàng et al. 155). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Cing Empire appears completely defeated. . . . 
Some say that the Japanese will soon go after Běi-jing.  Now the Cing will sue 
for peace . . . . 
Ji a o an-ni ko a n  Diōng-gēk sǹg-sī do a -bāi. . . . Wū láng dêh̄ gòng giam-cài 
Jit-bùn bêh̄ s u n-so a k i pāh Bak-gia n .  Jit-diap Diōng-gēk  a i bêh̄ giū-hé . . . . (117: 
122; emphasis mine) 
 
This is much stronger than a suggestion. The periodical is openly saying, not only 
that the Cing are getting the worst of the War, but that they are “completely 
defeated” (“do a -bāi”). There is, in the writers’ view, nothing left for them to do 
but send a request for peace discussions. If they do not, the Japanese may take 
control of the Běi-jing, putting an end to the Empire’s existence. 
There are three possible reasons for two opinions being given in the same 
issue. First, they may have been the work of different writers. The two pieces of 
writing were in the “News” part of the periodical, which did not give its writers’ 
names. As such, they may have had different writers, with different opinions 
about the War’s outcome. Second, the writers may have been purposely giving 
readers a mix of good and bad news, so that the effect of the bad news would be 
less; this was how other Cing periodicals gave bad news about the War (Tsai 
153–154). And last, the second piece of writing may have been made after the 
first piece was typeset. The writers’ opinions may have changed as they were 
making the issue, and so they put in another piece of writing giving their new 
opinion. This sort of thing was not uncommon in the  Church News . For example, 
in issue no. 112, there were writings saying that the two countries “ may soon be 
at War” (“but-giù  gà n  ê ̄gāo-ji a n”), and writings, like the one given above, saying 
that they were at War right now (74). But whatever the reason, the second piece 
of writing was the periodical’s “true” opinion. From that point to the end of the 
War, it said that the Cing Empire would be overcome. 
But their opinion on the War’s best possible outcome was unchanged. 
Even as the Japanese were getting nearer to Běi-jing, the readers’ directions were 
what they had been from the start: “Ask God too that the War might soon end, 
that the people of Tái-wan might be preserved from harm, and that God might 
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continue to protect God’s Church” (Yā giú Si o ng-d ê be-b i gāo-ji a n gìn hé, hō 
Dāi-wán láng  m -biàn gān-kò; so a jiào-g o Yi-ế gào-hoē”; 119: 16). This was the 
Church News ’ position to the end of the War. It was not good for one side to 
overcome the other; the War was bad for everyone, and the best thing would be 
for it to come to a quick end. 
 
Arguments  
At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the  Church News  said nothing about the 
War’s likely outcome. In this, it was different not only from the  Monthly 
Messenger , but the greater part of the periodicals in the Cing Empire too, where 
“the ‘public opinion’ . . . represented in newspapers prior to the War was that 
China would win” (Tsai 149–150). The reason for this was that the  Church News ’ 
writers were against the War, seeing it as a useless loss of men, money, and 
material. At the War’s start, they, like most, had the idea that the Cing would get 
the better of the Japanese, and in places they even put in suggestions of this 
opinion. But they did not say it openly. For one thing, getting up the 
churchgoers’ fighting spirits was not their purpose. For another, their hope was 
that Churchgoers would be against the War too. Then, like many Westerners, the 
writers’ opinions were changed by Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, as was their way of writing 
about the War: they now said openly that Cing would be overcome by the 
Japanese. In the West, this would not have been unusual: the  Monthly Messenger 
and many other periodicals were saying the same. But it was unlike most Cing 
periodicals, which went on saying the Cing would get the better of the Japanese 
in the end. This was likely the reason that the  Church News now gave its opinion 
openly. There were no periodicals in Tái-wan giving churchgoers the “truth” — 
the Cing had been bested — and so the  Church News had to do this for their 
readers.  
But, at no time, and no matter what opinion they gave, did the  Church 
News  take sides in the War. As noted in Chapter 1, before the War, many Cing 
periodicals said that the Cing overcoming the Japanese would be a good thing. 
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The War’s cause had been the Japanese Empire’s “coveting gain and neglecting 
rightness, taking no account of the country’s or people’s good” (“tan lì wàng yì, 
wǎng-gù gúo-jì mín-sheng”; Lǐ Jin-ciáng 15). What was more, it was “a great 
opportunity for China to wash away feelings of shame and humiliation that had 
persisted since the Opium Wars” (Tsai 149–150). After the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, 
many Western periodicals, even the  Monthly Messenger , said that the Japanese 
overcoming the Cing would be a good thing. A Cing loss would make them see the 
value of Western ways, and get the right persons into positions of power. 
But the  Church News did not say these things. Likely, the  Church News ’ 
accounts of the War were neutral by reason of its being a Church periodical for 
Cing readers, made by Western editors and writers. It was the writers’ hope that 
the readers would simply be against the War completely, but they could not be 
sure that this would be so. Their readers may have been churchgoers, but they 
were still Cing, and it would not do for the periodical to be openly against its 
readers’ own country. 
 
THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE  MONTHLY MESSENGER 
From the Japanese-Táiwanese War’s start, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers said 
that the Japanese Empire would get the better of the Táiwanese Republic. There 
was sense in this — the Japanese had many more and better soldiers and arms 
than their enemy — but the Republic gave everyone a surprise: they did some 
hard fighting against the Japanese, who were even stopped for a time, and had to 
get in new soldiers. Even so, the opinion of the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers was 
unchanged. They went on saying that the Japanese were sure to get the better of 
the Republic, and in the end even had a little part in making this so. 
It is no surprise then, that at no time were the writers neutral about the 
War’s outcome. From the first, it was their view that the Japanese overcoming 
the Táiwanese was the better outcome. What was more, the quicker the Japanese 
did this, the better. In the writers’ view, the longer the War went on, the more 
Táiwanese lives would go to waste, and the more bad feeling there would be 
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between the Táiwanese and their new rulers when the Japanese at last got 




The chart below gives the amount of writing in the  Monthly Messenger  saying that 
the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanese was a good thing. Again, the percentages 





J. OVCMG T. (GOOD) LINS PER 
592: 153–154 57 6.16% 
592: 158 42 4.54% 
594: 198 34 3.67% 
594: 201 47 5.08% 
596: 250 56 6.05% 
597: 272 57 6.16% 
598: 6 29 3.13% 
598: 10 64 6.91% 
598: 11–12 148 15.98% 
TOTAL: 8 477 51.51% 
 
As is clear from the above numbers, the  Monthly Messenger was quicker to give 
their opinion on the best outcome of the Cing-Japanese War, and gave more 
space to it. They were again on the side of the Japanese and, as will be seen 





From San-diao-jiăo to Tái-bĕi 
Tái-wan had not been a part of the Cing-Japanese War, but it had long been of 
interest to the Japanese military, who were now in a position to get nearly 
anything from the Cing government. The “Treaty of Shimonoseki” was signed by 
Cing and Japanese representatives on 17 April 1895. Article II of the treaty said: 
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following 
territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property 
thereon . . . 
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or 
belonging to the said Island of Formosa. 
(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands lying between the 
119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 
24th degrees of north latitude. (Kajima 263) 
 
News of this development had got to Tái-wan by the end of April. The greater 
part of the islanders were unhappy to be made a part of the Japanese Empire. A 
part of these did something about it. Through the end of April and the start of 
May, there were meetings of the islands moneyed and empowered — Cing 
government representatives, local gentry, and business leaders. Out of these 
meetings came a plan: Tái-wan would make itself free of the Cing and Japanese 
empires; it would have a new government — a republican government. On 23 
May, they made public the declaration of independence of the “Táiwanese 
Republic”:  
Now therefore we, the People of Formosa, are irrevocably resolved to die 
before we will serve the enemy. And we have in Council determined to 
convert the whole island of Formosa into a Republican State, and that the 
administration of all our State affairs shall be organized and carried on by 
the deliberations and decisions of Officers publicly elected by us the 
People. (Davidson 279) 
 
The Japanese leaders did not take this seriously. They would not give up control 
of their new island, and they would not have discussions with its new 
government. The Japanese prepared their military to take control of Tái-wan by 
force, and the Japanese-Táiwanese War was started.  
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The first fighting took place on 29 May when Japanese soldiers were 
landed at Sām-diāo-gāk, a beach in northeastern Tái-wan. They made short work 
of the Táiwanese there, and the were soon on their way to Dāi-bāk, the Táiwanese 
capital. It seemed the Tái-wan military could to little against them. By 06 June, 
the Japanese had control of the capital, Táng Jǐng-song — president of Tái-wan 
for less than seven days — was safely back in the Cing Empire, and the best 
soldiers in the Táiwanese military were giving up their arms. It seemed to many 
that the Táiwanese Republic would not see the end of its first week. 
The  Monthly Messenger first made note of the new War in the July issue. 
Again, they were certain about the outcome: the Japanese would get the better of 
their enemy. An editorial gave an account of the War to this point, and its likely 
end: 
A Republic was proclaimed (the “President” has since fled from Formosa!) 
and preparations made for resistance to the Japanese invasion. Having 
had the island formally handed over to them by a Chinese Imperial 
Commissioner, the Japanese at once proceeded to take possession, and 
already the Chinese “rebellion,” as it must now be called, is collapsing — 
but only after some stubborn fighting. (592: 153–154) 
 
It was not only the editor who said as much. In the same issue was a letter from 
William Ede, an educational missionary in Dāi-lám, giving much the same 
opinion: “Inferiority in numbers has sometimes been made up for by the 
inspiration of some great principles. But in Formosa there exists no high-souled 
enthusiasm to lead men to do and dare what seems impossible. Sordidness and 
sensuality are current vices. Conquering zeal was never born of such parentage” 
(592: 158). The periodical did not say outright that that the Japanese overcoming 
the Táiwanese was the better outcome, but it was made clear to readers even so. 
The editor says that the Táiwanese Republic may have been a government at the 
start, but now it is simply a “rebellion” — hardly the right group to have control 
of the island. Ede says that its leaders’ do not have the “high-souled enthusiasm” 
necessary for a War of this sort; worse, they are not good men: “Sordidness and 
sensuality are current vices.” In the  Monthly Messenger ’s opinion, the War’s most 
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likely, and best possible, outcome was a Táiwanese loss. And for this outcome 
they would not be long waiting. In the view of the editor, the Republic was 
already near death: “It is not likely that any further serious defence will be made 
by the Chinese; and peaceful occupation of Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám], our own centre, 
may now be reasonably expected” (592: 153-154). 
 
From Tái-bĕi to Tái-nán 
But the Táiwanese did not give up after the loss of Dāi-bāk. The Táiwanese 
military in the south was under the command of Lióu Yǒng-fú, whose “Black 
Standard Army” (“Hei-cí Jyun”) was said to be one of the best in the Cing Empire. 
Having gone over to the side of the Republic, Lióu was not about to give up on it. 
He made himself its new president, and his base in Dāi-lám the new capital. The 
Japanese military at once went south to take on Lióu and his army. But to the 
surprise of many, they did not get there, being stopped by hard fighting in and 
around the city of Dêk̄-c a m, some 216 kilometres north of Dāi-lám. For the time, 
the Republic was safe. An editorial in the September issue of the  Monthly 
Messenger  made note of these developments, but the writer’s view on the War’s 
likely outcome was unchanged. The Táiwanese could not possibly get the better 
of their enemy, and by fighting were only making things worse for themselves: 
The Japanese are meeting with a good deal of opposition and resistance 
from the “Black Flags,” on their march to Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] from the 
north. The “Black Flags” even succeeded in driving back the Japanese 
force ― a delay in the advance which is unfortunate, as it may encourage 
more obstinate resistance: the only result of which would be serious 
bloodshed and embittered feeling. (594: 201) 
 
In the editor’s view, the best possible outcome was for the Japanese to quickly 
make an end of the Táiwanese Republic: “It is to be earnestly hoped that Japanese 
officials may have their hands on the government of the whole islands soon” 
(594: 201). And in the end, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers got their wish. 
In stopping the Japanese at Dêk̄-c a m, the Táiwanese military had been 
badly hurt. The Japanese simply sent more soldiers, and at the end of August, the 
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Táiwanese army was broken completely at the battle of Bat-go a Mountain. By 
September, the Japanese were making their way south without much trouble. In 
the November issue of the  Monthly Messenger , the editor gave readers a list of the 
cities the Japanese had taken: 
Mr. Ede (writing from Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] on 2nd September) says that 
they had just heard that the Japanese had taken Chianghoa [Jiōng-ho a ] 
and Lok-kang [Lēk-gàng] (Lok-kang is on the coast; Chianghoa is inland). 
The report went on to tell that the Japanese force had reached Taulak 
[Dao-lak], a good many miles south of Chianghoa, and within three days 
march of Taiwanfoo. A Hong-kong telegram (18th October) announces 
what must be at last the beginning of the end: on the 16th the Japanese 
had captured Takow [Da n -gào], a large town south of Taiwanfoo, on the 
coast. (596: 250) 
 
Better, the Japanese were at last in a position see the War to its best possible 
outcome, the death of the Republic: “The Japanese advance from the north has 
been slow and cautious; and evidently after the first check, with a sufficient 
force. Probably before these lines are being read Taiwanfoo has fallen into their 
hands and the conquest of the western half of Formosa been completed” (596: 
250). 
The editor was not wrong. Lióu Yǒng-fú made the decision that there was 
no point in fighting on. By 21 October he was back in the Cing Empire, and 
Dāi-lám was in the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese-Táiwanese War was over. 
The December issue gave readers this news, and made note that the missionaries 
too, had been hoping the War would be over more quickly: 
The long delay in the Japanese advance has been an opportunity for 
rowdyism, of which full advantage has been taken . . . The hearts of Mr. 
Ferguson and Mr. Ede, who have so courageously stuck to their perilous 
post through it all, have been greatly saddened, and they have wondered 
at what seemed to them the inexplicable Japanese tardiness, while 
thankful to report that the Christians have everywhere continued in a 
simple and strong faith in God, spite of [sic] alarming rumours and cruel 
attacks. (597: 272) 
 
And, the January issue made clear, in the end they had done something about 
this: 
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Our own missionaries in Formosa―Messrs. Ede and Ferguson, with Mr. 
Barclay . . . courageously held the fort during the troubled months of the 
“Black Flag Republic.” They have been graciously preserved from harm, 
and have been able to facilitate a peaceful occupation of Taiwanfoo by the 
Japanese . (598: 6; emphasis mine) 
 
About just what they did, more will be said in later chapters. For now, it is 
enough to say that from start to end, the writers of the  Monthly Messenger , in 
England and Tái-wan, had seen a Táiwanese loss as the War’s best possible 




At the start of the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers were 
of the opinion that the Táiwanese Republic had no chance against the Japanese 
Empire. After all, the Japanese had just got the better of the Cing Empire, with its 
many ships, and its numberless soldiers. Against such a power, what chance had 
a little island with a new government and an untested military? And at first, the 
writers seemed right about this. The early battles with the Japanese went badly 
for the Republic, and it was soon without its president and its capital. At this 
point, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers said that the Republic was “collapsing,” 
and that the Japanese would have complete control of the island in the near 
future. But, the Republic was not done. It got a new president and a new capital; 
and it went on fighting. The Japanese were even stopped for a time at Dēk-c a m, 
much to the surprise of the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers. But this made no change 
to their opinions about the War’s likely outcome. They went on saying that the 
Japanese would surely get the better of the Republic. And at the end of October it 
did, with a little help from the Church’s own missionaries. 
At no time were the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers neutral about the War’s 
outcome. From the start they said that the Japanese overcoming the Republic 
would be a good outcome, and it was their hope that the Japanese would do this 
quickly. When the Japanese did not do it quickly, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers 
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in Tái-wan and England were unhappy about the “inexplicable Japanese 
tardiness.” Likely, this view had much to do with their opinion of the Republic’s 
chances against the Japanese. In its War with the Japanese, the Cing Empire had 
been let down by its leaders’ “impregnable arrogance and ignorance.” But the 
Cing had at least had enough soldiers and arms that, with better leaders, they 
would have been a danger to the Japanese. The Táiwanese Republic did not have 
enough soldiers or arms for this; there was no way for them to get the better of 
their enemy, and there was no point in fighting a War which could have only one 
outcome: a loss for the Táiwanese Republic. 
So, in a sense, the writers of the  Monthly Messenger were not against the 
Republic but on the side of the Táiwanese, or at least the Táiwanese churchgoers. 
The  Monthly Messenger ’s writers were looking ahead to the day when the Japanese 
had control of Tái-wan, when the islanders would have a Japanese governor, and 
be living under Japanese laws. As the Republic’s overcoming the Japanese was 
simply not possible, fighting an impossible War would only be the cause of 
“serious bloodshed” during the change in rulers, and “embittered feeling” after 
the Japanese had control of the island. It was this future that the writers were 
hoping would not come to be, and for this reason they took the side of the 
Japanese. 
 
THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE  CHURCH NEWS 
The  Church News never said anything about the most likely, or best, outcome of 
the Japanese-Táiwanese War. At the War’s start, they said only that there would 
be great changes in Tái-wan’s future. About the taking of Dāi-bak and the fall of 
the north, they said only that it had taken place. And about the fighting around 
Dēk-c a m, they said nearly nothing. But from the missionaries’ writings in the 
Monthly Messenger , it is clear that they did not give the Republic any chance 
against the Empire. And, this opinion does come through in the  Church News . The 
periodical gave readers news of the Táiwanese military’s losses against the 
Japanese, but little news of the Japanese troubles. They made the Republic’s 
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leaders seem weak. And they had statements from persons saying that the 
Japanese would overcome the Republic, but nothing from persons saying the 
opposite. In these ways, the periodical’s writers kept their opinions to 
themselves, while still making the suggestion that the Japanese would overcome 
the Táiwanese. By doing things in this way, they were able to make their readers 
ready for the future, without putting them in danger, or seeming to go against 
the government of the Táiwanese Republic. 
 
Numbers 
The  Church News said nothing about the Japanese-Táiwanese War, so there are 
again no numbers to give. But, the periodical again made suggestions about the 
War’s likely outcome. A detailed discussion of what these were, and why they 
were given, is below. 
 
From Sām-diāo-gāk to Dāi-pak 
In late May, the  Church News said that Church had before it “two very important 
issues” (122: 37; “nn̄g hāng doā yào-gìn ế d a i-j i ”). The first was that a number of 
churchgoers were to be made pastors, the first Táiwanese pastors in the church’s 
history. The other was the Japanese-Táiwanese War: 
Tái-wan has already been given to the Japanese Empire to rule. But, they 
have not yet begun to rule, because the people, unwilling to submit, have 
established a Republic. 
Dāi-wán yi-kêng sià hō Rīt-bùn lái goàn. Kiēk yin yao-bōe dêh̄ jiang-goàn, 
yīn-wī bêh-s i n   m -kềng hāng-hek, gā-dī bhêh̄ siat-lip z e Bhīn-zu-gēk. (122: 
37) 
 
Unlike the  Monthly Messenger , the  Church News said nothing about the Republic’s 
chances in the War. In fact, they said that great changes in Tái-wan’s future were 
the only certain thing — the War’s outcome could be a Táiwanese or Japanese 
loss: 
But, no matter whether we end up with Japanese rule or self-rule, things 
will be changed, and never more as they once were. 
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Zong-sī bé lūn bhêh̄ gui Rīt-bùn koàn a-sī bhêh̄ gā-dī li a o-lì, dêk-gāk 
bh ê -dīt tang yiú-goān cīn-ciū n  za-zếng ế koan-sīt, gêng-hòng wun-d a ng 
bhêh̄ gê-wā n . (122: 37–38) 
 
This is very different from the  Monthly Messenger , where William Ede was saying 
“in Formosa there exists no high-souled enthusiasm to lead men to do and dare 
what seems impossible” (592: 158). To their English readers, the missionaries 
were clear that, in their opinion, the Republic had no chance against the Japanese 
Empire. But to their readers in Tái-wan, they said that it was unclear which side 
would get the better of the other. And they said nothing at all about their feelings 
on this matter.  
While the missionaries seem to have kept their true feelings about the 
Republic’s future from the Táiwanese churchgoers, they did not keep from them 
that the Táiwanese military was doing badly against the Japanese: 
On 31 May the Japanese Empire sent soldiers to attack Tái-wan; they 
landed at a place 25 km south of Gê-̄láng. Some of the Táiwanese soldiers 
there just ran away, but others stayed to fight. The Japanese then 
advanced as far as the foothills of Gê-̄láng. . . . On 07 June we received 
news that Gê-̄láng had fallen to the Japanese on the 03 June. At this time 
Governor Táng evidently escaped on a steamer, and his office was burnt. 
The Japanese soon captured Dāi-bak-hù and H o -bhoề. 
Gh o -ghoêh cê 8 Rīt-bùn wū coā bêng bhêh̄ lái Dāi-wán; yīn d u i lī 
Gê-̄lāng-táo 50 lì lō ế làm-bêng ji u n -soa n . Dāi-wán bêng w u -ế zào, wū-ế gāp 
yin ji a n. Yin dīt-dit jìn-zếng g a o Gê-̄lāng-táo ế soā n -ka.  A o-lái gēh wū yin-ế 
bêng ji u n -soa n , hit-wī lī Gê-̄lang-táo pò-bo a n  lō. [. . .] Gh o -goêh 15 ghoàn 
jih-dieh siāo-sit dêh̄ gong-kì, bun-ghoêh 11 rit Gê-̄lāng-táo hō Rīt-bùn 
ci a m--k i . Hit-sí Dńg Bhu-dái zē hoe-zún zào--k i , yi-ế ghê-̄mńg so a hō láng 
siē-lie--k i . Bhế lo a -gù Rīt-bùn bêng lái ji a m Dāi-bak-hù gāp H o -bhề. (122: 
45) 
 
The readers, living far from the places in this account, may have been unclear 
about the geography of northern Tái-wan, but they were likely clear that Gê-̄láng 
and H o -bhòe were important cities, and that Dāi-bāk was, or had been, the 
Republic’s capital. Now, the Japanese were in control of these places, and the 
Táiwanese President, “Governor Táng,” was back in the Cing Empire. And so, the 
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same issue that gave readers news of the Táiwanese Republic’s birth, give them 
news of what seemed to be its end. 
But by the time the next month’s issue came out, the Táiwanese Republic 
was not only still living, but making great trouble for the Japanese at Dek-c a m. 
The periodical gave readers this news, and news of Lióu Yǒng-fú’s efforts to take 
back the island. They still said nothing about the War’s likely outcome, or their 
feelings about its best outcome. But, the readers might have got some idea of this 
from their account of Lióu’s leading the War effort: 
That day, Commissioner Lióu published an edict saying that because the 
Japanese had captured Dāi-bak, he would lead soldiers north to retake it. 
In the end, he did not go himself, but stayed in Dāi-lám. 
Hit-rīt Láo Kīm-cê cūt gè-sī gòng yīn-wī Rīt-bùn lái cīm-hoān Dāi-bāk yi 
bhêh̄ coā bêng k i hia kêk̄-hek.  A o-lái yi bun-sin bé k i , yiū-ghoán di a m 
Hu-siá n . (123: 53) 
 
This was not quite saying anything against Lióu — as President, he would likely 
have been more use to the Republic in its capital than on the front line — but it 
did not make him out to be the mighty general he was said to be in the Cing 
newspapers (Chén Jhong-cyun 48). But this was a small thing; for the most part, 
the missionaries were quiet about the War’s outcome. 
 
From Dāi-bak to Dāi-lám 
The next issue came out in the middle of July. It made note of how slowly the 
Japanese were making their way south, but said that they would likely get there 
in the end: 
The Japanese have still not attacked southern Tái-wan . . . Some say that 
they have not come because the south wind has been frequent of late, and 
the waves in the harbour too large; others claim that they are waiting for 
their soldiers in the north to come south; at that time they can all attack 
together. 
G a o da n  Rīt-bùn bêng yao-bhoē lái pāh Dāi-lám . . . W u -láng gòng yin bhế 
lái sī yīn-wī jit-diap siōng-sióng wū lām-hong, gang-kào ế ềng doā; wū-ế 
gòng sī dêh̄ tềng-hāo yīn-ế bêng d u i back-lō leh--lái gào-jia; hit-sí tang 
zè-hoè lái pāh. (124: 59–60) 
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Take note of the surprise in the words, “ still have not attacked” (“ yao-bhoē lái 
pāh”). This was not quite saying that the Japanese would certainly overcome the 
Táiwanese Republic, but it certainly makes that suggestion. Even so, the writers 
took care to put some distance between themselves and the suggestion that the 
Japanese would get the better of the Republic, saying only that “some say . . . 
others say” (“W u -láng gòng . . . wū-ế gòng”). But by the next month, the Japanese 
still had not come, and the  Church News at last gave readers news about why:  
Regarding the War, it has stopped for now. It is rumoured that the 
Japanese soldiers in the north retreated when they caught sight the Black 
Flag soldiers, but we have heard nothing about the outcome of the 
encounter. For other rumours about the War, see this month’s news from 
Dao-lak. 
Lūn gāo-ji a n ế sū hi a n-sí cia n -tếng--dêh̄. Gān-da dêh̄ hōng-sia n  gòng dī 
back-lō Rīt-bùn gì n -dieh hêk̄-gí ế bêng jiū t ê , bhế gong-kì sū-yá n  ế sū. Lūn 
gong-kì gāo-ji a n ế ên̄g-wē, cià n  lìn dieh ko a n  Dao-lak bùn ghoêh ế siāo-sit. 
(125: 69) 
 
In the  Monthly Messenger , the writers were very open about that being a bad 
thing. But in the  Church News they simply give the news, not saying that Japanese 
would surely get the better of the Republic in the end. But, they do put into doubt 
the stories about what the Táiwanese military had done, and was doing, saying 
that these are simply “rumours” (“hōng-sia n , “ên̄g-wē”). 
The writers would not give their own opinions on the Táiwanese 
Republic’s chances against the Japanese Empire, but they were happy enough to 
give the opinions of persons in agreement with them. The same issue the had 
news of the Japanese troubles had too a letter from an Evangelist in Jiāng-ho a . In 
it, he gave an account of his meeting with a person who was sure that the 
Japanese would get the better of the Republic, and was making plans for this 
time: 
some days ago a scholar sat and talked with me. He claimed to know the 
Gospel, which he said he loved. He said to me, “If the Japanese come, you 
Church-folk will not be afraid, eh? Indeed, you will probably profit. Your 
literate will be their teachers, your capable their mandarins, your strong 
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their soldiers; all of you will make a fortune. Though you are now 
slandered for having joined a foreign sect, you are unafraid. I also wish to 
join your Church; would you be so good as to provide me with an 
introduction? 
zên̄g-rit wū jit ế tāk-cêh-láng gāp ghoà zê ̄gòng wē, d e -lì kiēk zai, kòng yi 
jin  a i. Yi wū d u i ghoà gòng, Rīt-bùn nā lái, lìn rīp-g a o ế láng dêk-kāk kāh 
m -gia n , heh n ? Yā dêk-kāk wū tāo-lō. Nā bhat-rī--ế tang z e yin ế siān-sê n , 
gháo b a n-sū--ế tang z e yin ế goa n , wū k u i-lat--ế tang dn̄g-bêng, an-ni tang 
t a n z ê -zê ̄jí n . Sūi-rián jit-diap hō láng hiám rip hoān-a-g a o yā sī bhé 
yào-gìn, ghoá yā bhêh̄ lái gāp lìn rip g a o, hùi-sín lì t ê ghoà gì-ji a n. (125: 
70–71) 
 
The man did not get his introduction, but through his question, a clear message 
was sent to the readers: the Japanese are coming; the Táiwanese with education 
have seen that the Republic is done for, and are making ready for life under 
Japanese rule. 
In the next month’s issue, there were many accounts from Churchgoers 
living in Japanese controlled parts of the island. Sure enough, Jiāng-ho a was one 
of them (126: 81). From this point, things went quickly. The Japanese, with help, 
took control of Dāi-lám at the end of October, and the next issue of the  Church 
News said: “At the beginning of this year, Tái-wan belonged to the Cing, later it 
belonged to the Republic, and now it belongs to the Japanese Empire” (128: 105; 
“Dī gīn-ní táo Dāi-wán ế bêh-s ê n  siek dī Diōng-gēk,  a o-lái siek dī Bhīn-zu-gek, da n 
wū siek dī Rīt-bun-gēk”). 
 
Discussion  
At no time did the  Church News say openly that the Japanese Empire would 
overcome the Táiwanese Republic, or the Republic the Empire. At War’s start, the 
Church News said that its outcome was not certain, and that “ no matter whether we 
end up with Japanese rule or self-rule , things will be changed, and never more as 
they once were” (122: 37–38; emphasis mine). Openly, this was its position to the 
end. But the  Church News ’ makers were writers for the  Monthly Messenger too. And 
from their writings in this periodical, it is clear that many were of the opinion 
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that the Táiwanese Republic had no chance in the War. William Ede, for example, 
said that “Inferiority in numbers has sometimes been made up for by the 
inspiration of some great principles. But in Formosa there exists no high-souled 
enthusiasm to lead men to do and dare what seems impossible. . . . Conquering 
zeal was never born of such parentage” (592: 158). And when the Japanese 
seemed to be coming South too slowly, the missionaries were “greatly saddened” 
and “wondered at what seemed to them the inexplicable Japanese tardiness” 
(597: 272). 
But they kept these views out of the  Church News . Likely, there were at 
least two reasons for this. One was keeping themselves, and the churchgoers, out 
of danger. Many Táiwanese had the idea that the Church was working with 
foreign powers against the Cing, and now the Táiwanese, government. In places 
churchgoers were even put to death for “communicating with the Japanese” 
(“tong Rīt-bùn”), or “leading in the Japanese” (“coā Rīt-bùn bêng rīp-lái”;  Church 
News  128: 110). It would has been unwise to give any more reason for having 
these ideas. The missionaries themselves were living in Dāi-lám, the heart of the 
Táiwanese Republic. They had not been completely safe when Tái-wan had been 
part of the Cing Empire, which had by treaty to keep Westerners safe. The 
Táiwanese Republic had no such agreements with the Western powers, and to 
openly go against Lióu Yǒng-fú’s government could be a very bad thing for them. 
The other reason was that some of the Churchgoers might themselves 
have been friends of the Republic. It was bad enough that the War was making 
“embittered feeling” between the Táiwanese and Japanese ( Monthly Messenger 
594: 201). It would be no help at all if some in the Church had such feelings for 
the Western workers. But, the missionaries did not keep their thoughts about the 
Republic’s future out of the  Church News completely. Their accounts of the War 
made much of the Táiwanese losses, but said that the Japanese military’s troubles 
were only rumours. And their language made the suggestion that the Japanese 
would certainly make their way to Dāi-lám in the end. They even had statements 
from persons saying this openly, but nothing from anyone saying the opposite. 
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The missionaries never openly said that the Japanese would overcome the 
Táiwanese Republic, but the readers likely got this idea even so. 
 
111
5 — “Chinese and Japanese patriotism are of widely different 
types!”: Opinions on the Cing, Japanese, and Táiwanese 
 
In the last chapter it was seen that the  Monthly Messenger and  Church News were 
neutral at the start of the War between the Cing and Japanese Empires, but that 
over time both went over to the side of the Japanese. This chapter goes deeper 
into the reasons for this change, which had chiefly to do with the periodicals’ 
opinions about the leaders of the Cing, Japanese, and Táiwanese governments 
and militaries. It gives an account of what the periodicals’ writers saw as positive 
and negative about them, and why these judgements were the cause of the 
periodicals’ taking the side of the Japanese. 
 
Overview 
In the Cing-Japanese War, the  Monthly Messenger was of the opinion that the Cing 
Empire’s government leaders were foolish, and that its military leaders had little 
knowledge of their work. As for the Japanese, the  Monthly Messenger ’s opinion was 
that their government and military leaders were clearly better than the Cing 
leaders. These judgements were in part a result of the Japanese military’s doing 
so well in the Wars, but there was more to it than that. The  Monthly Messenger ’s 
writers saw the Cing leaders as having too high an opinion of their Empire’s 
accounts of the world and ways of living. In comparison, the Japanese had been 
quick to take up Western ways of thought and living, and for this the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s writers had a positive opinion of them. In comparison, the  Church 
News ’ accounts of the War openly said little about the quality of the Cing and 
Japanese Empires’ leaders. The periodical’s writers sometimes gave accounts of 
the Cing military which made the suggestion that they were doing their work 
badly, but they never said this outright and about the Japanese, the periodical 
said nothing positive or negative. More interesting is what it did not say: a 
number of events from the War which had a great effect on Western writers’ 
opinions of the Japanese were not noted at all in the  Church News . 
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The Monthly Messenger was against the Tái-wanese Republic from the 
start. Many times they said it was their hope that the Japanese would quickly 
take complete control of the island, and put their Western knowledge to work 
making it better place. As for the Tái-wanese government’s leaders, the Monthly 
Messenger’s writers made their cause out to be a false one: it was said that they 
were not a government, but a rebellion, and that their efforts for the cause were 
weak ones — their fighting and ruling were simply not on the level of the 
Japanese. The  Church News  was against the Republic too, but more even-handed in 
their accounts of the War. The Tái-wanese government’s troubles were made 
clear to readers, but so was the damage the Japanese military was doing to the 
island. Even so, the Japanese came off better in the comparison. As the  Monthly 
Messenger had done in the earlier War, the  Church News made the Japanese leaders 
out to be good and clever men, who took care of the Churchgoers when they 




Chapter 3 noted the amount of writing about the Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War in the periodicals. But, to make sense of the opinions 
that they gave on these three countries, it is necessary to put the writings “about 
the War” into still smaller groups. Here, this is done by taking account of the 
persons about whom they give opinions, and of the opinions themselves. In this 
section the rules by which the writings are put into groups. The first division is 
between writings giving and not giving opinions on different groups. Writings 
“giving an opinion” are those having at least one sentence in which something is 
said about the qualities of the Cing, Japanese, or Táiwanese, or any of their acts. 
There were two groups fighting in the Cing-Japanese War, and two groups 
fighting in the Japanese-Táiwanese War. So in the Cing-Japanese War, opinions 
could be given of the Cing, the Japanese, or the Cing and Japanese; and in the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War, opinions may be given of the Japanese, Táiwanese, or 
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Japanese and Táiwanese. Writings not giving an opinion on any group are not 
taken account of here.  
The second division is between the sorts of opinions given. Here, account 
will be taken only of two sorts of opinions: “positive” and “negative.” For a given 
person or group of persons, this gives three sorts of writings: “writings giving a 
positive opinion,” “writings giving a negative opinion,” and “writings giving 
positive and negative opinions.” As will be seen, writings giving two opinions 
were not common, but the few of them are given special discussions of the 
possible reasons for their writers’ having had two opinions. Take note that in 
English and  Ê -mńg there are many degrees of “positive” and “negative.” In 
theory, it is possible to put the writings into many more groups based on these 
degrees, but here they will be put into only two, based on the end to which they 
seem nearer. As noted in Chapter 3, to make a decision about some statement’s 
being a “positive” or “negative” opinion one sometimes has to make guesses 
about the writer’s views; where this has been done, the reasons for putting 
writings into one group or another are given. It is possible too to say that one’s 
opinion is neutral; here such writings are taken simply as examples of “not 
giving an opinion.”  
There are, then, three possible sorts of writing giving opinions about 
leaders of the Cing-Japanese War, and three sorts giving opinions on the leaders 
of the Japanese-Táiwanese War. And, there are three possible sorts of opinions on 
these writings. This gives fifteen sorts of writings giving opinions on the leaders 
of the Cing-Japanese War, and fifteen sorts giving opinions on the leaders of the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War. Below are given the different sorts of writings, and 
their relations. 
 
1. Writings about the Cing-Japanese War 
1.1. Writings giving an opinion only on the Cing leaders  
1.1.1. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders 
1.1.2. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders 
1.1.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative 
about the Cing leaders 
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1.2. Writings giving an opinion only on the Japanese leaders 
1.2.1. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese 
leaders 
1.2.2. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese 
leaders 
1.2.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative 
about the Japanese leaders 
1.3. Writings giving an opinion on the Cing and Japanese leaders 
1.3.1. Writings saying something positive about the Cing and 
Japanese leaders 
1.3.2. Writings saying something negative about the Cing and 
Japanese leaders 
1.3.3. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders, 
and something negative about the Japanese leaders 
1.3.4. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders, 
and positive about the Japanese leaders 
1.3.5. Writings saying something positive and negative about the 
Cing leaders, and something positive about the Japanese 
leaders 
1.3.6. Writings saying something positive and negative about the 
Cing leaders, and something negative about the Japanese 
leaders 
1.3.7. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders, 
and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders 
1.3.8. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders, 
and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders  
1.3.9. Writings saying something positive and negative about the 
Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese 
leaders  
1.4. Writings  not giving an opinion on the Cing or Japanese leaders 
2. Writings  not about the Cing-Japanese War 
 
3. Writings about the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
3.1. Writings giving an opinion on the Japanese leaders  
3.1.1. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese 
leaders 
3.1.2. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese 
leaders 
3.1.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative 
about the Japanese leaders 
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3.2. Writings giving an opinion on the Táiwanese leaders 
3.2.1. Writings saying something positive about the Táiwanese 
leaders 
3.2.2. Writings saying something negative about the Táiwanese 
leaders 
3.2.3. Writings saying something positive and something negative 
about the Táiwanese leaders 
3.3. Writings giving an opinion on the Japanese and Táiwanese leaders 
3.3.1. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese and 
Táiwanese leaders 
3.3.2. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese and 
Táiwanese leaders 
3.3.3. Writings saying something positive about the Japanese 
leaders, and something negative about the Táiwanese 
leaders 
3.3.4. Writings saying something positive and negative about the 
Táiwanese leaders, and something positive about the 
Japanese leaders 
3.3.5. Writings saying something positive and negative about the 
Táiwanese leaders, and something negative about the 
Japanese leaders 
3.3.6. Writings saying something positive about the Cing leaders, 
and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders 
3.3.7. Writings saying something negative about the Cing leaders, 
and positive and negative about the Japanese leaders  
3.3.8. Writings saying something positive and negative about the 
Cing leaders, and positive and negative about the Japanese 
leaders  
3.3.9. Writings saying something negative about the Japanese 
leaders, and positive about the Táiwanese leaders 
3.4. Writings not giving an opinion on the Japanese or Táiwanese 
leaders 
4. Writings  not about the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
 
The numbers of such writings are given in later sections alongside discussions of 
their details. The other sections of this chapter are accounts of the opinions that 
the periodicals gave on the Wars. It has not been possible to give a complete 
account of all opinion-giving writings, but the ones here give a good idea of the 
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opinions not seen. The sections first go through the amount of space taken up by 
writings giving opinions on the different groups, and then give details on the 
opinions themselves. The sections come to an end with a comparison of the 
opinions given in the two periodicals, and some suggestions about some possible 
reasons for their giving these opinions. 
 
OPINIONS ON THE CING AND JAPANESE IN  THE MONTHLY 
MESSENGER 
The writers for the  Monthly Messenger had a negative opinion of the Cing Empire’s 
leaders, but a very positive opinion of the Japanese leaders. There were two 
reasons. First, the Japanese were getting the better of the Cing in the War. As was 
seen in Chapter 4, in the writers’ view the Cing Empire had every advantage 
going into the War. But the Japanese still got the better of them, and so the 
writers had great respect for the Japanese military leaders. Second, the Cing were 
less open to Western accounts of the world, and Western ways of living, than the 
Japanese. The missionaries had for years been giving the Cing Empire education 
in Western geography, astronomy, medicine, and so on; and still the Cing leaders 
made use of their own “Chinese” accounts of the world. But the Japanese were 
not only happy to get Western accounts of the world, they frequently sent 
Japanese persons to the West for the purpose of learning more about these. It 
seemed to the writers that only the Japanese had seen the value of “Western 
civilisation.” And so, to them the Japanese leaders were “clever and progressive,” 




Of the the fifteen possible opinions on the Cing and Japanese, the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s accounts of the War gave only four: “saying something positive about 
the Japanese leaders” (“J. POS”), “saying something negative about the Cing 
leaders (“C. NEG”), “saying something negative about the Cing leaders, and 
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positive about the Japanese leaders (“C. NEG; J. POS”), and “saying something 
positive and negative about the Cing leaders” (“C. POS & NEG”). There numbers 
of such writings, and how much space they took up, is given below. 
 
MONTHLY MESSENGER — CING-JAPANESE WAR 
J. POS LINS PER C. NEG LINS PER 
583: 222–223 20 2.25% 587: 33 22 2.48% 
TOTAL: 1 20 2.25% 1 22 2.48% 
 
C. NEG; J. POS LINS PER C. POS & NEG LINS PER 
586:15 73 8.22% 583: 227 16 1.80% 
590: 102 17 1.91% 584: 254 27 3.04% 
590: 105 34 3.83% 585: 274–275 38 4.28% 
591: 137–138 169 19.03% 587: 33 17 1.91% 
   589: 83 22 2.48% 




The first thing of note here is that negative comparisons of the Cing to the 
Japanese was much the most common sort of opinion — a third of the space taken 
up by the periodical’s accounts of the War was taken up by accounts giving such 
opinions. The other thing of note is that negative opinions of the Cing were a 
great part of the periodical’s writings about the War. Nothing positive was ever 
said about the Cing without something negative being said in the same piece of 
writings — and many writings did not say anything positive the all. Below is a 
more detailed discussion of what opinions were given of the Cing and Japanese, 





Opinions of the Cing 
In the Cing-Japanese War, nearly every opinion the  Monthly Messenger gave about 
the Cing military and political leaders was negative. It was seen in Chapter 4 that 
the Cing losses came as a great surprise to the makers of the the  Monthly 
Messenger . But the writers were quick to give a reason for these losses — the bad 
quality of the Cing military leaders: 
The individual Chinaman is at least as capable and strong and brave as his 
Japanese foe. And there are 350,000,000 Chinamen against 30,000,000 
Japanese. Yet the Chinese are flying in panic; retreating from impregnable 
fortresses without a blow. . . . Chinese officers have taken no pains to 
learn how to conduct and handle their troops; on field days, when the 
soldiers were drilling or manœvring, the commanding officers would sit 
in their marquees drinking tea! (585: 274–275). 
 
Take note that the quality of the Cing soldiers and bases are not in question. The 
soldiers are “at least as capable and strong and brave” as the Japanese — maybe 
more — and their bases, Pyeongyang, Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, and so on, are not simply 
strong, they are “impregnable.” The trouble is with the military leaders, who 
have done nothing to make themselves or their soldiers ready for War. They have 
no knowledge of their work, and so the Cing Empire’s great advantages have all 
gone to waste. In another issue, William Campbell, one of the missionaries to 
Tái-wan, gave an example of the trouble with Cing military leaders — an account 
of a Cing General’s inspecting a fort in Tái-wan: 
Although the fort was supposed to have six cannon, it really had only 
three. But the officer in charge was equal to the occasion. He got three 
wooden cannon made and neatly hooped with rattan, and painted black, 
and he actually succeeded in passing them off at the inspection by his 
superior officer. Charges of loose powder were fired from the wooden 
guns, and the Brigadier-General complimented the officer on the 
deafening roar of the cannons. (591: 137–138) 
 
No one comes off well in this account. It is not clear whose work it was to get 
cannon for the fort, but this was not done before the inspection; it has only half 
the number it should. The officer in charge of the the fort goes to some trouble to 
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keep the Brigadier-General from making the discovery that the work has not 
been done, while making no attempt at all to put things right. And the 
Brigadier-General has so little knowledge of arms that he is taken in by the 
officer’s false cannon. Campbell did not say if these men took part in the 
Cing-Japanese War, but it will have been clear to the readers that with men such 
as these as leaders, the Cing military never had a chance. 
The  Monthly Messenger ’s opinions on the Government leaders in Běi-jing 
were no better. Here the trouble was much the same as with the military: the 
leaders had not enough knowledge of their work. But with the government 
leaders, this trouble went deeper than having a poor knowledge of drills and 
cannons. The Cing military made at least some use of Western military arms and 
organisations; but the Government leaders would have nothing to do with 
Western “knowledge” of any sort: 
the Pekin literati (Chinese, not Manchus) seem embedded in impregnable 
arrogance and ignorance. The highest degrees are conferred only by the 
Pekin Examination Board; “men,” says Church at Home and Abroad 
(American Presbyterian), “who rate fair handwriting far above a 
knowledge of geography, and skilful rhyming above mathematical 
attainment. Some of them still assert that the earth is flat, and believe 
that the sun is eclipsed by being swallowed by a dog in the sky; also that 
dried scorpions are a potent medicine, and that needle thrust four inches 
into the abdomen is the standard remedy for Asiatic cholera.” (584: 254) 
 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, many missionaries were of the opinion that 
Western accounts of the world, and the ways of living based on these, were better 
than Chinese ways. And many missions, even the Presbyterian Church of 
England’s own missions to the Empire’s southeast, had put in a great amount of 
work teaching the Cing about Western ways. But they had had little to no effect 
on the Cing leaders, who went on keeping their own geography, astronomy, and 
medicine, and keeping the common persons from taking up Western ways too.  1
1 In fact, the Cing leaders were more interested in Western accounts of the world than the  Monthly 
Messenger  let on, and had been for some time. But there were never enough leaders of this mind to 
make the Cing government take up Western ways as the Japanese government had done (Hsü 
261–291).  
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Keeping to the old ways had, in the view of the  Monthly Messenger , made the 
Empire weak, and this was costing the Cing the War. As the  Monthly Messenger 
said after Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, “It is not wonderful that a people, great and vigorous 
though they be, whose leaders are of such stuff should be beaten at every point 
by the clever, intelligent, and progressive Japanese” (584: 254). 
 
Opinions of the Japanese 
As has been seen, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers had much to say about the 
positive qualities of the Japanese military’s leaders. They had got the better of 
the Cing at Pyeongyang through “superior discipline and generalship” (583: 
222–223), and their taking of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu was “another signal proof of the 
inability of courage and physical strength to contend against discipline and 
skilled leadership” (585: 275). Even the missionaries in the middle of the War had 
a positive opinion of them, as in this letter from a missionary to the Joseon 
Kingdom: 
The Japanese army is in a high state of efficiency; the leaders are men of 
great ability, chiefly educated in European countries. While China was fast 
asleep and utterly unconscious of Japan’s designs, the latter country was 
awake and pulsating with new life, and busily engaged in preparing for 
the present conflict. (586: 15) 
 
The periodicals’ earlier statements about the Japanese Empire’s being “the 
aggressor” were important no longer. The good quality of their military leaders 
had put these things quite in the shadows. 
The periodical had much good to say about the Japanese government’s 
leaders too. The writers were conscious of the Japanese leaders’ strong interest in 
Western accounts of the world and ways of action. In fact, the Presbyterian 
Church in England had even had a hand helping the Japanese leaders to get this 
knowledge. In 1863, the editor said, five young Japanese men had gone to 
England for this purpose: 
They were brought to Mr. Matheson in London and were taken charge of 
by him. He placed them in the University College School, arranging that 
they should live with one of the professors. They were most carefully 
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educated — two of them remaining in London for five years. These are the 
men, Mr. Matheson said, who have been governing Japan for the last 
twenty years. One of them, Count Ito [Itō Hirobumi], is now head of the 
Government, and is directing the conduct of the war with remarkable skill 
― a remarkable link in the chain of the Providence of God. (584: 251–252) 
 
Even the Japanese Emperor himself was a man of quality. William Campbell, of 
the Church’s mission to Tái-wan, had been to the Japanese islands on his way 
back to London. The editor gave an account of Campbell’s experiences there: 
He was in Kobe [Kōbe] when the Crown Prince arrived there, and the very 
children welcomed H.R.H. with great acclamations. He was also in 
Hiroshima, to which place the Emperor and his ministers had removed, 
and he knew that the Emperor was one of the hardest-working of the 
staff, working from early morning to late every night. The Japanese were 
a remarkable nation, and there were so many things which indicated their 
capacity, that it was impossible not to be hopeful regarding them. (591: 
137-138). 
 
The  Monthly Messenger made a comparison of the Japanese and Cing leaders 
effects on their countries’ common persons. In the Japanese Empire, even 
businesses were doing their part for the War: 
Chinese and Japanese patriotism are of widely different types! A large 
business house in Tokio [Tōkyō], during the severity of the winter, fined 
any of its employés [sic] who complained of the cold weather, the rule 
being based on the ground of the privations and suffering which at that 
time were being endured by Japanese soldiers in Manchuria. The fines 
were sent to Government as a contribution to the expenses of the war. So 
much for Japanese feeling! (590: 102) 
 
In the Cing Empire, things were very different: 
Chinese lack of a similar sentiment comes well out in an incident which 
occurred at the Red Cross Hospital in Chefoo [Yan-tái]. The ambulance 
men were incompetent cowards. They could not be induced to go 
anywhere near the scene of fighting to look for wounded Chinamen. They 
were ready, they said, to care for the wounded men in hospital, and they 
did so in characteristic fashion during the first cold night of the hospital's 
work. At midnight the ten knights of the Red Cross rose and took off the 
covering of the wounded men, carrying them away to their own quarters, 
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and spreading them on their own beds.  No wonder Japan has been the victor 
in the war . (590: 102; emphasis mine) 
 
In the eyes of the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers, the Japanese leaders were nearly 
the complete opposite of the Cing leaders. The Japanese military’s leaders had a 
good knowledge of their work. The Japanese government’s leaders had an 
interest in Western ways, and the good sense to put them to work. And for these 
reasons, the  Monthly Messenger’s  writers gave a very positive opinion of them. 
 
Discussion 
In the Cing-Japanese War, the  Monthly Messengers ’ writers had a positive opinion 
of the Japanese military’s and government’s leaders, and a negative opinion of 
nearly all the Cing leaders. The reason for their having these opinions was partly 
how well the Cing and Japanese military leaders were doing in the War, for it 
seemed to the writers that the Cing military’s leaders had little knowledge of 
their work, having “taken no pains to learn how to conduct and handle their 
troops,” while the Japanese leaders were “men of great ability, chiefly educated 
in European countries.” But, it was this education, more than how they were 
doing in the War, which was the cause of the writers’ having such a good opinion 
of the Japanese, and such a negative opinion of their enemy. From the writers’ 
point of view, Western accounts of the world, and the ways of living that these 
made possible, were simply better than anything in East Asia: Western geography 
was a truer picture of the earth; Western astronomy a better guide to the stars; 
and Western medicine a surer way of overcoming disease. The Chinese and 
Japanese accounts of the world may have been good enough in the past, but 
Westerners had long since given them better better accounts. In fact, the 
Presbyterian Church of England’s own missions had made schools and books for 
the teaching of Western ideas. 
The Japanese seemed to see the value of Western ways. For many years, 
they had sent their best men to Europe for the purpose of learning Europeans 
ways; the church had even had a hand in helping one such group of learners. 
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With this knowledge, they had made schools for Western ideas, and remade their 
government and military along Western lines. But, the Cing leaders had little 
interest in Western ways. They went on doing things as they had done in the 
past, and even made it harder for others to get an education in these things; by so 
doing, great damage was done. The effects of these decisions were clear in the 
Cing-Japanese War. The Western-educated Japanese were better at fighting and 
ruling than the Cing leaders. Even the common Japanese in the streets were 
better at supporting the War than their Cing counterparts. The  Monthly 
Messenger ’s writers took the measure of a leader’s value not only by how well 
they did their work, but also by how nearly their doings were like a European’s. 
And so, it seems to them that the Cing leaders, who kept to their old Chinese 
accounts of the world, were “embedded in impregnable arrogance and 
ignorance.” But the Japanese leaders, who were making great use of Western 
ways, were “clever, intelligent, and progressive.” 
 
THE CING-JAPANESE WAR IN  THE CHURCH NEWS 
The  Church New ’s accounts of the War, for all their detail, had little to say about 
the military and government leaders in the Cing and Japanese Empires. And 
when these leaders did come up, nothing was said openly about the quality of 
their actions. This comes across most clearly in the periodicals’ account of the 
events about which the  Monthly Messenger and other Cing or Western periodicals 
gave strong opinions With respect to such events as the death of a missionary at 
the hands of the Cing military, or a Japanese attack on an unarmed Cing military 
transport, the other periodicals were quick to give their opinions, but the  Church 
News was strangely quiet, giving only the facts of the matters. 
Even so, in a few places, the writers’ opinions do come through, for while 
they are nowhere given openly, the language of some accounts still makes a 
suggestion about their makers’ point of view. For example, while nothing was 
said about the Japanese, or about the Cing government, accounts of the Cing 
military’s actions make it clear that, in the eyes of the  Church News ’ writers, the 
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Cing military leaders were doing their work badly. Likely, the writers did not 
openly give their opinions to keep from making trouble with the readers or other 
Táiwanese: they were Westerners living in the Cing Empire, and it would not do 
to be openly negative about the Empire’s military. 
 
Numbers 
No opinions were openly given in the  Church News , so there are no numbers to 
give here. But, as noted above, some of the writers’ language does make 
suggestions about their opinions. Below the reasons for these readers are given, 




For the most part, the  Church News ’ accounts of the Cing-Japanese War gave no 
opinions on the two countries’ military and government leaders. But, for some 
things of which the  Church News gave accounts, it is possible to make an educated 
guess about what the writers’ opinions were. There are two reason for this. First, 
the  Monthly Messenger ’s and  Church News ’ writers were users of the same 
languages. It is likely that on many matter, their opinions were the same, or 
nearly the same, and so their  not giving an opinion on certain events is 
interesting. Second, some of the writers, like William Campbell, did give their 
opinion to the  Monthly Messenger , and these are all the same as the opinions given 
by England-based writers. For this reason, it is interesting when the  Church News 
did not give an opinion on an event about which the writers’ very likely had a 
strong opinion. 
For example, in early August, some Cing soldiers on their way through the 
city of Liáo-yáng made an attack on Pastor James Wylie, a Presbyterian 
missionary working there. Wylie was badly hurt in the attack, and dead some six 
days later (Christie 87). The  Monthly Messenger was not kind about the Cing 
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government’s part in the matter (585: 274–275). But the  Church News gave more 
attention to what the Cing government had done after the attack:  
The next day the government opened an investigation. They asked the 
military to send the soldiers for judgment. But the military refused to 
cooperate, frustrating the civil government. So the civil government 
appealed by telegram to the Governor. A few days later an edict arrived 
instructing the military to hand over the offending soldiers, and the civil 
government to repair the chapel and pay compensation for the pastor’s 
life. The Emperor issued an edict saying that his heart was troubled, and 
commanding Lǐ Hóng-jhang to apprehend the offending soldiers and have 
them beheaded. 
Gêh-mí goā n -hù lái cā-ghiām; so a d u i bhu-goa n  tò bêng bhêh̄ lái bān. 
Bhu-goa n  jip-y i  m -kềng, dì-g a o Bhūn-bhù but-hé. Bhūn-goa n  zêk-sí g o ng 
di a n-b o k i bìn Zong-dēk. Goề-rit wū bhūn-su g a o, jiong hīt-ế bhu-goa n 
già-dếng gêk-jīt; yā hoān-hù bhū-goa n  siat-hoāt, siū-lì bài-dńg, cu-boế 
Bhēk-su ế rīn-bhên̄g. Yi u -gêh̄ Hōng-d ê cut-ji a o, gong yi-ế sim jin yiū-wūt, 
têk-lên̄g Lì Hōng-ciong d a ng-bān hit-ế bhu-goa n  so a jiong hiah ế hiōng-sin 
liah lái cu-zàm. (114: 92). 
 
Very likely, the  Church News ’ writers saw the Cing government’s taking the side of 
the Church against the military as a good thing; but, the account does not give an 
opinion on the government or military. The Emperor himself took an interest in 
the matter; but the periodical does not say anything for or against him. And Lǐ 
Hóng-jhang, one the most important leaders of the Cing Empire — who was in the 
middle of overseeing the War with Japan — was given the work of seeing that the 
Church got justice; but the periodical says nothing about Lǐ. The missionaries 
could not has been unhappy about this turn of events — as will be seen, it was 
their hope for such government support in Tái-wan — but their account of it in 
the  Church News gives no opinions at all. 
Another example is the Japanese attack on the  Gao-sheng — the reason for 
the Cing declaration of war. In this case, the comparison is not with the  Monthly 
Messenger , which said nothing at all about the attack, but with other Western 
periodicals, which had question about it. In the eyes of many Westerners, the 
attack on the  Gao-sheng was a war crime: there had been no declaration of war 
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before the attack, and the Japanese naval leaders had made no effort to give help 
to the Cing soldiers from the ship, letting them go to their deaths in the sea 
(Howland 193–194; Paine 134). But here is what the  Church News said about the 
attack: 
The Japanese immediately launched their torpedoes and fired their guns, 
whereupon the  Gao-sheng began to sink. The foreigners seized their 
opportunity and fled for their lives; most leapt into the sea, whence they 
were rescued by the Japanese. Besides these, around 200 people made it to 
shore. Unfortunately, about 1,000 sank beneath the sea. 
Súi-sí p a ng zui-lúi kūi-c ê ng, hit-jiah Gē-sêng liām-bi n  dím--lēh-k i . Hit-sí 
gho a -gek láng siòng-pún dē-miā wū-ế wū tiào-leh hài, hō Rīt-bùn ế zūn-à 
gi u --k i . Yi-ghoā geh wū wà 200 láng yā gi u ji u n -soa n ; ke-siēh bhêh̄ g a o jiá n 
1000 láng dīm-leh hài. (114: 91) 
 
The  Church News says nothing about the question over the rightness of the attack. 
It does make note of the fact that the Japanese gave help to the “foreigners” 
(“gho a -gek láng”) from the ship, but does not outright say that help was 
purposely not given to the Cing soldiers. The  Church News does say that the 
deaths were “unfortunate” (“ke-siēh”), but does not give any detail; they may be 
“unfortunate” simply from their being deaths. In short, while the Western and 
Cing periodicals were giving negative opinions of the Japanese for what they had 
done in the attack, the  Church News was neutral. 
 
Opinions of the Cing and Japanese 
As seen about, the  Church News ’ writing about the War was neutral even when the 
writers likely had strong opinions. But, in a few places their opinions still come 
through, for the writers’ decisions about which words to use give an idea of their 
views on the Cing and Japanese. Unsurprisingly, given their backgrounds, these 
opinions were very like those given in the  Monthly Messenger . Take for example, 
the periodical’s account of the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu: 
Last month’s  Church News explained that Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu was an important 
stronghold, and that the Japanese were going to attack it. On 20 November 
they attacked the outer camps. The next day they attacked again, at which 
point many Cing officers and men did not fight, but scattered, allowing 
127
the Japanese to advance as they pleased; by nightfall they controlled the 
area. 
Zên̄g-ghoêh ế Gào-ho e -b e wū gòng Lu-s u n-gàng sī hiam-y a o ế ài-kào, yā 
dêh̄ gòng, Rit-bùn bêng bêh̄ k i pāh hīt so-zāi. G a o jīt 10 ghoêh 23, wū k i 
gong, hīt jit wū gōng-po a go a -bêng ế yā n -zê.̄ Geh-mế geh-z a i pāh; g a o 
hit-diap bun-gēk ế Bhu-goa n  gūn-bêng kah-zē bhé gāp yin di-dek, ji a m-dé 
sì-so a n , cut-zāi Rit-bùn dīt-dit jìn-zếng; g a o hīt rit  a m hīt-ế d ê -g a i lòng ho 
yin ji a m--k i . (117: 121) 
 
The writers do not say outright that the Cing military did its work badly: they do 
not say that the Cing soldiers could, or should, have kept on fighting. But, the 
name that the writers give to the soldiers’ going out of the city, “scattering” 
(“sì-so a n ”), makes this suggestion very strongly. For comparison, in the 
periodical’s accounts of the Battle of Yá Mountain, early in the War, it was said 
that the Cing soldiers “retreated” (“t ê ”) and “withdrew” (“tiu”), and that the 
Japanese soldiers, in the face of a Cing counterattack, “went south” (“leh lám”; 
114: 91). These are three names for the same action, going away from the fighting 
— the same action that the soldiers took at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu — but “retreated,” 
“withdrew,” and “went south” make the suggestion that the action was done on 
purpose, and in a orderly way. “Scattering,” makes the opposite suggestion — the 
action was not part of the leaders’ design, and was not even orderly. And so, 
without openly saying anything negative about the Cing, the writers were able to 
make the suggestion that they were not fighting well. 
Farther along in the account of the Battle was another, stronger, 
suggestion: “Many people are puzzled by how such a strong position could have 
been taken so easily” (“Z ê ng láng dēh gī-go a i hīt so-zāi g a o hiāh yong-z o ng 
giān-g o zoa n -yi u n  wū gào-hiāh yōng-yī n  pāh”; 117: 121). This is nearly saying 
outright that the Cing gave up too quickly. But, the writers were careful to put 
distance between themselves and this suggestion. They do not say that  they are 
“puzzled” (“gī-go a i”); this has been said by “many people” (“z ê ng láng”). Where 
these persons came from, what their interest in the Battle was, and what about it 
made them “puzzled,” these details are not given to the reader. Importantly, 
“z ê ng láng” is not simply a good-sized group of persons: it is nearer to “the 
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multitude” or “the masses”; it is a name for the greater part of some very great 
number of persons, such as all the persons of a country. The writers are not 
simply saying that some persons, such as military and political leaders, are 
puzzled by how quickly the Cing gave up Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu; they are saying that 
nearly  everyone is puzzled. 
In the last days of the War the Japanese took over the Bê ̄n -ó n  — a chain of 
islands in the Strait of Tái-wan — to put themselves in a better position for taking 
Tái-wan itself. The  Church News had an account of the attack on Ma-gêng, the 
capital of the Bê ̄n -ó n , which again made the suggestion that the Cing military was 
doing its work badly: “On Sunday they attacked Ma-gêng; no one opposed them, 
and they quickly captured the battery” (“Lê-bài-rit so a k i pāh Ma-gêng, bhé 
sim-mih láng gāp yin di-dêk̄, pào-dái liām-bi n  hō yin ji a m-k i ”; 119: 9). From this 
account, it seems that the Cing military did nothing at all against the Japanese 
attack. But Jukichi Inouye, in an official Japanese account of the War, gives the 
story differently: 
On the morning of the 23rd, the column landed at Koching point, on the 
south-east of Pescadore Island, and after a slight skirmish took possession 
of the coast fort to the north-east of How Point, and also of Makung 
Castle. The Chinese then attacked Makung for the forts on Fisher Island; 
but on the 25th, they fired their magazine and fled from the island. (87) 
 
This is no Thermopylae, but it is not true that when the Japanese made their 
attack on Ma-gêng “no one opposed them” (“bhé sim-mih láng gāp yin di-dêk̄”). 
In fact, the  Church News ’ writers are making the suggestion that the Cing soldiers 
did their work so badly that there was  figuratively no fighting at all. 
 
Discussion  
At no time in the Cing-Japanese War did the  Church News openly say anything 
about the quality of the two powers’ government or military leaders. This comes 
across most clearly in its accounts of events about which other periodicals gave 
strong opinions. For example, when James Wylie, a Presbyterian missionary in 
the northeastern Cing Empire, was put to death by Cing soldiers, the  Monthly 
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Messenger was angry about it, but the  Church News  simply gave the facts, and even 
gave a good amount of attention to what the government was doing to get justice 
for the Church. Or, take the Japanese military’s attack on the  Gao-sheng , which in 
many Western newspapers was said to be “wrong.” The  Church News gave all the 
details about the actions which had made the Western newspapers say this, but 
gave no opinion of its own. 
In a few places, though, the writers’ opinion do come through — not as 
open statements, but through their decisions about the words of their accounts. 
About the Japanese no suggestions were made, and the same was true of the Cing 
government. But the  Church News’ opinion of the Cing military was the same as 
the Monthly Messenger ’s: the Cing military was doing its work badly. For example, 
in the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the Cing soldiers were said to have “scattered”, not 
“retreated,” or “withdrawn.” And in the Battle of Ma-gêng, the Cing military was 
said to have done so little, that there may as well have been no fighting at all. 
So, the opinions of the  Church News ’ writers, at least about the Cing 
military, were much the same as the opinions of the Presbyterian Church of 
England’s other writers — again, unsurprisingly, for they were shaped by the 
same languages — but, they kept these opinions out of the  Church News . This was 
likely to keep themselves, and the Churchgoers, from danger. As noted, it was the 
writers’ hope that the Churchgoers would take no interest in the War; but some 
of them surely did, and being openly negative about the Cing military could made 
trouble with those readers. But, the more important thing may have been 
keeping out of trouble with the other Táiwanese. In those days it was often said 
that the Cing Churches were simply tools by which other countries could have 
power over the Cing Empire (Bays 75). This had been the cause of trouble for the 
Church in the past (Lài Ying-zé 8–12), and it would give them trouble again 
before the Cing-Táiwanese War was over. Saying negative things about the Cing 
military could give persons outside and inside the Church even more reason for 
taking this view. So, the writers did not openly give their opinion about the Cing 
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military, but, consciously or not, these opinions still came through in their 
decisions about what words to make use of in their accounts of the War. 
 
THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN THE  MONTHLY MESSENGER 
In the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the  Monthly Messenger was again on the side of 
the Japanese. It seemed to them that the Táiwanese Republic was not a 
government at all, but a design by the old Cing rulers of the island to keep 
control of it for as long as possible, which did not even have the support of the 
Táiwanese. The writers gave no thought at all to what the Republic might do if it 
had control of Tái-wan: there was simply no chance of that ever taking place. As 
for the Japanese, in comparison with the earlier War, there was less writing 
about the them, but what there was was even more positive. It was said that the 
Japanese Army was very like a Western army in its way of doing things, such as 
taking care of the Táiwanese and Westerners who came under its control. What 
was more, the Japanese were going to make Western ways more common in 
Tái-wan. As noted in Chapter 4, this had been the hope of the writers for some 
time, and they were happy to see this at last coming true. 
 
Numbers 
Below are the numbers and sizes of the accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
in the  Monthly Messenger which gave opinions on the Japanese and Táiwanese. 
Again, of the fifteen possible opinions, only four are present: “saying the 
Táiwanese are good” (“T. POS”), “saying the Japanese are good” (“J. POS”), 
“saying the Táiwanese are bad” (“T. NEG”), “saying the Táiwanese are bad, and 







MONTHLY MESSENGER — JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR 
T. POS LINS PER J. POS LINS PER 
596: 250  56 6.31% 593: 178–179 111 11.99% 
    598: 10 64 6.91% 
TOTAL: 1  56 6.31% 2 175 19.71% 
 
T. NEG LINS PER T. NEG; J. POS LINS PER 
595: 226 18 1.94% 592: 153–154 57 6.16% 
597: 272 52 5.62% 592: 158 42 4.54% 
598: 12–14 32 3.46% 598: 11–12 148 15.98% 
TOTAL: 3 102 11.02% 3 247 26.67% 
 
In this War, negative comparisons of the Japanese and their enemy were again 
the most common sort of opinion, and writings saying something negative about 
the Táiwanese Republic’s leaders were very common besides. The reasons for the 
Monthly Messenger ’s having such a positive opinion of the Japanese, and such a 
negative opinion of the Táiwanese, are given in more detail below. 
 
Opinions on the Táiwanese 
The  Monthly Messenger had a very negative opinion of the Táiwanese Republic’s 
government and military. In fact, the periodical never once made the Táiwanese 
Republic out to be a real government at all. In a number of places, the 
periodical’s writers simply gave it another name,“rebellion,” but even when the 
writers did make use of Táiwanese leaders’ own names for their state and 
themselves, inverted commas made the writers’ opinions of these clear. For 
example, here is how the readers were given news of the Republic’s birth: 
A Republic was proclaimed (the “President” has since fled from Formosa!) 
and preparations made for resistance to the Japanese invasion. Having 
had the island formally handed over to them by a Chinese Imperial 
Commissioner, the Japanese at once proceeded to take possession, and 




In this piece of writing, the writers first make use of the Táiwanese leaders name 
for their country, “ republic,” only to give it a new name in the last line — 
“rebellion.” And the writer does not even take the trouble of giving the 
Republic’s leader a new name: the inverted commas around “president” make it 
clear that the writers do not see Táng Jǐng-song as a real president. On its face, 
this gives readers news of the new Republic, but at the same time it makes sure 
that they do not take it seriously. 
This was said to be the position of the Táiwanese themselves too. The 
Monthly Messenger had a number of accounts of what the “common persons” of 
Tái-wan were doing, or not doing, in support of their new government. For 
example, here is the  Monthly Messenger ’s account of the thoughts of Murray 
Cairns, a medical missionary from the Tái-wan mission, on the question of 
Táiwanese support for the Republic:  
Dr. Murray Cairns expresses the opinion that the cession of Formosa to 
the Japanese is resented by the governing class in China far more than the 
many overwhelming defeats on land and sea during the war. . . . Naturally 
this feeling will be keenest in Formosa itself. It isn’t so, indeed, amongst 
the common people there, who, as Dr. Murray Cairns told his interviewer, 
have been crying, “Let the Japanese come, for our own Government is 
greedy at heart, and grinds the lives out of us.” But the “Black Flags” 
(“Chinese braves,” Mr. Matheson calls them), instigated by the literati, no 
doubt, are in arms against the Japanese occupation. (594 :198) 
 
In Cairns’ view, and the  Monthly Messenger ’s, the new state is not of, by, or for the 
common persons of Tái-wan: it is simply a design by the “literati” — “presidents” 
Táng and Lióu — to keep themselves in power. In fact, the common persons are 
not only not interested in the Republic, they, like the periodical, are supporters 
of the Japanese.  
In the above account can be seen too a third sort of attack on the Republic 
— saying that its military was not even from Tái-wan. In the  Monthly Messenger 
the fighting was usually said to be between the Japanese and the “Black Flags,” 
Lióu Yǒng-fú’s personal army. This was important, as the greater part of the 
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Black Flags had come across from the Mainland with Lióu. By, saying that the 
Black Flags were the ones fighting against the Japanese, the writers were saying 
that the War was not between the Japanese and Táiwanese, but the Japanese and 
the old Cing leaders, who would not give up control of the island. The  Monthly 
Messenger ’s account of the War’s end makes this point again, and gets in another 
attack on support for the Republic: 
Since the capture of Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] by the Japanese (about 20th of 
October) — apparently without serious resistance — it has been 
announced that ‘Kachi’ has also been occupied by the Japanese. Probably 
this is Kagi [Gā-ghī], where Dr. Gavin Russell died, about 30 miles north of 
Taiwanfoo. The Black Flags were in strong force in Kagi, but Dr. Maxwell 
says (in Medical Missions, which he edits so admirably) that “many of the 
people in the districts between Chianghoa (farther to the north) and Kagi 
have white flags with a circle in the middle, within which are the 
characters ‘Tai Jit-pun’ [Dāi Rit-bùn] (Great Japan). These are exhibited 
whenever the Japanese make their appearance.” (272: 2) 
 
In this account, the Táiwanese are happy about the Japanese Empire’s at last 
taking control of their island. The  Monthly Messenger not only gave very negative 
accounts of the Republic, it made out that these were the same sorts of accounts 
that the Táiwanese themselves would give. The writers and the Táiwanese were, 
it seems, of one mind: the Republic was not their government, and the Japanese 
government’s taking control of Tái-wan would be a good thing for the island and 
its persons. 
 
Opinions on the Japanese 
The  Monthly Messenger ’s accounts of the War in Tái-wan said little about the 
Japanese leaders, but what they did say was very positive. For example, in the 
August 1895  Monthly Messenger was an account of “A manifestation of Christian 
brotherhood . . . in itself delightful, and, besides, a hopeful omen for the future of 
our Formosan work under Japanese rule” (593: 178–179). The place of the 
manifestation was the Bê ̄n -ó n  Islands, which had by then been under Japanese 
control for four months. A number of Japanese soldiers and officers were 
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Churchgoers, and had been having services with the Presbyterian churchgoers. 
One of their number, a Japanese Army Lieutenant, sent a letter to the 
missionaries in Dāi-lám, a copy of which went into the  Monthly Messenger . In the 
letter, which was not signed, the Japanese lieutenant gave a defense of the War: 
I am sorry that this war broke out. But it was necessary that we should 
fight. I believe that there is a Divine guidance in this war, which leads 
Oriental nations to leave their old civilisations and seek the new and 
spiritual one. I believe firmly in the Divine Mission of Japan, and I fought 
this war to fulfil my duty. (593: 178–179) 
 
If the Lieutenant had been a reader of the  Monthly Messenger , he would have been 
conscious that no defense was necessary. In fact, the writers of the  Monthly 
Messenger  were happy about what he had done: not only was the Japanese 
government living up to their greatest hopes — making Western ways more 
common in East Asia — the Japanese themselves were good sorts. The  Monthly 
Messenger ’s editor said that the letter was “manly, patriotic, and devout,” and its 
writer the equal of a Westerner, even saying of him “An army of such men as he 
would be as invincible as Cromwell’s Ironsides” (593: 178–179). Thomas Barclay, 
who had sent the letter, was in complete agreement, saying “If many of the 
Japanese fought in this spirit, it is little wonder that the Chinese went down 
before them” (593: 178–179). 
In October, Barclay and the other missionaries in Tái-wan had the chance 
to see the Japanese military in more detail. By 20 October the persons of Dāi-lám 
were conscious that Lióu Yǒng-fú had quietly gone back to the Cing Empire. 
There seemed little point in fighting on, and the city’s leaders made designs to 
give the city over to the Japanese. As the missionaries had not taken sides in the 
War, the city’s leaders went to them and made the request that the missionaries 
take a note about this design to the Japanese. The  Monthly Messenger had William 
Ferguson’s account of this meeting: 
We had walked about five miles, and were approaching a village called 
Ji-chhian-hang [Ri-zàn-háng], when suddenly we heard a peculiar 
summons. Barclay and I at once know it was the Japanese sentry calling on 
us to halt. We ran forward with a light, held up our British flag, and called 
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out that we were English. A lot of soldiers came running forward, fixed 
bayonets, and stood pointing at us. Soon an officer, who could speak a 
little English, came forward. We managed to make him understand our 
mission . . . We were then conducted to another officer. By means of an 
interpreter he got all of our information about Liu having run off, and the 
people of Taiwanfoo [Dāi-lám] inviting them to enter in peace. Then we 
were handed on from one officer to another until 3 a.m. on Monday. We 
were then told by General Nogii that the army would start at 5 a.m. for 
Taiwanfoo. (598: 11–12). 
 
Nothing is openly said for the Japanese here, but it is a quite positive account of 
them even so: in effect, it is a comparison of their military with the Táiwanese 
military. Unlike the Táiwanese, the Japanese soldiers do their work well and with 
care; the officers have a knowledge of English; and the General himself takes the 
time for a meeting with the missionaries. Everything is done rightly, which is to 
say in the Western way.  
The issue had Thomas Barclay’s account of giving over the city too. He 
went farther than Ferguson, openly making a positive comparison of the 
Japanese and Westerners, and making special note of the way in which the 
Japanese had taken over the city: “compared with the treatment of conquered 
cities by heathen nations in ancient and modern times, [it] has been, I should say, 
marvellously good. Many who know say it would compare favourably with the 
behaviour of soldiers of European nations” (598: 10). This, in a statement, is the 
reason for the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers having such a good opinion of the 
Japanese. The new rulers of Tái-wan are not simply good in comparison to other 
East Asians, they are nearly as good as Westerners. 
 
Discussion  
In the War between the Japanese Empire and Táiwanese Republic, the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s writers were completely against the Republic and very much on the 
side of the Japanese. Unlike in the earlier War, this had little to do with how well 
the two sides were fighting. As was seen in Chapter 4, the  Monthly Messenger 
never gave the Táiwanese a chance against the Japanese, and were unhappy 
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about how long it took the Japanese to get the better of their enemy. The 
periodical’s supporting one side against the other had everything to do with how 
“Western” the two sides were. The Táiwanese had given their state the name 
“Republic” partly in the hope that it would make Westerners more likely to give 
it their support. But, for the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers, this name seems to have 
had to opposite effect. The Táiwanese state was not simply getting in the way of 
the better Japanese government, it was falsely making use of a Western name. 
And so, nearly every time they said anything about the Republic, it made the 
point that it was not a “real” Republic, but a rebellion. When giving the names of 
its leaders, the  Monthly Messenger put their titles in inverted commas, making 
clear that they were not real ranks. When giving accounts of its army, they said 
that it was not made up of common Táiwanese fighting for their way of life, but 
of “Black Flags” from the Cing Empire. And, when giving accounts of the common 
persons’ thoughts on the Republic, they said that there was no support for it, and 
most persons were hoping that the Japanese would quickly take control. 
In comparison, the Japanese government and military were doing things 
very like a Western country. For example, the missionaries’ account of their 
meeting with the Japanese Army makes very clear that the Japanese military 
does things like a Western military; one of the missionaries even says that their 
action in taking the city “would compare favourably with the behaviour of 
European nations.” In their discussion of the Japanese Lieutenant’s “manly, 
patriotic, and devout” letter, the writers not only give their approval to the 
Japanese Empire’s “divine mission,” they make a comparison between the 
Japanese military and an army from England’s past — Oliver Cromwell’s “New 
Model Army,” the “Ironsides.” This is very high praise. In the seventeenth 
century, Cromwell’s army had put an end to the English Kings’ rule, and, for a 
time, the power of the Roman Catholic Church in England. This, in the 
Presbyterian Church of England’s histories, was said to be the birth of English 
Presbyterianism. By making a comparison between the Japanese Army and the 
“Ironsides,” the writers of the  Monthly Messenger was saying that the Japanese 
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military in Tái-wan was not simply on a level with Westerners, but on level with 
one of English Presbyterianism’s greatest fighters and rulers. In short, they were 
against the Táiwanese for making a state with a Western name but no Western 
qualities, and for the Japanese for being as Western as Presbyterianism’s best. 
 
OPINIONS ON THE JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR IN  THE CHURCH 
NEWS 
The  Church News ’ accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War were more 
even-handed than at  Monthly Messenger ’s. There were accounts of the Japanese 
doing good and bad things to the island’s persons, but the writers made it clear 
that the bad things were being done by the Japanese military’s porters and 
enlisted men. The Japanese leaders were different: they were good and clever 
men, who were taking care of the Churchgoers where they could, and would go 
on doing so when they had control of the island. There were positive and 
negative accounts of the Republic too. Like the  Monthly Messenger , the  Church 
News made it out not to be a real state, but a group of Cing leaders hoping to keep 
control past their time. The  Church News gave much attention to how little 
control the Republic had over its lands and persons, and said too that things were 
going badly in the the places still under the Republic’s control, maybe even worse 
than in the places under Japanese control. By giving such accounts of the 
Japanese and the Táiwanese, the  Church News was able to quietly put follow its 
writers true opinions: Tái-wan would, and should, be under Japanese control. 
 
Numbers 
In the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the  Church News  at last gave opinions on the two 
sides. But, again, of the fifteen possible opinions, only four were present: “saying 
something good about the Japs” (“J. POS”), “saying something bad about the 
Japanese (“J. NEG”), “saying something good and bad about the Japanese” (“J. POS 
& NEG”), and  “saying something bad about the Táiwanese” (“T. NEG”). Below are 
the amounts of space taken up by these writings. 
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CHURCH NEWS — JAPANESE-TÁIWANESE WAR 
J. POS LINS PER J. NEG LINS PER 
122: 45–46 25 1.06% 128: 106 14 0.59% 
124: 58 21 0.89% 128: 106 11 0.46% 
128: 106–106 6 0.25% 128: 107–108 91 3.85% 
   129: 116 12 0.51% 
TOTAL: 3 52 2.20% 4 128 5.41% 
 
J. POS & NEG LINS PER T. POS LINS PER 
122: 39–40 253 10.69% 123: 53–54 131 5.54% 
126; 81–82 56 2.37%    
128: 108–109 91 3.85%    
129: 114–116 150 6.34%    
TOTAL: 4 550 23.25% 1 131 5.54% 
 
Interestingly, the greatest number of opinion-giving writings, at least by space 
taken up, were writings giving mixed opinions on the Japanese. There were more 
lines of writing giving opinions on the Japanese than the Táiwanese, but the 
amount of writing saying bad things about the Japanese and Táiwanese was about 
the same — even if there was more writing saying good things about the 
Japanese. Below are given the details of the these opinions and the likely reasons 
for giving them.  
 
Opinions on the Japanese 
For the most part, the  Church News ’ writers had a good opinion of the Japanese 
leaders, but a bad one of the lower ranks. Take for example, this account from 
the Bê ̄n -ó n  Islands, which gives a different point of view on the “manifestation of 
brotherhood” noted in the  Monthly Messenger : 
One matter, however, vexes us; that is, Japanese porters occupied our 
chapel, and destroyed its door, windows, benches, tables, and everything 
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else within it. However, afterward, a Japanese officer named 
Gong-diān-diat-zóng, who is also a believer, came and restored order. The 
chapel has since been cleaned out, and we now meet every week for 
worship. A high-ranking Japanese officer named Rīt-pit-sìn-liāng, who 
ardently loves the Lord, a pastor named Nai-sū-ghi-zùn, and a doctor all 
join us for worship, as well as many soldiers. 
M -gù jīt-hāng hō làn tang hoān-lè--ế, ji u -sī lê-bài-dńg ho Rīt-bùn gēk ế 
gūn-bhu ji a m--k i , hia-ế mńg, tang, yì, dēh, cam l a i-bhīn sò wū ế mih lòng 
yit-jīn sng-hoāi bē-lé--k i . Riān- a o wū jit-ế Rīt-bùn ế goa n , miá 
Gong-diān-diat-zóng yah sī s i n Zù ế láng, yi jiāh lái siat-hoāt g a o he-s ê . Da n 
s a o cên̄g-k i , mùi lê-b a i tang d i -hia z u -jip; gēh wū jit-ế Rīt-bùn did 
do a -goa n , miá Rīt-pit-sìn-liāng, jīt ế [sic] yah sī riat-sim b a i Si o ng-d ê ế 
láng; yah wū jit-ế Bēk-su, miá Nai-sū-ghi-zùn, yah wū Rīt-bùn ế Yī-sêng lái 
z e jit-ế z u -jip z e lê-b a i; yah wū z ê -zê ̄ế gūn-bêng. ( Church News 122: 39–40) 
 
Take note that it was the “porters” (“gūn-bhu”) who did the damage, but an 
“officer” (“goa n ”) who put things back together. And, while there are some 
“enlisted soldiers” (“gūn-bêng”) at the church too, unlike the officers their 
names are not given, and nothing said about their good qualities. Another writer, 
from northern Tái-wan, was even clearer about the different qualities of the 
officers and men: 
Some of the high-ranking Japanese officers seem excellent fellows, 
because they have studied abroad; some speak several languages. . . . The 
ones making trouble are all soldiers and coolies. 
Ghoà ko a n  Japan [sic] ế do a -goa n , wū ế jin hè, yīn-wī wū k i bat gēk tāk-cêh̄; 
wū láng bhāt gui-nā kiū n -kào. . . . So-wū sī bêng gāp yin ế gū-lì gāh 
l a m-sàm zo e . (128: 108–109) 
 
The writers’ mixed opinions on the qualities of the Japanese are clear too in their 
accounts of the War in southern Tái-wan. There were accounts of the Japanese 
soldiers making attacks on unarmed persons (129: 114–116), and Japanese officers 
making “Protection Stations” (“Be-liōng-giek”) to keep them safe (128: 108–109); 
accounts of Japanese soldiers burning churches (128: 106), and being kept under 
control by their leaders (127: 94). Even the taking of Dāi-lám was more complex 
than in the  Monthly Messenger . The account of Barclay and Ferguson’s taking the 
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Japanese into the city was much the same, but what came next is very unlike the 
Monthly Messenger ’s “marvellously good” behaviour: 
Once Hu-siá n  was secure, the Japanese began searching all the houses. 
Unfortunately, some stole people’s things, and some harassed the women. 
They behaved in this way for several days, and the people of Hu-siá n  were 
very afraid. For some ten days no one would open their shops; even now 
some of the shops remain closed. Many people, afraid of the future, have 
moved to the Cing Empire. The Japanese officers are good, but the men 
are a mix of good and bad. 
Rīt-bùn bêng dit-dieh Hu-siá n  liào, jiū liām-bi n  ciāo-coê ̄dāk-láng ế c u . 
Ke-sieh wū-ế ciù n  láng ế mih, yah wū-ế zāo-tāt h u -rīn-láng. Yin gui-nā rit 
gù giá n  an-ni, dì-g a o bêh-s ê n  ế sim jin doā hoān-lè. Go ê zāp-jit ế diōng-gan 
láng  m -gà n  kui yin-ế di a m, yah g a o jit-diap do a -kàm ế z ê -zê ̄yao-bhoêh̄ 
kui. Gēh, wū láng z ê -zê ̄yīn-wī b ê -ê ̄tūn-lùn gān-kò wū boā n -go ê --k i 
Dn̄g-soa n . Rīt-bùn ế goa n  sī hò, yah yin-ế bên̄g wū-ế sī hè wū-ế sī bé. (129: 
114–116). 
 
This, then, was the periodical’s view of the Japanese: their leaders were good 
persons, but their soldiers more mixed. Even so, there was hope for the future; 
the “bad Japanese” would not be around much longer: 
At present the Japanese are ruling Tái-wān with their military; as a result, 
the local people are suffering greatly. Perhaps in a few weeks they will 
exchange it for civil administration, in which case the people will be 
considerably happier. 
Hi a n-gim Rīt-bùn láng dī Dāi-wán wū ên̄g bhu-bī ế goan-hāt, dì-g a o z a i-dê ̄
ế bêh̄-s ê n  but-jì zê ̄wū doā gān-kò. Ga n -sī gēh gui-nā lê-b a i jiāh bhêh̄ wā n 
bhūn-sū ế hoāt, jiū bêh̄-s ê n  gà n  wū tang kāh koà n -wah . (128: 106) 
 
The War was over, and the  Church News was now saying openly that Japanese rule 
might not be bad. The Japanese who took control of Tái-wan may have been a 
mix of bad and good, but before long the island would be under the control of the 
“good Japanese,” and the people would be happy again. 
 
Opinions on the Táiwanese 
There was more balance too to the periodical’s writing about the Táiwanese 
leaders. But, even so, it still came down more against the Republicans than for 
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them. The  Church News  never said, as the  Monthly Messenger  did, that the Republic 
was simply a “rebellion,” but by making use of its leaders’ old names, the 
periodicals made it very clear that the Táiwanese Republic was something less 
than a real government. Take, for example, this account of the Republic’s birth, 
which makes note of Táng’s new title, “President” (“Bhīn-zù”): 
May 25th, Tái-wan established a Republic. On this day the leaders and 
gentry of Dāi-bāk presented a document to the Governor. It said, “Tái-wan 
is now a Republic; the Governor is now the President; the Dragon flag is 
now a Tiger flag.” 
May 25th [sic] (zêk̄ 5 ghoêh̄ cê 2) Dāi-wán siat-lip Bhīn-zu-gēk. Hit-rit 
Dāi-bāk ế Tāo-láng gāp Sīn-sū wū c o ng rit-ế-ghún ế y i n, s a ng hō Bhu-dái. 
Hīt ế y i n ế rī sī gòng, Dāi-wán Bhīn-zu-gēk, Bhu-dái zo e Bhīn-zù, Lên̄g-gí 
wā n  Ho-gí. (123: 53) 
 
Farther along in the same piece of writing, an account of Táng’s going back to the 
Cing Empire, gives his old title: “June 4th (zêk̄ 5 ghoêh̄ 12 rit), at night the 
Governor, disguised as a soldier, escaped to Ho-bhề and boarded the steamer 
Gà-sí” (June 4th (zêk̄ 5 ghoêh̄ 12 rit), mī-sí Bhu-dái cên̄g bên̄g-yòng ế sa n  tāo-zào 
g a o H o -bhề, leh Gà-sí ế hê-zún”; 123: 53-54; brackets in original). The writer 
makes very clear that, whatever the declaration of independence says, Táng is 
not a “president”: he was, and is, simply a Cing governor. 
Much the same was done with Liou. In late August the Church sent out 
notes given to them by Liou, which said that the churches were under his 
protection. In the  Church News was a translation of the certificate — its first line 
was “An announcement from President Lióu, of the Táiwanese Republic” 
(“Dāi-wán Bhīn-zu-gēk Do a -Zong-tòng, Bāng-bān Láo ế gè-sī”; 125: 72). But just 
above the translations was a short account of how they had come to have it, and 
this gave Lióu’s old title, in italics no less: “About two months ago we requested 
certificates from  Commissioner Lióu to paste on our buildings; on 17 August they 
finally arrived. (“Cā-but-de nn̄g ghoêh̄-rit zếng ghoàn wū d u i  Láo Kīm-cê 
cêng-hoāt h o -ji e tang dāh dī làn jiā gek-wī ế bài-dńg, g a o 6 ghoêh 27 rit jiāh 
jih-dieh”; 125: 72; emphasis in original). The message is clear: whatever Lióu says 
his name is, he is in fact what he always was — a Cing commissioner.  
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Accounts of living in the Republic were mixed too. They did not openly 
say that the Táiwanese Republic’s governments was doing its work badly, but 
many made note of how little control it seemed to have over the fewer and fewer 
places that were under its rule. Take, for example, this letter from Ō-ghū-lán: 
Lately the people of Pō-siā have been turbulent. The bad characters have 
seized this opportunity to gang up and go pillaging. It is rumoured that 
they will come to the villages of Ō-ghū-lán . . . The brethren judge that if 
bandits come, the church will be difficult to protect. However, we hope 
that God will protect it from harm. Right now, there are robberies along 
the road daily and nightly. 
Da n  l u n-gào jīt Bō-si a -lāi rīn-bhín ế sū jīn loān. Sên̄g jīt ế gī-hoē pai n -láng 
giat-dòng z u -jip, zè-hoè ciu n -giāp; yā wū hōng-sia n  tiā n -g i n  gòng pài n  láng 
wū bhêh̄ lái ciu n -giap jīt Ō-ghū-lán . . . Siat-sù hiā n -dī nā bé diū n -dà n  b i -bān, 
pài n  láng [sic] nā lái jiū lān-dit-bè jīt ế bài-dńg bê ̄si u -hāi. Zong-sī 
n g-bhāng Si o ng-d ê sī-yin hō jīt ế gào-hoê ̄bhiàn siū jit-hē ế h a m-hāi. 
Jīt-zūn rit--sí ế--sí wū dêh ciu n -láng, giōng-g o ng ciu n -lō lòng wū. (125: 71) 
 
In this account, the Táiwanese Republic seems to have no control over the lands 
around Ō-ghū-lán: the “bad characters” (“pai n -láng”) are free to do what makes 
them happy, which is “pillaging” (“ciu n -giāp”) and robbing” (“ciu n -láng”). But 
even where the Republic did have power, this was not necessarily a good thing 
for the persons living there, as this letter from Dao-lak makes clear: 
Lately the people here have been pitiable, because the government is 
demanding this year’s taxes; those who cannot pay are being sent for 
judgment. The crops have not yet been harvested, how can anyone have 
money for taxes? 
Hi a n-sí jia ế bêh-s ê n  jin kò, yīn-wī goā n -hù bêk̄ gīn-ní ế jī n -niú. Nā m̄ lái lap, 
jiū bhêh̄ p a i cê k i bān, ngo-gēk yao-bhoê ̄siū-sếng, bhêh-t a i wū jí n  tang lap 
jī n -niú. (125: 71) 
 
There were many such accounts in the  Monthly Messenger . To the readers, it likely 
seemed that the Republic was unable to keep control of its own country, and bad 
at ruling the few places still under its control. The Japanese may not have been 




In comparison with the  Monthly Messenger , the  Church News ’ accounts of the War 
in Tái-wan were balanced. They had, for example, more negative accounts of the 
the Japanese military — accounts of damage to churches, harassment of women, 
and the deaths of unarmed persons. This with very unlike the  Monthly Messenger , 
where the only thing negative said about the Japanese was that they were too 
slow in taking over Tái-wan. But, importantly, in the  Church News  all these thing 
were said to have been done by the Japanese porters and enlisted men, not the 
officers, who were said to be “excellent fellows.” In support of this were a 
number of accounts of the officers putting churches back together, and keeping 
the Táiwanese safe. What was more, the periodical made clear that when the 
island was under Japanese control, it would be these leaders, not the soldiers, 
who would be in charge. 
The  Church News ’ accounts of the Táiwanese Republic were also more 
balanced than the  Monthly Messenger ’s, but they still had a bad opinion of the 
Republic in comparison with the Japanese. The writers made no use of its leaders’ 
new titles: in its pages, Táng Jǐng-song and Lióu Yǒng-fú were still a “governor” 
and “commissioner.” The use of these names made the suggestion to readers that 
the Republic was not a real government, but simply a group of Cing leader who 
would not give up their positions. And, while the  Church News had a number of 
writings saying that the Republic was doing things well — like Lióu’s giving signs 
to the Church — there were more accounts of how little control it had over its 
land, and how bad Republican rule was in the places where it did have control. 
As in the Cing-Japanese War, the  Church News ’ makers, the missionaries, 
were likely on the side of the Japanese from the start. As was seen in earlier 
sections, the missionaries said openly in the  Monthly Messenger that the Republic 
had no chance against the Japanese Empire, and that the Japanese would be 
better rulers of Tái-wan anyway. But here, even more than in the earlier War, 
they could not be openly in support of the Japanese in the  Church News , at least 
not while the Japanese were putting unarmed persons to death, and putting 
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churches to flame. So the writers did what they could. The  Church News  made 
clear that the Japanese were doing good and bad on the island: this was clear 
enough to the readers that to do anything else would have seemed strange. But 
the  Church News made clear too that the Japanese leaders, who would have 
control of Tái-wan in the future, were good men. In comparison, little good was 
said about the Republic. In the  Church News ’ accounts, it was unable to keep 
control of its lands, and bad at taking care of the lands still under its control. It 
seems that the  Church News was quietly giving its readers a push in the direction 
of the missionaries’ opinion: the Japanese would have control of Tái-wan, but this 




6 — “The arrival of the Japanese means order and protection”: 
Hoping for a better future under Japanese rule 
 
This Chapter takes up the periodicals’ views on the prospects of evangelisation in 
view of the emerging Japanese victory. As was seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the 
periodicals had a good opinion of the Japanese government and military leaders, 
and were not unhappy about the Japanese Empire getting the better of the Cing. 
This Chapter goes more deeply into the reasons for this view: in short, the 
periodicals’ makers had the idea that the Japanese would make Western ways 
more common in the Cing Empire and on Tái-wan, and that in the new conditions 
the Churches would be able to do their work better than ever before. 
 
Overview  
At the Cing-Japanese War’s start, the  Monthly Messenger said that it would be bad 
for the Cing Empire’s Protestant Churches. It was the writers’ view that the Cing 
persons’ anger at the Japanese, and the fall from power of Cing leaders friendly 
to missions, would make the Churches’ work harder. But, once the Japanese were 
getting the better of the Cing, the writers’ position was changed: they now said 
that the War would be good for the Churches, as it would make the Cing persons 
more likely to take up Western ways of thought and living, which would make 
the work of the Churches simpler. As seen in Chapter 4, for much of the 
Cing-Japanese War, the  Church News ’ writers were unsure of its outcome, and for 
all of it, they had to seem neutral. Unsurprisingly, they had little to say about the 
War’s likely effects on the Churches, giving their attention completely to fighting 
and politics. This is most clearly seen in comparison with the  Monthly Messenger : 
there were a number of events in the War that had an effect on the Cing 
Churches, and both periodicals’ makers were aware of these, but, only the 
English periodical had discussion of these events’ likely effect on the Cing 
Churches. About them, the Táiwanese periodical was silent. 
As soon as news of the Treaty of Shimonoseki was made public, the 
Monthly Messenger ’s writers were saying that Japanese rule would be good for the 
146
Presbyterian Churches in Tái-wan. In the earlier War, the Japanese had only been 
able to make the suggestion, on the battlefields, that the Cing Empire should take 
up Western ways. In Tái-wan, they would be able to  make these ways common — 
by force, if necessary. This would be very good for the Church, whose work could 
be done better and more quickly in a place where Western ways were more 
common. The  Church News did not outright say that the Táiwanese Church’s 
future would be better under Japanese rule, but it made this suggestion very 
strongly. This was done through accounts of the Japanese officers’ taking care of 
the island’s Churchgoers when they came across them, and going to church 
alongside the Táiwanese. In fact, Church-goers were a small part of the Japanese 
military, but the  Church News ’ writings made them seem like a very important 
part. Readers likely came away with the suggestion that Japanese control of the 
island would have a very good effect on the Church’s future in Tái-wan. 
 
Definitions and divisions 
Here, as in Chapter 4, the writings of interest are those that say something about 
the future. But, unlike in the earlier chapter, the future of interest here is not 
that the of the War itself, but of the Churches. And, simply saying something 
about the Church’s futures and the events of the Wars is not enough: to be of 
interest, the writing must make a connection between these events and states. 
So, the writings of interest in this Chapter have four qualities: 
I. they must be accounts of the War 
II. they must have guesses about the Churches’ futures 
III. they must make a connection between (I) and (II) 
IV. they must give an opinion on (II) 
 
These groups can be ordered in a number of ways. Here, the group of writings 
given in Chapter 3, writings “about the War,” are taken as the base level. It is 
then necessary to put these writings into still smaller groups: writings “ about the 
Churches’ futures ” and “ not about the Churches’ futures .” What is of interest here are 
“guesses,” which are somewhat different from statements. For present purposes, 
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a “guess” is “the utterance by a certain speaker or writer of certain words (a 
sentence) to an audience with reference to an  future situation, event or what 
not.” A guess may be “about the Church” in one or more of these ways: 
A. Having the name of a Church, church, or any group of these 
B. Having the name of a Churchgoer undertaking some action with 
the idea that it will have an effect on a Church or church 
 
Take note that it is not necessary the action have the hoped-for effect: what is 
important is that the actor has the idea that it will have this effect. It is then 
necessary to put the writing into groups “ making a connection between the War and 
the Church’s futures ” and “ not making a connection between the War and the Church’s 
futures .” For present purposes, account is taken only of connection which are 
made openly. That is, if the connection is made openly if it is made by a 
“conjunctive adverb,” like “therefore” (“so-yì”), or a conjunctive prepositional 
phrase, like “as a result” (“giat-gè”). If it is simply a suggestion, then it is not 
noted in the numbers, but given its own discussion in the Chapter. 
Opinions on the future are put into two groups: “ the Churches ’ futures will 
be better ” and “ the Churches ’ futures will be worse .” In theory, a third opinion is 
possible — “ the Churches ’ futures will be unchanged .” But, here, there were no 
writings giving such an opinion, so no account need be taken of it. Last, it is 
necessarily to put the writings into groups “ giving an opinion ” and “ not giving an 
opinion .” Here, again, accounts will be taken of only two opinions: “ the Churches’ 
futures will be better ” and “ the Churches futures will be worse .” Again, in theory, it is 
possible to say that the Church’s futures will be “ better  and worse ,” but again, 
there were no such writings in the periodicals. 
The writings are put into these groups by reason of their having or not 
having four qualities: being “about the War,” “about the Churches,” “about the 
future,” and “making a connection between the War and the Church’s futures.” 





1. Writings having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War 
1.1. Writings having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and guesses 
about the Churches’ futures 
1.1.1. Writings making connections between the Cing-Japanese 
War and the Churches’ futures 
1.1.1.1. Writings saying the Churches’ futures will be better 
1.1.1.2. Writings saying the Churches’ futures will be worse 
1.1.2. Writings  not making connections between the 
Cing-Japanese War and the Churches’ futures 
1.2. Writings having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War but  not guesses 
about the Churches’ futures  
2. Writings  not having accounts of the Cing-Japanese War 
 
3. Writings having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
3.1. Writings having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War and 
guesses about the Churches’ futures 
3.1.1. Writings making connections between the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War and the Churches’ futures 
3.1.1.1. Writings saying the Churchs’ futures will be better 
3.1.1.2. Writings saying the Churches’ futures will be worse 
3.1.2. Writings  not making connections between the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War and the Churches’ futures 
3.2. Writings having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War but  not 
guesses about the Churches’ futures  
4. Writings  not having accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War 
 
Like the others, this Chapter has four parts, which take account of the two Wars 
in the two periodicals. As in Chapter 5, what it most interesting here is that the 
Church News ’ writers, whose views on the Churches’ futures were given in the 
Monthly Messenger , said nothing about these in the  Church News . Their opinions 
did come through, but only as suggestions, never openly. And so, the 
organisation of the sections about the  Church News are a bit different: the  Monthly 
Messenger sections are chiefly about was the periodical said; the  Church News 
sections are about what it did not say. 
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THE CING CHURCHES’ FUTURES IN THE  MONTHLY MESSENGER 
At the start of the Cing-Japanese War, the  Monthly Messenger was sure that it 
would have a bad effect on the Cing Empire’s Churches and missions. For one 
thing, Cing persons would take out their anger at the Japanese on the Churches. 
For another, the War would be bad for Cing leaders with a interest in Western 
ways. But, once the Japanese were getting the better of the Cing, their opinion 
was changed: the  Monthly Messenger now said that the War would be good for the 
Churches and missions. As noted in Chapter 2, many missionaries and 
missionary-sending Churches were of the opinion that the growth of the Cing 
Empire’s Churches was too slow. It was said that one of the chief reasons for this 
was the Cing leaders’ being uninterested in Western accounts of the world, and 
Western ways of living. But now the Japanese, who made use of Western ways, 
were getting the better of the Cing Empire. The  Monthly Messenger was certain 
that this would make the Cing take a better view of Western ways. And, when 
these ways were more common in the Cing Empire, more persons would take an 
interest in the Cing Churches. 
 
Numbers 
The chart below gives the numbers of accounts of the War in the  Monthly 
Messenger  which gave an opinion one Churches’ future. Here, the two possible 
opinions were given: “the Churches’ futures would be better” (“BTR FUT”), and 
“the Churches’ futures would be worse” (“WRS FUT”). 
 
MONTHLY MESSENGER — CING-JAPANESE WAR 
BTR FUT  LINS  PER  WRS FUT  LINS  PER 
585: 274–275 38  4.28%  582: 198–199 58  6.53% 
586: 15 73  8.22%  583: 222–223 20  2.25% 
588: 59 19  2.14%  583: 227 16  1.80% 
589: 82 11  1.24%       
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589: 83 22  2.48%       
589: 83 22  2.48%       
590:105 34  3.83%       
591:127–128 163  18.36%       
 169  19.03%       
TOTAL: 8 551  62.05%  3  94  10.59% 
 
What is of interest here is he clear division between the two opinions: issues 
number 582 and 583 said that the Churches’ futures would be worse, but nearly 
every issue after these said the opposite. In the end, a much greater part of the 
Monthly Messenger ’s writings about the War said the Church’s futures would be 
better. Below are given the details of what they said, and the reasons for this.  
 
Worse futures 
The September 1894  Monthly Messenger , after giving readers an account of the 
War’s likely causes, made it clear that these were not the periodical’s chief 
interest, saying “Our concern in this place, with this useless war, centres round 
its probable effect on missions” (582: 198-199). These were, it seemed to the 
writers, likely to be bad all around. In Japan, public interest in the War, which 
would later give William Campbell so much pleasure, was at first seen by the 
Monthly Messenger as a likely cause of trouble: “The war-fever in Japan is 
unfavourable to the spread of the Gospel” (582: 198-199). Meantime, in the Joseon 
Kingdom “The actual outbreak of war has naturally increased the anti-foreign 
and anti-missionary feeling which had been before making itself perceptible in 
some parts of the peninsula” (582: 198-199). But, the Church’s own missionaries 
were in the Cing Empire, and it was the troubles of the Cing Churches that were 
of greatest interest to the periodical. 
The periodical said that the War was likely to be bad for the Cing Empire’s 
Churches in two ways. First, the Churches and their missions could come under 
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attack by Cing persons. The loss of James Wylie had come about in this way, and 
that was before the Cing military had even seen action. The outcome of the 
fighting would not make things better, and the  Monthly Messenger made note that 
in some places the anger was being taken out on the missionaries: “In China the 
anti-foreign feeling will, unhappily, be strengthened by her disasters. The 
missionaries in Manchuria are being compelled to leave their inland stations to 
be pillaged and burned, and to take refuge in the treaty port of Newchang 
[Yíng-kǒu]” (583: 222-223). This, to be sure, was a long way from the Presbyterian 
Church of England’s own missions, but even so, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers 
were often afraid for the Missions in the southeast, where “few could distinguish 
between ‘outside countries’ — Japanese or Europeans are all the same to the great 
mass of the people” (586: 14). 
But second, and more important, was the War’s effect on the “Viceroy of 
Jhií-lì” (“Jhií-lì Zǒng-du”) — Lǐ Hóng-jhang. He was nearly the only Cing leader of 
whom the  Monthly Messenger had a good opinion. It was not that Lǐ was himself a 
Churchgoer, or even that he was a supporter of the Churches, but that Lǐ, more 
than most Cing leaders, saw value in Western accounts of the world, and had 
done quite a lot to make them more common in the Cing Empire. This, in the 
Monthly Messenger ’s view, made him a friend of the Churches. As noted in Chapter 
2, to take part in the Presbyterian Churches of the southeastern Cing Empire, one 
had to give up certain common acts, such as giving gifts to to the ancestors and 
other spirits. And by so doing, one could make one’s neighbours into enemies. 
But these beings and these acts had no place in Western views of the world. It 
was the hope of the  Monthly Messenger that if Western accounts of the world were 
more common, more persons would give the Church a chance. And Lǐ seemed to 
them nearly the only Cing leader doing anything to promote Western ideas. 
But Lǐ had another position — leader of the Běi-yáng Army and Navy. And 
as they were doing badly in battle with the Japanese, the  Monthly Messenger  had 
the idea that Lǐ might not be in power for much longer. Even before the Cing 
Empire’s worst losses, the  Monthly Messenger said “a serious peril to all missionary 
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work is already threatened by the disfavour into which Li Hung Chang [Lǐ 
Hóng-jhang], the enlightened viceroy at Tientsin [Tian-jin], the virtual prime 
minister of China, has fallen” (582: 198-199). After the loss of Pyeongyang, they 
gave a more detailed account of what he had done for the Empire, and would 
danger there would be if he were gone: 
The failure of the Chinese fleet and army to rout the Japanese is, it is 
feared, paving the way for the downfall of the enlightened Viceroy, Li 
Hung Chang, on whom the Pekin [Běi-jing] reactionaries lay all the blame. 
If they succeed, it will be a calamity for China, and will introduce a period 
of restriction and difficulty in the conduct of missionary work. The 
openness of mind Li Hung Chang has long shown to European thought and 
practice has just received a fresh illustration. He has established a new 
medical school at Tientsin [Tian-jin], in which Chinese students are being 
taught Western medicine, so as to become efficient doctors for the army 
and navy. (583: 222-223) 
 
If Lǐ and his medical schools are gone, then there will be a “period of restriction 
and difficulty in the conduct of missionary work.” It is not that the military’s 
having better doctors will necessary be good for the Churches, but that the users 
of “Western medicine” are less likely to be users of “Chinese medicine, ” which is 
based on Chinese accounts of the world. And so, Lǐ’s making Western medicine 
more common was a help to the Churches, for at the same time he was making 
weaker the power of the ideas that kept the Cing away from the them. 
But, given the state of the War, it seemed he would not be able to do this 
for much longer. To the  Monthly Messenger , it still seemed likely that the Cing 
would overcome their enemy in the end. But they could do it without Lǐ, the Cing 
Churches would be in a worse position for it. 
 
Better futures 
Then came the Cing losses at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu and Wei-hǎi-wèi. The  Monthly 
Messenger ’s writers were now conscious that the Cing might not get the better of 
their enemy after all — and this gave them hope. As seen in Chapters 4, these 
writers had a bad opinion of Cing accounts of the world. Missions to Cing Empire 
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had been for many years working to make Western ways more common there, 
but had not made much headway. In Japan, Western ways had been common for 
many years, and the Japanese were now making good use of Western arms, 
organisation, and medicine in their War against the Cing. It was the hope of the 
Monthly Messenger ’s writers that the Cing, at last seeing for themselves the 
advantages of Western ways, might now give them a chance. And this, in turn, 
would make things better for the Cing Churches. 
The  Monthly Messenger first made this suggestion in an account of the 
Battle of Wei-hǎi-wèi: 
Everybody has been reading the story of the Japanese attacks on 
Wei-hai-wei, where, for the first time in the war, the Chinese have made a 
valiant and resolute stand, though in the end their warships and 
torpedo-boats have been all captured or destroyed, and the great fortress 
is now in the hands of the Japanese. . . . May it be, as some are hopefully 
predicting, that a humbled China will be more open to receive the 
salvation of Jesus Christ! (588: 59). 
 
The connection between Western ways and Church growth is only a suggestion 
here, but it is made nonetheless. The Cing Empire has been “humbled” by the 
Japanese military’s arms. If the Cing would keep this from happening again, they 
must do as the Japanese have done, and take up Western ways. This would at the 
very least makes it simpler for Cing persons to go to church, and at best might 
even make more persons take an interest in the Churches. But an account of Lǐ 
Hóng-jhang’s getting his position back makes the connection between Western 
ways and Church-going openly: 
Better counsels seems to have prevailed at last in Pekin. It is recognised 
there that Li Hung Chang is the only man to whom the Empire can look 
for extrication from its present position of humiliating impotence. . . . His 
real return to power, with increased influence in Pekin, would 
unquestionably mean more honesty in government, a frank abandonment 
of hostility to western civilisation, and better days for the people — gains 
to China in which Christian missions would certainly share (589: 83). 
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It was not that a “humbled” Cing Empire would necessary see church-going as a 
way out of their trouble: a Western sort of government, a Western-armed 
military — and the Western accounts of the world that made these possible — 
were the way to make the Empire strong again. But, the “abandonment of 
hostility to western civilisation” necessary for this would be good for the 
Churches too, for where Western ways were common, there would be fewer 
things keeping Cing persons from the Churches. 
A last example of the  Monthly Messenger ’s view on the connection between 
“Western civilisation” and the growth of the Cing Churches comes from its 
account of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This said, among other things, that the 
cities of Sha-shiì, Chóng-cìng, Su-jhou, and Háng-jhou “shall be opened to the 
trade, residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the 
same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present 
open cities, towns, and ports of China” (Kajima 265) What was more, the rivers 
between these cities would be made open to transportation. The  Monthly 
Messenger ’s writers were sure that the coming of the Japanese businesses to these 
cities would be good for the churches there: 
The region which is thus to be thrown open to the civilised world is of a 
vast extent. It is, perhaps, the most densely-populated, as it is the richest 
part of the Chinese Empire. It is inhabited by two hundred millions 
people, peaceful, industrious, cultured, well-to-do, and accustomed even 
to luxury. What magnificent opportunities for missionary enterprise will 
be presented to Christendom, if this great territory is really made freely 
accessible to the civilized world! (590: 105). 
 
It seems from this writing that the cities were being made open to the Churches 
for the first time. In fact, there had been Churches there for many years. The 
cities had simply been made open to Japanese business in the same way as the 
other “treaty ports” had been in the 1840s and 1860s. The reason for the 
“magnificent opportunity” was that in these places there would now be Western 
and Japanese business persons: Western goods, actions, and accounts of the 
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The  Monthly Messenger ’s writers were of the opinion that the Cing leaders’ limited 
interest in Western ways was making things hard for the Cing Churches. To be a 
Churchgoer, one had to give up doing things that were common in the Cing 
Empire, like giving gifts to the spirits or one’s own ancestors. This could make 
enemies, which put many persons off going to church. But these things were 
based on Chinese accounts of the world: if these could be done away with, or at 
least be made less important, then the Churches’ growth would be faster. At first, 
it seemed to the writers that the War would likely make things worse: there 
would be more “anti-foreign feeling,” and it would be harder to get the Cing 
leaders interested in Western ways. Worse still was the War’s effect on Lǐ 
Hóng-jhang. He was one of the only Cing leaders working to make Western ways 
more common, and with him gone from power, this work would come to a stop. 
But when it was clear that the Japanese would get the better of the Cing, 
the writers’ views on the War’s likely effects were changed. The  Monthly 
Messenger now said that the War would be good for the Cing Empire’s Churches. 
The Japanese had been making use of Western ways for years; the writers’ hope 
was that this would make the Cing leaders at last give these ways a chance. The 
Cing leaders would do what they had to do to make the Empire strong again, and 
making greater use of Western ways was certain to be a part of this. Once 
Western ways were common, there would be fewer disadvantages to going to 
Church. And so it was that the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers could say “a humbled 
China will be more open to receive the salvation of Jesus Christ!” 
Even better, it seemed to them that the War had in the end only made Lǐ’s 
position stronger. It seemed to the writers that 
His real return to power, with increased influence in Pekin, would 
unquestionably mean more honesty in government, a frank abandonment 
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of hostility to western civilisation, and better days for the people — gains 
to China in which Christian missions would certainly share. 
 
With his position and powers back, Lǐ could now go on with his work of making 
Western ways more common; even better, other leaders were now more likely to 
give their support to this work. Even the treaty Lǐ had made with the Japanese 
would be a help here: new parts of the Empire would be made open to the 
Japanese and their Western ways, and so the Churches in these places would now 
have better chances at getting persons interested in their teachings. From the 
Monthly Messenger ’s point of view, what had at first seemed a bad thing for the 
Churches was without doubt a good one. The War may have done great damage 
to the Cing Government and military, but it was a gift to the Churches.  
 
THE CING CHURCHES’ FUTURES IN THE  CHURCH NEWS 
As seen above, the Monthly Messenger had a number of discussions about the 
Cing-Japanese War’s likely effect on the Cing Churches. But, the  Church News had 
none at all, even of events which very likely would have an effect. For example, 
two event of great interest to the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers were Lǐ 
Hóng-jhang’s loss of power, and the conditions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The 
Monthly Messenger ’s writers said that the first would have a bad effect of the Cing 
Churches, and the second would have a good one. The  Church News had accounts 
of these events too, but gave no opinion on their likely effect on the Churches. 
Likely, the views of the  Church News ’ writers were much the same as the views 
given in the  Monthly Messenger ; but they kept these opinions out of the  Church 
News , for the same reason that their accounts of the the Cing-Japanese War said 
nothing about the good qualities of the Japanese government or military. The 
Church News ’ writers were living in the Cing Empire, and would, it then seemed, 
be living there when the War was over. Saying good things about a country at 





As noted above, the  Church News said nothing openly about the Cing Churches’ 
futures, and so there are no numbers to give here. But below is a discussion of 
what what the periodical did  not  give opinions about, and why this is interesting 
and important. 
 
The Works of Lĭ 
Nowhere did the  Church News  say anything about the likely effects of the 
Cing-Japanese War on the future of the Cing Churches. But, again, from the 
writings in the  Monthly Messenger , it is possible to get sense of their ideas about 
this future. And, again, it is interesting that certain of these gave no opinion 
these events which, in the view of their sister periodical, would likely have a 
great effect on the Churches of the Cing Empire. For example, as seen above, the 
Monthly Messenger saw Lǐ Hóng-jhang’s loss of power as a very bad thing for the 
Cing Churches, but this is what it said about the event in the  Church News : 
The Emperor lately criticised and degraded Lǐ Hóng-jhang for running the 
War badly, having no strategy, wasting his soldiers’ lives, and shaming the 
Empire. 
G i n-lái Lì Hōng-jiong hō Hōng-d ê zêk-zoê ̄g a ng-jip sī yīn-wī yi jiàn-hoāt 
bhū-bhó, sit-leh kề-cêk, dì-g a o līm-diu bāi bêng, go--dieh gek-ka ế sū. 
(115: 106) 
 
Unlike the  Monthly Messenger , the  Church News says nothing about Lǐ’s helping the 
missions, directly or otherwise; it says nothing about the truth of what is said 
about Lǐ, or the rightness of the Emperor’s taking his power; and, most 
importantly, there are no guesses about the effects of Lǐ’s loss of power on the 
Cing Churches. The writers of the  Church News were surely conscious of what Lǐ 
had been doing to make Western ways more common in Tái-wan — as will be 
seen a little later, the missionaries were very interested in seeing them made 
even more so. True, Tái-wan was a long way from Jhí-lì, and the missionaries had 
likely seen little of Lǐ’s work, but all the Church’s mission fields were a long way 
from Jhí-lì, and the  Monthly Messenger still said that Lǐ’s loss of power would be 
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bad for them. It seemed very likely that the  Church News ’ makers were of one 
mind with their England-based brothers and sisters on the matter of Lǐ’s loss of 
power, but they put nothing of this opinion into their Táiwanese periodical. The 
Church News simply says what the Emperor had done, and why, letting the 
readers make up their own minds about the rightness of his actions, and their 
likely outcome. 
Another example is the two periodicals’ different accounts of Lǐ getting 
his power and position back. As noted, the  Monthly Messenger said that this would 
have a very good effect on the Cing Church’s future. Their hope was that Lǐ, a 
friend of “western civilisation” even before the War, would now be in a position 
to make its ways even more common in the Empire, which would be good for the 
Churches there. The  Church News ’ writers likely had the same hope, but of Lǐ’s 
coming back to power, the Tái-wan periodical said only this: 
The Cing Empire has looked at the situation, and realised that they have 
no choice but to sue for peace; and so they have sent Lǐ Hóng-jhang to the 
Japanese Empire to negotiate. 
Diong-gēk ko a n  g a o jit-hē sề-bhīn, but-dek-pūt siū n  ài-bhêh hé; so-yì ce Lì 
Hōng-jiong go ê -k i Rit-bùn gēk gāp yin gh i -hé.  (119: 9) 
 
This is to some degree a friendly statement — the Cing government would not 
send a useless man to be their last hope — but in comparison with the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s account of Lǐ’s comeback, it says very little. Nothing is said of Lǐ’s 
interest in Western ways, or his attempts to make them more common in the 
Cing Empire; nothing is said about the connection between the commonness of 
Western ways and the growth of the Churches; and nothing is said about the 
likely effect on the Cing Church of Lǐ’s getting his power back. The  Church News ’s 
writers may, and likely did, have the same hopes for the Cing Empire after the 
War as the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers did — in fact, as will be seen later, William 
Campbell said as much in the English periodical — but they did not give this 
opinions in the  Church News . There, they simply gave the facts, and let readers 
make their own decisions about the future. 
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The Treaty of Shimonoseki 
Another place where the  Church News ’ not giving an opinion is interesting is its 
accounts of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. As seen above, the  Monthly Messenger was 
of the opinion that the Treaty of Shimonoseki would be a very good thing for are 
the Cing Churches. In the British periodical’s view, one of the Treaty’s best points 
was Article 6, which made open new cities to Japanese business: this, in the view 
of the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers, would make Western ways more common in 
those cities, which would be good for the Churches there. One account of the 
Treaty in the  Monthly Messenger , based on a missionary’s speech to the 
Presbyterian Church of England’s General Assembly, said of the new condition 
made by the article, “It was a vast emergency of opportunity. Not only the gates, 
but even the highways, of China had been thrown open” (591: 137–138). But when 
the  Church News ’ first took note of the treaty in May, their account of it ways this: 
The articles of the treaty have not yet been released to the people. 
However, we have heard that they are more or less as follows:― 
1. Tái-wan will be ceded to the Japanese Empire. 
2. A portion of Liáo-dong, which includes the base at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, will 
be ceded to the Japanese Empire too. 
3. The Japanese Empire will be paid 2,000,000 niu-ghín, which is 
approximately 3,000,000 ghín. 
The treaty has other articles, but we need not print them here. 
Hē-yek ế diāo-koà n  yao-bhoê ̄tuán hō bêh-s ê n  zai. Zong-sī ji a o láng gòng sī 
cīn-ciū n   ê -dề jiāh-ế:— 
1. Dāi-wán dieh hō Rīt-bùn. 
2. Liāo-dang dieh goāh jīt-d ê hō yin, jiōng-diong Lu-s u n-kào ế p a o-dái dieh 
hō yin. 
3. Dieh boế yin nn̄g bhān niù ghín (2,0000,0000 niú), ji u -sī cā-but-dē sa n 
bhān ghín. 
L ê ng-ghoā yā wū gui-nā diāo, zong-sī d i -jia  m -bhiàn g i . (121: 26) 
 
Of the Treaty’s eleven articles, this translation gives only Article 5, and part of 
Article 2. That these are given is not a surprise: they would naturally have been 
of great interest to the readers of the  Church News . What is surprising, and 
interesting, is that that  Church News says nothing at all about the article of 
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greatest interest to the  Monthly Messenger : Article 6. There is no mention of the 
new Treaty Ports, and nothing is said about the new chances for Japanese and 
Western businesses in Cing Empire. In the  Monthly Messenger , these changes were 
seen as likely to have very important — and very good — effects on the Cing 
Churches, but the  Church News  not only says nothing about these effects, it says 
nothing about the Articles at all. 
The next month, the  Church News at last got around to giving a more 
complete translation of the Treaty. But before the translation was this note: 
W e have already published some of the conditions from the treaty in our 
periodical. Here we have not translated the whole thing, but only 
summarised each condition. 
Diōng-gek sò līp ế hē-yēk hiah-ế diāo-koà n  wū y i n dī ghoàn ế Sīn-būn-b e ; 
da n   m -biàn long-zòng hoan-êk, gān-day diah-cut dāk-diáo ế d a i-liek lái y i n 
dī  ê -dề . (122: 46) 
 
The summarised Article VI said this: 
6. All of this article has to do with business, so there is no need to give a 
translation. It opens four places to business: Sha-shiì in Hú-běi, 
Chóng-cìng in Siì-chuan, Su-jhou in Jiang-su, and Háng-jhou in Jhè-jiang. 
Jit-koà n  lòng sī gong-kì z e sên̄g-lì ế sū,  m -bhiàn huān-êk. Jiōng-diōng wū 
gê siat 4 wī tang z e tōng-siong ế zo-g a i. Ji u -si Ō-back ế Sā-cī, Sù-cuān ế 
Diōng-k ê ng, Gāng-so ế Sō-jiū, Jiāt-gang ế Hāng-jiū. (122: 46). 
 
This was hardly the  Monthly Messenger ’s “a vast emergency of opportunity.” The 
Church News gives only the simplest translation of the article. It says nothing 
about the sort of business that will now be possible there, nothing about the 
opening of the rivers, it does not even say that the Treaty, on paper, only makes 
the cities open to Japanese businesses.  The  Church News ’ writers were lifelong 1
missionaries, whose language and education were much the same as the makers 
of the  Monthly Messenger : they would likely have had very much the same idea 
about the effect of the Treaty on the future of the Cing Churches. But, in the 
periodical they say nothing at all about this. In fact, they go so far as to not give a 
1 In fact, the “most favoured nation” clauses of the Western countries treaties with the Cing made 
the cities open to them too. 
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complete translation of the Article at all, saying that it “has to do with business, 
so there is no need to give a translation.” The  Church News was a Church 
periodical made by and for Churchgoers, but it was notably quiet about about the 
effects of the Cing-Japanese War on the Cing Churches. 
 
Discussion  
The Monthly Messenger was from the start interested in the Cing-Japanese War’s 
likely effect on the Cing Churches. But about these effects, the  Church News said 
nothing. Their different ways of writing about the War come through clearly in 
their accounts of two events said to be greatly important to the development of 
the Cing Churches — Lǐ Hóng-jhang’s loss of power, and the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. When some of Lǐ’s powers were taken, the  Monthly Messenger ’s 
writers were not happy at all, and said that this development would have a bad 
effect on the Churches. But their account of Lǐ’s loss of power said nothing about 
the likely effect on the Churches, only that he had been “criticized and degraded 
for his management of the War by the Emperor” (115: 106). And when the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki came out, the  Monthly Messenger said that Article 6 was “a vast 
emergency of opportunity” for the Cing Churches and missions. The  Church News ’ 
discussion of the Treaty said nothing of this “opportunity”: in fact, the writers 
did not even give a complete translation of it, saying only that “All of this article 
has to do with business, so there is no need to give a translation” (122: 46). 
The  Monthly Messenger ’s and  Church News ’ writers made use of the same 
languages and accounts of the world. Very likely, the two groups of writers had 
much the same opinions on the likely effects of this events. In fact, as seen, some 
of the  Church News ’ writers sent material to the  Monthly Messenger too, and in this 
material their opinions on the War are little different from the writers in 
England. But in the  Church News there is no discussion of the Cing-Japanese War’s 
likely effects on the Churches in the Cing Empire. In a sense, this is not a surprise. 
As was seen in Chapter 4, the  Church News ’ writers were slow to say anything 
about the likely end of the Cing-Japanese War. And as was seen in Chapter 5, their 
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accounts of the Japanese government and military in the War had far fewer 
opinions than the accounts in the  Monthly Messenger . 
Likely, it was for much the same reasons as these that the  Church News  said 
nothing about the relations between event in the War and the future of the Cing 
Churches. The makers of the  Church News  were workers for the Presbyterian 
Church of England, but they were Churchgoers and leaders at the Presbyterian 
Church of Tái-wan too. To the best of their knowledge, they would be living and 
working in the Cing Empire for many more years. Giving opinions on Cing 
politics, like Lǐ’s loss of power, was unwise: who could say what opinions the Cing 
leaders in Tái-wan had of Lǐ? Still more unwise would have been saying that Cing 
Empire’s loss to the Japanese was, in fact, a good thing for the Churches. So the 
writers kept their peace. But, they would not have to do so for long. 
 
THE TÁIWANESE CHURCH’S FUTURE IN THE  MONTHLY 
MESSENGER 
From the start, the  Monthly Messenger had great hopes for the future of the 
Presbyterian Church of Tái-wan under Japanese rule. While the outcome of the 
Cing-Japanese War might make the Cing leaders take a greater interest in 
Western ways, there was no way to be sure that this would take place. But in 
Tái-wan, the Japanese would be the government, and would surely use their 
power to make Western ways more common. This, in the eyes of the  Monthly 
Messenger , would be good for the Churches of Tái-wan: there would more interest 
in them, and fewer things in the way of persons going to church. 
There was another reason too for the writers’ hopes. In the past, a number 
of Cing leaders in Tái-wan had been unfriendly to the Church: Church leaders, 
missionaries, and Churchgoers had come under attack; there had even been a 
number of deaths. The writers were certain that it would not be so under the rule 
of the Japanese. And so, in the  Monthly Messenger ’s accounts of the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War were many writings, from missionaries and writers in 
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England, giving their views on how the Church’s future in a Japanese-controlled 
Tái-wan would be bright. 
 
Numbers 
The chart below gives the  Monthly Messenger ’s opinions on the Táiwanese 
Churches futures in view of the Táiwanese-Japanese War. As can be seen, there is 
not much to these: from start to end, the periodical said that the Japanese getting 
the better of the Táiwanese Republic (“BTR FUT”) would be good for the 
Táiwanese Churches. The numbers of such writings, and the amount of space 
they took up, can be seen below. 
MONTHLY MESSENGER — 
JAPANESES-TÁIWANESE WAR 
BTR FUT LINS PER 
591: 153–154 57 6.16% 
592: 158 42 4.54% 
594: 198 34 3.67% 
594: 201 47 5.08% 
598: 12 32 3.46% 
TOTAL: 5 212 22.89% 
 
Writings giving an opinion on the Churches’ futures were took up about one fifth 
of the space that the  Monthly Messenger  gave to writings about the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War. The reasons that they gave these opinions have a 
connection with their views on the Chinese and Japanese in general. The details 
of these are given below.  
 
Developing the island 
Even before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was made public, the Monthly Messenger ’s 
writers said the Japanese might take control of Tái-wan. They were not unhappy 
about this, and saw it as likely to be a help to their mission there. One piece of 
writing said, “It is all but certain . . . that the Japanese will take possession of 
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Formosa as a material guarantee, if not as an actual possession. But, excepting in 
the first disturbance, that ought not to be unfavourable to our Missions” (589: 
82). When the treaty was at last made public, the  Monthly Messenger ’s writers took 
great pleasure in it. Their thoughts on its effects in the Cing Empire were seen in 
an earlier section, but their hopes for its effects in Tái-wan were even higher. 
One piece of writing, from a missionary in Tái-wan, said 
Japanese rule will not be unfavourable to the progress of Christian work. 
The Government will be just and firm, and friendly to foreigners. The 
great natural resources of the island will be rapidly developed. The 
intelligence of the people will be quickened. The new conditions will 
further the spread of the Gospel. (591: 127-128) 
 
This is very in keeping with their thoughts on the relations between the 
commonness of the Western ways and the growth of the Churches. The writer is 
not saying that the Japanese will give their support to the Church, only that they 
will make “new conditions” in which the Church will be better able to do its 
work. What the government  will do is make Western ways more common: there 
will be laws like a Western country, so “The government will be just and firm”; 
there will be logging, mining, and farming organisations like those in Western 
countries, so “The great natural resources . . . will be rapidly developed”; and 
there will be schools teaching Western accounts of the world, so “The 
intelligence of the people will be quickened.” 
It was not only missionaries then in Tái-wan who were of this opinion. 
James Maxwell, the Church’s first missionary to Tái-wan, was by 1895 back in 
England overseeing his own periodical,  Medical Missions . Into this he put his 
thoughts on the future of his old Mission, and an account of these was given in 
the  Monthly Messenger :  
Dr. Maxwell (in Medical Missions) shares the belief of the missionaries 
now on the field, that Japanese rule will result in the rapid development 
of the great natural resources of Formosa, and the bettering of the 
condition of the people, and will, at any rate, not be unfriendly to 
Christian Missions. If Japan prohibits the importation of opium in its new 
province, as it does at home, it will, of course, immensely benefit the 
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island, and remove a great barrier to the progress of the gospel. (592: 
153-154). 
 
Again, there is hope for the development of the island’s “great natural 
resources,” and for the “bettering of the condition of the people,” at least some 
part of which was making schools for Western ideas. The hope for laws on opium 
are a good example of the connection between Cing ways of living and the slow 
growth of the Churches. Opium use was then common in the Cing Empire: in 
some accounts, as many as ten percent of Cing persons made use of it. But the 
Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan was completely against its use. In their eyes, 
would-be Churchgoers had to make a decision between opium and the Church, 
and too many were making the wrong decision. The Japanese may have had their 
own reasons for doing away with opium use, but the new laws, by taking away 
this “great barrier,” would be a great help to the Church. 
Doing away with opium was not the only way that the new Japanese laws 
could make conditions better for the Church. George Ede, in the same piece of 
writing, gave still another hope for the future: 
Best of all, Christianity will be acknowledged. Sunday will in Government 
establishments be observed as a day of rest, open violent persecution will 
be stopped, and finally, official recognition may be given to Mission work 
and institutions. Much of this may be external Christianity, but let us 
hope that concurrently with the outward form there may also by Divine 
influence spring up the inward grace which shall ere long manifest itself 
in the true righteousness which alone exalteth a nation. (592: 158) 
 
This is another way in which the Church’s way of living, being based on their 
account of the world, was very different from that of the Cing. The Church in 
Tái-wan made its Churchgoers keep the Sabbath: they could do nothing on 
Sunday that would make them money. And this was the cause of some trouble to 
would-be Churchgoers: not working on the Sabbath seemed foolish to many, and 
to the very poor could even be a dangerous decision. It made sense once they had 
taken on the Church’s account of the world, but the missionaries or Evangelists 
might make them keep the Sabbath well before they had got to that level of 
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“knowledge.” Under the Japanese, things would be different, government 
workers would get the Sabbath, as they did in Japan, and this would make it 
simpler to get others to keep it too. If the Japanese did not make Sunday a day of 
rest for the whole country, then in this, as in so many other things, they would at 
least be an example for them. 
 
Letting the missionaries do their work 
As seen above, one of George Ede’s hopes was that “open violent persecution will 
be stopped.” He was far from the only writer with that hope. Likely, nearly all of 
them had in mind the old Cing government of Tái-wan, which had at times been 
very unfriendly to the Church. In theory, the Cing government could do nothing 
to a missionary who kept within the law, and little to one who went outside it. 
But even so, over the years a number of Cing government leaders in Tái-wan had 
done their best to make the Church go away. For example, James Maxwell, when 
hoping for the “bettering of the condition of the people” may have had in mind 
an experience from his missionary days, when there was for a short while open 
war on the Church: 
From a houses in which he took shelter the mob burst in the door, pulled 
our poor brother out, dragged him a considerable distance along the 
street, and then, near a tree beside which I have several times stood to 
speak, and where Cheng-hong [Zng Cên̄g-hong] doubtless has also stood to 
read the gospel, they stoned him the stones and beat him with clubs till he 
died. Their brutality did not even end with his death. On of them with a 
knife cutting open the poor crushed body. His remains were thrown into a 
ditch close by, and carried in a bag to the seashore, and there sunk in the 
sea. (qtd. in Johnston 175) 
 
Maxwell had gone to the Cing government about this, but they had done nothing. 
Only after the British Royal Navy had taken control of Ān-bêng — saying said that 
they would open fire on Dāi-lám, the seat of the government — did the Cing put a 
stop to the attacks. 
Thing were never again that bad, but to the end of the Cing period, the 
missionaries were not completely safe. For example, William Campbell, in his 
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book,  Sketches from Formosa , gave an account of coming under attack while 
journeying in the countryside. He went to bed in an Evangelist’s house, only to be 
made awake by the discovery that the house was on fire, and a group of armed 
men were waiting outside for him:  
The place now began to fill with smoke, the dry grass roofing being on fire 
all around, and the chapel itself enveloped in flames. My own little 
bedroom was crumbling to ashes, and continually the heated air in the 
blazing bamboos would become expanded and burst like the report of so 
many pistols. . . . There was nothing save fire and smoke all over the 
chapel, and there seemed something fiendish in the determination of that 
crowd as they stood awaiting my exit with uplifted knives and spears. I 
once more rushed inside and sorely injured my hand and bare feet in 
trying to break a way of escape from the back; but, while thus engaged, 
someone smashed the bars of the window-opening, and cast in a burning 
torch, which began to set the loose straw of the bed on fire. 
It was at this point I quite gave it up, groaned out a prayer that God 
would surely be near me, and, for the last time, dashed out, expecting 
nothing but to be stabbed by those glittering spears. (98) 
 
In the end, Campbell got away from his attackers, and made his way to the 
nearest Cing government representative — who did nothing. 
It may have been, at least in part, the memory of that experience that 
made Campbell say to a group of Churchgoers in London: “Missionaries in Japan 
were very hopeful as to the work there, and all that was desired in Formosa was 
that the Japanese should extend to the missionaries there the same privileges 
that they had extended to the missionaries on the mainland of Japan” (591: 
137-138). Campbell, whose who had lately been to the Japanese Empire — see 
Chapter 5 — was very conscious of the fact that in the nearly thirty years 
missionaries had been working in the Empire, there had been only a small 
number of attacks on them, and each time the Japanese government had seen 
that the Churches got “justice.” 
This fact was on the minds of the Church leaders too. In the last days of 
the Táiwanese Republic, as the Japanese were making ready to take Dāi-lám, a 
piece of writing in the  Monthly Messenger gave this message from Hugh Matheson, 
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the old friend of the Japanese Prime Minister: “I have the highest authority for 
saying that Admiral Kabiyama [Kabayama Sukenori], the High Officer sent from 
Tokio, and the appointed Resident minister, Mr. Midzuno [Mizuno Jun], have 
been instructed by their Government to devote their first attention to the 
welfare of the foreign residents and missionaries” (594: 198). 
 
Discussion  
Even before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was made public, the  Monthly Messenger ’s 
writers had an idea that the Japanese would take control of Tái-wan. And even at 
this time, they were happy about it. There were two reason: first, if the Japanese 
had control of Tái-wan, they would see to the “development” of the island, which 
would be good for the growth of the Church; second, a Japanese government 
would be “not unfriendly” to the Presbyterian Church, so the missionaries would 
be able to do their work more safely. 
By “development,” the writers had in mind the making common of 
Western ways of thought and living. As was seen in Chapter 5, the  Monthly 
Messenger ’s writers had the idea that certain Chinese ways of living, and the 
trouble with giving them up, were making it harder to get Cing persons 
interested in the Church. The writers’ hope was that the Japanese would put in 
place laws more like those of Western countries, which would do away 
completely with some of these things, such as opium use. At the same time, the 
Japanese government’s use of Western science, medicine, geography, and so on 
would make these more common in Tái-wan, and make less common their 
Chinese counterparts. In short, the writers were sure that if the Japanese made 
Western ways more common in Tái-wan, the growth of the Church would be 
quicker. Hugh Matheson, of the Church’s Foreign Missions Committee, made the 
connection very clear for his readers: “The Government will be just and firm, and 
friendly to foreigners. The great natural resources of the island will be rapidly 
developed. The intelligence of the people will be quickened. The new conditions 
will further the spread of the Gospel” ( Monthly Messenger 591: 127–128). 
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By “not unfriendly,” the writers had in mind the safekeeping of 
missionaries and Churchgoers. In the thirty years that the Church had been on 
the island, it had come under attack a number of times: Churches had been 
damaged; money had been lost; there had even been some deaths. In theory, the 
Cing government leaders had, by law, to keep the Church safe — but many did 
nothing of the sort. In fact, some of the attacks had been made with the 
knowledge of, or even on the orders of, Cing leaders. The Japanese government 
was different: in the same period of time, the Churches in the Japanese islands 
had been much safer, the Japanese government having gone to some lengths to 
keep them so. The writers in England and Tái-wan were well aware of this, and it 
was their hope that the Japanese government would keep the Presbyterian 
Church of Tái-wan safe too. It was for a level of safeness like the missionaries in 
Japan that William Campbell was hoping when he said: “all that was desired in 
Formosa was that the Japanese should extend to the missionaries there  the same 
privileges that they had extended to the missionaries on the mainland of Japan” 
( Monthly Messenger 591: 137–138; emphasis mine). 
 
THE TÁIWANESE CHURCH’S FUTURE IN THE  CHURCH NEWS 
The  Church News ’ writing about Tái-wan’s future was different from the writing in 
the  Monthly Messenger . For one thing, accounts of the future were a smaller part 
of the periodical’s war writing. For another, the missionaries’ pleasure at the 
thought of a Japanese-controlled Tái-wan came through but softly, at least in 
comparison with the loud and frequent voice it was given in the English 
periodical. In the  Monthly Messenger , the writers said that they were hoping for a 
Tái-wan in which Western ways were more common, and the government was a 
friend of the Church. In the  Church News , they did not say these things openly, but 
got their point across even so. They did this by making note of future changes 
that, it would have been clear to readers, would be good for the Church. And they 
gave a great amount of attention to the number of Churchgoers in the Japanese 
military, and the friendly relations between the Japanese Churches and the 
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government. The readers likely got the point — in the future, the island would be 
Japanese, and under the new government, there would be great changes which 
would likely be a better future for the Church. 
 
Numbers 
Once again, the  Church News  openly gave no opinions on the likely future of the 
Táiwanese Churches if they came under Japanese control. But, the missionaries, 
whose opinions were seen in the last section, got their opinions across even so, 
by the use of quotations from others persons, and suggestions about what the 
Japanese could do for the Church. Below, there is discussion of the details of 
these opinions. 
 
Changes for the better 
The makers of the  Church News , the missionaries, were certain not only that Japan 
would take control of Tái-wan, but that this would be good for the Church. But 
for the most part, they kept these opinions out of the  Church News . In fact, only 
one piece of writing in the  Church News openly said anything at all about the 
Church’s future: 
no matter whether we end up with Japanese rule or self-rule, things will 
be changed, and never more as they once were. Some of us believe that 
the future holds better opportunities to preach the Gospel, and that the 
Church will quickly expand. Ask for God's protection, and that the Church 
might not encounter any obstacles, but rather experience good fortune. 
bé lūn bhêh̄ gui Rīt-bùn koàn a-sī bhêh̄ gā-dī li a o-lì, dêk-gāk bh ê -dīt tang 
yiú-goān cīn-ciū n  za-zếng ế koan-sīt, gêng-hòng wun-d a ng bhêh̄ gê-wā n . 
Ghoàn wū láng dēh ǹg-bhāng āo-lái wū gēh kāh hé gī-hoē tāng tuán d e -lì, 
gào-ho ê kāh gìn kūi-kuāh. D a i-gê diēh giú Si o ng-d ê jiàn-g o , bhian-dit 
gào-ho ê du-dieh zo-ghāi,  ê dit doā, hên̄g-ōng ế hēk-k i . (122: 37-38) 
 
The first part of the writing, “no matter whether . . . ” would have made it 
unclear to readers under whose rule there would be “better opportunities to 
preach the Gospel,” and under what conditions “the Church will quickly expand.” 
The readers were given hope for the future, but no idea about what that future 
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would be. Had they been readers of the  Monthly Messenger , things would has been 
clearer. The “us” (“ghoàn”) in the writings is the missionaries: the Ê-mńg 
language has a different pronoun — “làn” — for groups made up of the speaker 
and the listener. In the English periodical the missionaries had been very open 
about their hope for the island: that Japan would put the island under its control, 
then make conditions in which the Church would better able to do its work. But 
in the  Church News , they kept this from readers, saying only that the future would 
— or at least could — be better, but saying nothing about the details of this 
future, or the reasons for its being so. 
In fact, the missionaries never openly said in the  Church News that 
Japanese rule would be good for the Church. But, as when giving opinions of the 
Táiwanese Republic’s leaders, they made this suggestion in at least one place. As 
seen above, one thing which the missionaries were certain the Japanese would do 
for Tái-wan was see to its “development.” In a piece of writing for the  Monthly 
Messenger , George Ede gave the details of his hopes: “Personally I think the 
change will be for the better. Good roads will be made, railways constructed, 
rivers and harbours dredged, factories erected, fresh methods of agriculture 
introduced” (592: 158). In the  Church News , the missionaries were not quite so 
open about this hope; but they still got across to readers that if the Japanese had 
control of the island, they would make its transportation better: 
A Japanese officer tells me that when they control southern Tái-wan, they 
will immediately begin building a railway to connect the north and the 
south. This will be a great boon to our church, for I will be able to go to 
you, and you to come to me, much more quickly. 
Japan [sic] ế Do a -goa n  wū gā goà yin nā k i Dāi-lám goàn so-zāi nā ān-zên̄g, 
yin sūi-sī bhêh̄ c o ng he-yān-cia, bhêh̄ ho Dāi-wán Dāi-bak Dāi-lám ế lo wê ̄
tong. Zê sī làn g a o-ho e ế doā l o - ên̄g, nā sī lìn  a i lái, ghuàn k i jiū jin ko a i. 
(128: 108–109). 
 
The readers could not have been unconscious of what a great help such a railway 
would be to the Church. Overland transportation in nineteenth-century Tái-wan 
was not well developed at all: roads were poorly developed, the rivers unusable, 
bandits were widespread; going between cities by sea was often quicker than 
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taking the shorter overland road (DeGlopper 69–70). But this was not possible for 
the evangelists and missionaries. There were Churches everywhere, and it was it 
was very frequently necessary for them to go into the countryside and 
mountains. This had to be done on foot, and over the bad roads. In fact, when the 
Church had its yearly meeting, the  Church News  had to make the Evangelists 
conscious of this many months before the day, so that they could get to Dāi-lám 
in time. But with a railway, and the better roads that the Japanese were sure to 
make, things would be different. The evangelists and missionaries could make 
their rounds more quickly and in greater safety. And the Church could have 
meetings more frequently. The  Church News was not openly saying that the 
Japanese would make conditions better for the Church’s work, but the readers 
likely got the suggestion. 
 
Churchgoers among the Japanese leaders  
The suggestion that the Church would have a better future under the Japanese 
was made in other ways too. For example, in places the  Church News made the 
suggestion that the Japanese were friends of the Churches in a way that the Cing 
had not been. Around August, the  Church News made note of something that had 
taken place a little before the Cing-Japanese War, and which seemed a good sign 
for the island’s future: 
When the Japanese soldiers were preparing for war, the Bible Society 
prepared Gospels of John for them to read. These were very small books, 
which were suited for travellers; each was about three c u n long, and well 
printed. They sent out around 10,000 copies. The officers were extremely 
pleased, and all willing to pass the books along to the men to read. 
Hīt-sí Rīt-bùn bên̄g bhêh̄ cūt-ji a n, hiāh-ế Sềng-cêh-ho ê wū b i -bān jīt-bùn 
Yek-hān Hek-yīm-duān bhêh̄ s a ng yin ko a n . Hit-bùn jīn sè-bùn, du-happy 
cut-ghoā láng ế l o -ên̄g, dńg 2 c u n 3, koāh cùn-lak, rī yā bhếng; wū s a ng 
kui-nā bhān bùn. Do a -koa n  yā jin hoā n -hì lòng kām-goān ho bên̄g-dêng siu 
k i ko a n .  (124: 59-60) 
 
A Church’s giving Bibles or part of Bibles to the Japanese military was not 
necessarily interesting or unusual. The Cing Churches often did things like this: 
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in fact, before the War the Presbyterian Church in Tái-wan itself had a part in 
giving a Bible to the “Dowager Empress” (“Huáng-tài-hòu”) of the Cing Empire 
( Church News 115: 108). What was unusual was the Japanese military’s answer: 
“The officers were extremely pleased, and very willing to pass the books along to 
the men to read.” This was something very unlikely to take place in the Cing 
Empire, where, as seen in the accounts of Wylie’s death and Campbell’s 
near-death experience, the government and military at best had nothing to do 
with the missions, and at worst were behind attacks on them. The  Church News 
did not say that the Táiwanese Church would be better off under a government 
whose military was happy to get Bibles from Churches, but the readers must have 
given this some thought.  
And it was not only the Japanese government that was friendly to the 
Churches. After giving an account of the taking of Dāi-lám, the  Church News gave 
readers the news that they now had a new group of brothers and sisters: 
The General Assembly of the Japanese Presbyterian Church knows that 
Japan now controls Tái-wan, and has dispatched two of their Japanese 
pastors to Tái-wan to investigate, and to see how they can be of use here. 
When they learned that our General Assembly was convening, they hoped 
to come along so that they could meet with us and talk. We have written 
to tell them about it, and have invited them to join in us in Dāi-lām-hù. 
And so, we urge you, Elders and others, to attend the meeting. 
Rīt-bùn Diu n -le-gào ế D a i-hoê ̄ yi-gêng zai Dāi-wán siek Rīt-bùn guàn, jiū 
tek-diōng yin bun-dê ̄ế Bek-sū nn̄g láng dieh lái Dāi-wán sún ko a n  hoế-hêk̄, 
hō yin  a o-lái tang siat-hoāt l i -êk̄ Dāi-wán. Yin nn̄g láng tiā n -g i n  gòng làn 
Dāi-wān-hu-siek ế gào-hoê ̄bhêh̄ siāt D a i-hoê ̄yin zi a n  siū n  dieh hit-sí lái 
hù-hoê ̄tang cam làn z e -hoề z u -jip gāo-boê. So-yì ghuàn deh-sia-poê 
tōng-di yin zai, ǹg-bhāng yin hit-diap ê ̄lái Dāi-lām-hù. An-ni jiū cià n 
diu n -lè zềng-láng yào-gìn dêk-kāk dieh lái hù-hoê.̄ (129: 116–117) 
 
This was something new — a Japanese Church going out of its way to give help to 
the Táiwanese Church. True, the  Church News made sure that readers were 
conscious of other Churches in the Cing Empire, and the Presbyterian Churches 
of Shàn-tóu and  Ê -mńg had quite good relations with the Táiwanese Church. But 
this was something very different: even as the fighting was still going on between 
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the Japanese and Táiwanese, a Japanese Presbyterian Church was making an 
attempt to give support to a group of Táiwanese Churchgoers whom they had 
never even seen. The Táiwanese Church had been part of the Japanese Empire for 
only a short time, but it seemed that they had friends there, who would give 
them help with putting things back together after the War. The  Church News did 
not outright say that this was a good thing. Likely, it seemed unnecessary to do 
so. When the war over, Tái-wan would be under the control of a government that 
would make it simpler for the Church to do its work. They had friends in 
government and military, and new friends in the Japanese Empire too. To the 
missionaries, the Church’s future seemed bright indeed, and to the readers of the 
Church News , it must have seemed the same. 
 
Discussion  
The  Church News ’ editors, and many of its writers, were missionaries from the 
Presbyterian Church of England. These missionaries often sent writings to 
Monthly Messenger , in which their opinions on the future of Japanese-controlled 
Tái-wan can be seen. It would, in their view, would be a good future, for the 
Japanese would make Western ways more common in Tái-wan, and would be 
friends of the Church. But, this opinion was nowhere openly given in the  Church 
News . In the Táiwanese periodical, there was only one piece of writing saying 
anything about the Church’s future: this said it could be better, but was 
purposely unclear about who had control of Tái-wan in this better future. 
The reason for the writers’ not giving their opinions freely was likely the 
same one that kept them quiet in the Cing-Japanese War: it would be bad for the 
Church to say outright that a future under Japanese control would be a good 
future. Republic-supporting Churchgoers would not be happy about this, and all 
Churchgoers would be put in danger from their neighbours, or the government. 
It could even be the end of the periodical, which was based in 
Republican-controlled Dāi-lám, and could come under attack at any time. 
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So the missionaries kept quiet. But, even without openly saying as much, 
they were able to get across their hope that the Church’s future in a 
Japanese-controlled Tái-wan would be bright. They did this in two ways. First, 
they put into the  Church News writings saying what changes the Japanese would 
make to Tái-wan. That these changes were for the better, the missionaries 
themselves never said, but it was likely clear enough to the readers. And, when 
others said that these changes would be good for the Church, the missionaries 
were happy enough to put this in, as when Pastor Ghiám said of the Japanese 
designs to make a new railway, “this will be a great boon to our church, for I will 
be able to go to you, and you to come to me, much more quickly" ( Church News 
128: 109). Second, they put in accounts of Japanese persons’ giving help to the 
Church. There were the accounts from the Bê ̄n -ó n  islands, seen in an earlier 
chapter, but accounts too from much farther away. There were, for example, 
stories about the Japanese Bible Society giving Bibles to the Japanese Army, and 
the officers’ being happy to get them. There was even a story about the Japanese 
Presbyterian Church’s sending its pastors to Tái-wan, “to see how they can be of 
use here”  (Church News 129: 116–117). So, the missionaries did not themselves say 
that the Japanese would be friends of the Church, but readers of these stories 
would likely have got that idea. 
In the  Church News the missionaries were quiet about their hopes for the 
future, making no open statements about these. But, they were nonetheless able 






Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have given the details of what the  Monthly Messenger and 
Church News said in their accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War. In this Chapter, the matter in the earlier chapters is 
gone through again, in order to make clear the relations between the different 
parts of this work, and why they are important. 
 
LANGUAGES AND VALUES  
Many writers have put forward arguments saying that a person’s experience of 
the world is shaped at least partly by their “languages” — the system of signs 
from which their accounts of the world are made — for example, maths, physics, 
arts, and so on. To the users of some group of languages, the theories go, their 
experience of the world seems to be of the world as it really is; in fact they have 
but one possible experience of it (Hall 26–35). These “constructionist” theories of 
language have been put to use making sense of nineteenth-century Westerners’ 
writings about non-Western persons. Westerners, it is said, taking their own 
accounts of the world to be “true” and their own ways of living to be “right,” 
necessarily saw non-Westerners’ accounts of the world as “not-true” and the 
ways of living based on these as “not-right.” And, in places where Westerners had 
power over non-Westerners, they were free not only to take their Western 
accounts of these persons as “knowledge,” but to make the non-Westerners 
themselves take up this “knowledge” in place of their own (Barry 185–187). 
This was certainly so in the Cing Empire, where Westerners generally took 
Chinese accounts of the world as “not-true,” and many Chinese ways of living as 
strange, and even wrong (Mackeras 65). Some Westerners, notably the Protestant 
missionaries, took upon themselves the work of teaching the Cing about Western 
ways. For one thing, teaching about the Church’s accounts of the world was their 
very reason for being in the Cing Empire. For another, in the view of some 
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missionaries the Churches could never do well till Western ideas in general — 
medicine, physics, political theory, and so on — took the places of Chinese ideas 
(Bays 67–73). To this end many Cing churches and missions put out periodicals, at 
least in part as a tool for teaching the Cing about Western accounts of the world.  
The Cing quickly made their own periodicals too, from which Cing readers 
could get accounts of news and Western ways without the Church-matter in the 
missionary periodicals. These periodicals were popular, and some Cing leaders 
made good use of them (Zhang, chap. 2); but they still got to only a small part of 
the Empire. No more than three to five percent of Cing persons had enough 
education to make sense of the periodicals (Ramsey 104–106), and of the ones 
who could make sense of them, the greater part saw Western accounts of the 
world as “not-true” and Western ways of living as “not-right” (Kuo and Liu 
166–176). And, unlike in other parts of the world, Westerners did not have 
enough power over the Cing Empire to make the Cing take up these ideas by 
force. 
Things were different in the Japanese Empire. Westerners took the 
Japanese accounts of the world as “not-true” too, but had a somewhat better 
opinion of Japanese ways of living, at least in comparison with the Cing. They 
were, it seemed, nearer to Western ways, and so “righter” than Cing ways 
(Lehmann 45–46). What was more, unlike the Cing government, the Japanese 
government was very interested in Western accounts of the world, and in the 
military technology that these made possible. So while the Cing leaders went on 
using their old Chinese accounts of the world, the Japanese sent their young men 
to the West to get a better knowledge of the theories of Western science and 
politics, and made schools in the Japanese Empire for building greater knowledge 
of these more generally. Based on this knowledge, the Japanese remade their 
government and military too, to be more like those in the West (Beasley,  Rise 




WRITINGS ABOUT THE WARS 
Westerners had a chance to make a comparison of the two countries’ 
developments in 1894, when the Cing and Japanese Empires went to war for 
control of the nearby Joseon Kingdom. The Japanese military quickly took control 
of the Kingdom, and then took the War into the Cing Empire itself. By the start of 
1895, the Japanese were in a position to take over the Cing capital, and the Cing 
government had to make a request for peace. The War was ended by the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, which, among other things, gave control of the Cing province of 
Tái-wan over to the Japanese Empire. But before the Japanese could take the 
island, the Táiwanese made a new government, the “Táiwanese Republic” and in 
May of 1895 made a declaration of independence from the two Empires. They 
were not free for long though. The Japanese sent their military to the island, and 
there was fighting between Empire and Republic till the end of the year, when 
the Japanese at last got complete control of Tái-wan. 
The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War were of great 
interest to many Westerners, and there was a great amount of writing about the 
Wars in the Western newspapers and other periodicals. As other writers have 
said, the degree to which the two sides made use of Western ways and accounts 
of the world had a great effect on what was said about them in this writing. In 
general, Western periodicals had a very positive opinion of the Japanese. For one 
thing, the Japanese military had done very well against the seemingly much 
greater-sized Cing army.  For another, it was somewhat like a Western military in 1
its organisation and way of fighting, and so seemed to them the “righter” of the 
two.  In comparison, the Western periodicals gave a very negative opinion of the 
Cing. The Cing military had given up the great advantages it had at the start of 
the War, and while it had some Western weapons, the Cing military’s 
organisation and way of fighting — or, more often, of not fighting — was, to the 
Western writers, strange and “not-right.”  2
1 In fact, the two sides’ armies were about the same size, but few Westerners were conscious of 
this at the time (Fung 1026–1029). 
2 Quite a number of writers have made the argument. For examples, see Dorwart, Hough, and 
Paine.  
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The Cing periodicals took the opposite position in nearly all matters about 
the War. Cing persons, if they had any knowledge of the Japanese at all, saw them 
as lesser persons, whose accounts of the world and ways of living had value only 
to the degree that they were like Chinese ways. From the point of view of the 
Cing languages, the Japanese government’s taking on Western accounts of the 
world had only made their position worse in comparison to the Cing (Paine 
99-100). What was more, the Japanese attempt to get more control over the 
Joseon Kingdom was clearly “not-right,” and the Cing military was fighting to put 
the world back in order. And so, in their accounts of the War, the Cing periodicals 
gave a very negative opinion of the Japanese military and government, and a 
very positive opinion of their own forces. 
The trouble was, the Japanese forces kept getting the better of the Cing in 
battle. Sometimes the Cing periodicals simply said the opposite, but when they 
did give news of Cing losses, they often gave some reason that getting the better 
of the Japanese was not then possible for the Cing — such as the Japanese Army’s 
having far greater numbers. Even when the Cing military had clearly been 
overcome, the greater part of Cing periodicals said that the reason was their not 
being good enough examples of the Chinese ways of war and government; 
nothing was said about the advantages of Western ways (Tsai 148–161). 
To date, there has been some work on Western and Cing periodicals’ 
accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War: the above 
overviews are based on these. But, these writers have given their attention 
chiefly to the greatest-sized periodicals in different countries, periodicals whose 
chief purpose was to give accounts of events around the Cing Empire and the 
world. So, for example, Sarah Paine’s  The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 takes 
account of only  The Pall Mall Gazette and  The Times in the U.K., and only the  New 
York Times  and the World in the U.S. As for accounts of the Cing Empire’s 
periodicals, Chén Jhong-chún’s “Research into Newspaper and Public Opinion on 
the 1895 Resistance to the Cession of Tái-wan” (“Bào-kan Yú-lùn yǔ Yǐ-wéi Fǎn 
Ge-Tái Dòu-jheng Yán-jiòu”) takes account of the  Shen-bào , the most important 
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newspaper in Shàng-hǎi; and Lǐ Jin-ciáng’s “Hong Kong’s Response to the First 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)” (“Jiá-wǔ Jhàn-jheng Shií-ci [1894–1895] 
Siang-gǎng de ̊Fǎn-yìng”; square brackets in original), takes account of  The 
Chinese Mail (“Huà-ziì Rhiì-bào”), one of Siang-gǎng’s important newspapers. 
But, there were many other sorts of periodicals being made in the Cing 
Empire and the West. As noted, many Cing Churches and missions made 
periodicals for the purpose of teaching Cing persons about Western accounts of 
the world. But, some of these gave news too, and likely all that did had at least 
some accounts of the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War. Nearly all 
Cing Churches had relations with Churches and mission organisations in the 
West, which put out their own periodicals. These Western Church and missionary 
periodicals were chiefly interested in news from the mission field, and other 
church matters, but the Cing-Japanese War was important enough that many of 
the Western Church and missionary periodicals had accounts of it too. 
While some attention has been given to the history and purposes of 
missionaries periodicals, nothing has been said about the accounts of the 
Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War in these smaller, 
special-purpose periodicals. As such, this work makes an addition to both bodies 
of work by taking account of what was said about the War in two missionary 
periodicals — the Presbyterian Church of England’s  Monthly Messenger and Gospel 
in China  and the Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan’s  Dāi-lám Capital Church 
News . 
The reason for taking account of these two periodicals is that they had a 
number of writers in common. The Presbyterian Church in Southern Tái-wan had 
got its start with the help of missionaries from the Presbyterian Church of 
England, and in 1894 the English Church’s missionaries still had charge of the 
Church News , for which they, not the Táiwanese, did most of the writing. At the 
same time, the missionaries regularly sent writings to the Presbyterian Church of 
England, and from these the  Monthly Messenger ’s editor made its accounts of the 
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mission in Tái-wan. As such, the two periodicals’ accounts of the War were from 
the missionaries’ point of view. 
The two periodicals were chiefly interested in Church matters: they gave 
news of past and future Church and mission events — for the Táiwanese Church 
had its own mission, to the Bê ̄n -ó n  Islands — accounts of important events from 
the churches history, and simple teaching in theology. But, they sometimes gave 
accounts too of events which had, on the face of it, little connection to the 
Churches. The Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War were such events. 
So, in these two periodicals is a chance not only to see how a Western and Cing 
Church periodical’s accounts of the War were different from other periodicals in 
their countries, but also to see how the two periodicals’ accounts of the War, 
many of which came from the same writers, were different from each other. 
 
AMOUNTS OF WRITING ABOUT THE WARS 
The first way in which the  Monthly Messenger ’s and  Church News ’ accounts of the 
Wars were different, is that the two periodicals had different amounts of writing 
about the Wars. In Chapter 3, the measurements of their writings sizes were 
taken by putting the periodicals’ War-time writings into two groups, “about the 
War” and “not about the War” and making a comparison of the number of lines 
of writing “about the War,” with the greatest possible number of lines of writing 
in the periodical.  From these measurements, it was seen that writing about the 3
Cing-Japanese War took up 6.49 percent of the 10 issues of the  Church News that 
came out at the time of the War, but only 3.92 percent of the 10 issues of the 
Monthly Messenger that came out in the same time.  Writing about the 4
3 A piece of writing may be “about the War” in one or more of these ways: (1) having a name for 
one or more of the Wars, “Mr. Shaw remarked that the policy of England in the matter had been 
one of strict and almost severe neutrality” ( Monthly Messenger 591: 137–138; emphasis mine); (2) 
having an account of actions undertaken to make the War’s end nearer, “several hundred people 
gave a great shout, rushed the Japanese, and began fighting them” (“bêh̄-sên dān-lé hoāh-hiu, wū 
gui-nā bāh-láng dī hīd-tāh gap yin san tái”;  Church News 128: 109); (3) having an account of a state 
which came into being through the War, “At present rice is very expensive in Hu-siá n  (“Hian-sí dī 
Hu-siá n  bhì jin gui”;  Church News 127: 93). 
4 Account was taken only of the writings in issues that were made, partly or completely, at the 
time the Wars were taking place. For the Cing-Japanese War, this is 25 Jul. 1894 to 08 May 1895. 
For the Japanese-Táiwanese War, it is 23 Jun. 1895 to 21 Oct. 1895. 
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Japanese-Táiwanese War took up 29.34 percent of the 8 issues of the  Church News 
made at the time, or shortly after, the War, and 5.93 percent of the 5 issues of the 
Monthly Messenger that came out in that time. 
Likely, the reason for these different amounts of writings is the different 
relations of the two periodicals’ readers to the Wars. The readers of the  Monthly 
Messenger  were far from the fighting of the Cing-Japanese War, which was having 
little effect on them besides. What was more, many other periodicals in the U.K. 
had accounts of the War. The  Monthly Messenger ’s readers had many other ways of 
getting news about it, and the Church periodical likely could not get news to 
them as quickly as the greater-sized U.K. periodicals, like the Times . Things were 
only a little different when the Japanese-Táiwanese War was taking place. The 
readers were still safely far from the fighting, and there were still accounts of it 
in the U.K. newspapers, but the War was having a greater effect on the missions, 
and the missionaries were sending in accounts from Tái-wan itself; so the  Monthly 
Messenger gave more space to news of the Japanese-Táiwanese War, but not much 
more. 
 The readers of the  Church News  were in a somewhat different position 
with respect to the Cing-Japanese War. It was taking place a long way from them, 
and at the start seemed unlikely to have any effect on Tái-wan. But even so, it 
was a war between their country and an enemy — something that was naturally 
of greater interest to the Táiwanese. And they had few other ways of getting 
news of the War: very few churchgoers — maybe as few as one percent — were 
able to make sense of the “Literary Chinese” (“wén-yán-wén”) in which most of 
the Cing Empire’s other periodicals were written, and so they had to get all their 
news of it from the  Church News , which made use of Tái-wan’s lingua franca — the 
Ê -mńg (“Amoy”) language (Heylen 16–21). And so, the periodical gave more space 
to the Cing-Japanese War than did the  Monthly Messenger , but it was still a small 
part of its space. In comparison, the Japanese-Táiwanese War was clearly very 
important to the  Church News readers: it was a war for control of the island, and 
its outcome would have a great effect on the Church’s future. And so, the  Church 
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News gave more space to writing about the Japanese-Táiwanese War than it had 
the Cing-Japanese War. 
This work then made a comparison of the two periodicals’ writings “about 
the War” with an eye to three test questions: 
 
(1) WERE THE PERIODICALS NEUTRAL IN THE WARS? 
As Paine and others have made clear, the greater part of Western periodicals 
gave a very negative opinion of the Cing Empire in the Cing-Japanese War. This is 
no surprise: Westerners, whose languages made them see Cing accounts of the 
world as “not-true” and Cing ways of action as “not-right,” had a negative 
opinion of the Cing even before the War, and were in general on the side of the 
more “Western” Japanese military. But the better part of Cing periodicals were 
on the side of the Empire: they saw the Japanese as a lesser country, whose 
accounts of the world were “not-true” and whose ways of action were 
“not-right.” A comparison of the two periodicals’ views on the Wars’ best 
outcomes was made by putting their writings “about the War” into three groups: 
(1) “writings saying the Cing/Republic will — and should — overcome the 
Japanese,” (2) “writings saying the Japanese will — and should — overcome the 
Cing,” and (3) “writings saying nothing about the Wars’ outcomes.” 
The measurements of these groups were taken, and from these it was seen 
that the  Monthly Messenger was very like the other Western periodicals. At the 
start of the War it was neutral, saying nothing about which outcome was best, 
but after the Japanese got the better of the Cing at Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the  Monthly 
Messenger went over to their side. By the War’s end, 18.69 percent of the 
periodical’s writing about the War had said that the Japanese overcoming the 
Táiwanese was best. The periodical’s hope was that seeing the effect of Western 
accounts of the world and technologies in action would make the Cing more 
likely to take them up, and maybe give more power to the Cing leaders making 
attempts to take up Western practices. As the editor said, “when the war ends in 
a peace humiliating to China wiser councils may (should) prevail in Pekin 
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[Běi-jing] . . . Her failure to hold her own may give overwhelming force to the 
party of progress” ( Monthly Messenger 585: 274). This had been the missionaries’ 
purpose for some time, and in their view anything which made it simpler was a 
good thing. 
The  Church News , unlike the Western and Cing periodicals, was neutral 
from start to end. The periodical had nothing at all to say about the War’s best 
outcome, and very little to say about the War’s possible outcome. What the 
periodical did in a few places was make a suggestion that the Japanese would get 
the worst of it, as when they said of the Japanese making a base inside Cing lands, 
“The Japanese seem to be planning for a long stay; they really have too high an 
opinion of themselves ” (“Da n  yin gềng-rián  a i gu-dńg di a m hia ki a -kì,  zê yā jin būt zū 
liōng lāh ”; 117: 121; emphasis mine). But after a string of Cing losses, the 
periodical — like the Western periodicals, but completely unlike the other Cing 
periodicals — did outright say that the Japanese would get the better of the Cing: 
“the Cing Empire appears completely defeated. . . . Now the Cing will sue for 
peace (“Ji a o an-ni ko a n  Diōng-gēk sǹg-sī do a -bāi. . . . Jit-diap Diōng-gēk  a i bêh̄ 
giū-hé”;  Church News  117: 122). Likely, the makers of the  Church News were of 
much the same opinion as the makers of the  Monthly Messenger : the Cing 
government’s losses could be the Cing churches’ gains. But, they kept their 
opinion out of the  Church News in the interest of keeping the peace. Their readers 
may have been Churchgoers, but they were still Cing, and it would not do to 
openly go against their government. 
In the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the  Monthly Messenger  was on the side of 
the Japanese from the start. No less than 51.51 percent of its writing about the 
War said that the Japanese overcoming the Táiwanese was the better outcome, 
while none at all said the opposite. In fact, the writers were unhappy about the 
“inexplicable Japanese tardiness” in putting down the Republic (597: 272). There 
were at least two reasons for this. First, the  Monthly Messenger took the view that 
the Táiwanese Republic had no chance against the Japanese Empire, and that all 
their fighting would only be the cause of “serious bloodshed” while the War was 
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going on, and “embittered feeling” between Japanese and Táiwanese when it was 
at last over (594: 201). Second, they were of the opinion that the Táiwanese 
government was a “Republic” in name only: in fact, it was simply the old Cing 
government in new clothes — and their feelings for the Cing government should 
be quite clear from the periodical’s writings about the Cing-Japanese War. But 
the Japanese had by that time made clear that they could, and were, doing things 
as Western countries did, and so the  Monthly Messenger was hoping that the 
Japanese would take control of Tái-wan. 
The  Church News again did not openly take sides. But, in places they made 
the suggestion that the Republic was the worse government of the two, and that 
the Japanese taking control would not be a negative thing. For one thing, they 
gave news of the Táiwanese Republic’s military troubles, but said nothing about 
the troubles of the Japanese military. So, for example, the periodical gave a 
detailed account of the Táiwanese military’s giving up control of the island’s 
north nearly without any fighting (122: 45), but said nothing at all about the 
month that the Japanese military could not get past the Táiwanese at Dek-c a m. 
For another thing, the periodical had quotations from other persons saying that 
it was not a question of if the Japanese took over, but when. This time, there is no 
question about the missionaries’ true opinions: they were clearly on the side of 
the Japanese, for they said as much in the  Monthly Messenger .  But, again, it was 5
not safe to openly take the side of an enemy power, and so in the  Church News , 
they did not give this opinion openly, but only made suggestions. 
 
(2) WHAT WERE THE PERIODICALS’ OPINIONS OF THE CING, 
JAPANESE, AND TÁIWANESE? 
Lehmann, Spence, Dawson and others have made clear that nineteenth-century 
Westerners had a negative opinion of East Asian accounts of the world in general, 
and very negative opinion of the Cing and their ways of living, but a somewhat 
better opinion of the Japanese, whose ways of living were nearer to those of 
5 For example, see  Monthly Messenger 592: 158. 
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Westerners. And this, as seen above, had a great effect on Westerners writing 
about the Cing-Japanese War and Japanese-Táiwanese War. To take the measure 
of this, the writings “about the War” were put into groups about “Cing leaders,” 
“Japanese leaders,” and “Táiwanese leaders,” or any combination of these.  These 6
groups were then put into still smaller groups of writings giving “positive,” 
“negative,” or “positive and negative” opinions on the leaders, and the 
measurements of these groups were taken. 
From this measurements, it is clear that opinions made up an important 
part of the  Monthly Messenger ’s writing about the War. In the Cing-Japanese War, 
over half of its writing “about the War” gave an opinion on the Cing or Japanese. 
The  Monthly Messenger gave only positive opinions on the Japanese government 
and military leaders, but its opinions of Cing leaders were mixed. Positive and 
negative accounts were always together; at no time was anything positive said 
about a Cing leader without something negative being said about a different Cing 
leader. The negative opinions of the Cing leaders were very negative, saying that 
the military leaders “have taken no pains to learn how to conduct and handle 
their troops” (585: 274–275), while the government leaders “seem embedded in 
impregnable arrogance and ignorance” (584: 254). 
The reason for these opinions was that the Cing leaders seemed to have no 
interest in Western “civilisation” — that is, Western accounts of the world and 
ways of action. Notably, the only leader of whom the periodical gave a positive 
opinion was Lǐ Hóng-jhang, the Viceroy of Jhií-lì (“Jhií-lì Zǒng-du”), and the 
reason for this opinion was his “friendliness to Western ideas and inventions” 
( Monthly Messenger  582: 198). It is no surprise, then that the  Monthly Messenger ’s 
opinion of the Japanese was very positive. They were especially interested in how 
quickly and completely the Japanese had taken on Western “civilisation.” One 
writer, having seen the Japanese military in action, said: 
The Japanese army is in a high state of efficiency; the leaders are men of 
great ability, chiefly educated in European countries. While China was fast 
asleep and utterly unconscious of Japan’s designs, the latter country was 
6 Account was taken only of the leaders, as there was little writing about non-leaders. 
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awake and pulsating with new life, and busily engaged in preparing for 
the present conflict. (586: 15) 
 
Opinions of the Japanese government leaders were quite as positive. It was said 
that Japanese Prime Minister, Ito Hirobumi, “is directing the conduct of the war 
with remarkable skill (584: 251–252), while the Japanese Emperor “was one of the 
hardest-working of the staff, working from early morning to late every night” 
(591: 137-138). 
Interestingly, the  Church News never openly gave opinions about the Cing 
or Japanese military leaders. Even when giving an account of events on which the 
missionaries very likely had strong views, the periodical did not say anything 
about the Cing leaders. So, for example, while the  Church News gave a detailed 
account of some Cing soldiers putting a Western missionary to death in 
Liáo-yáng, the account said nothing negative about the Cing leaders, and even 
gave attention to their attempts to get justice for the Church (114: 92). But, here 
again, in a number of places the writers language makes suggestions about their 
views. These were very like the views in the  Monthly Messenger . For example, the 
periodical’s account of the Battle of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu said that in the face of the 
Japanese attack, the Cing troops were “scattered, allowing the Japanese to 
advance as they pleased” (“sì-so a n , cut-zāi Rit-bùn dīt-dit jìn-zếng”; 117: 121); this 
strongly made the suggestion that the Cing military leaders were not doing their 
work well at all, as did the periodical’s statement that “Many people are puzzled 
by how such a strong position could have been taken so easily” (“Z ê ng láng dēh 
gī-go a i hīt so-zāi g a o hiāh yong-z o ng giān-g o zoa n -yi u n  wū gào-hiāh yōng-yī n 
pāh”; 117: 121). 
Of the  Monthly Messenger ’s accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War, 63.71 
percent gave opinions. All gave positive opinions of the Japanese, and nearly all 
negative opinions of the Táiwanese. The Japanese leaders were again said to be 
good and clever men; as ever, things were “good” or “bad” based on how nearly 
they were like the Western ways of doing the same, and the Japanese leaders 
were far nearer than the Táiwanese. Of the Japanese Army’s acts in taking 
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Dāi-lám, one of the missionaries even said in the  Monthly Messenger “compared 
with the treatment of conquered cities by heathen nations in ancient and 
modern times, [it] has been, I should say, marvellously good. Many who know say 
it would compare favourably with the behaviour of soldiers of European nations” 
(598: 10). 
The  Church News ’ accounts of the Japanese-Táiwanese War gave more 
mixed opinions on the Japanese and Táiwanese leaders. The periodical said that 
while the Japanese were doing a great amount of damage to the country’s 
persons and buildings, not all Japanese were equal in this respect: 
Some of the high-ranking Japanese officers seem excellent fellows, 
because they have studied abroad; some speak several languages. . . . The 
ones making trouble are all soldiers and coolies. 
Ghoà ko a n  Japan [sic] ế do a -goa n , wū ế jin hè, yīn-wī wū k i bat gēk tāk-cêh̄; 
wū láng bhāt gui-nā kiū n -kào. . . . So-wū sī bêng gāp yin ế gū-lì gāh 
l a m-sàm zo e . (128: 108–109). 
 
When the War was over, the periodical said, the soldiers and coolies would go 
home, and Tái-wan would be in the hands of the “good” Japanese. On the other 
side, the  Church News  made clear that the first and second Presidents of the 
Republic, Táng Jǐng-song and Lióu Yǒng-fú, were in fact nothing of the sort: by 
frequent use of the the men’s old titles, “Governor” (“bhu-dái”) and 
“Commissioner” (“kīm-cê”), the periodical made readers conscious that the 
“Republican” leaders were simply the old Cing government. They gave much 
attention too, to the troubles in lands under Republican control. There were 
many account of bandits making trouble for the Churchgoers, events which were 
notably less common in places under Japanese control. 
 
(3) WHAT EFFECTS DID THE PERIODICALS SAY THE WARS 
WOULD HAVE ON THE CING CHURCHES? 
One of the chief reasons that the  Monthly Messenger and  Church News are of 
interest is that they were not newspapers, and have a different point of view on 
the Wars than the periodicals to which other writers have given their attention. 
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For example, the two periodical were greatly interested in the effects that the 
Wars would have on the Churches. To take account of this, the periodicals’ 
writings “about the War” were put into groups which made connections between 
the events of the Wars and events in the Church’s futures, and these were put 
into three groups: “writings saying the Churches’ future would be better,” 
“writings saying the Churches’ future would be worse,” and “writings saying that 
the Churches’ future would be no different.” Once again, the groups’ 
measurements were taken.  
From these measurements, it was seen that in the Cing-Japanese War, the 
Monthly Messenger sometimes said that the Churches’ futures would be better 
because of the War, and sometimes said they would be worse. At the start of the 
War, when the periodical’s position was that the Cing would get the better of the 
Japanese, the  Church News said that this would be a bad thing for the Churches in 
the Cing Empire, where “the anti-foreign feeling will, unhappily, be 
strengthened” (583: 222–223). It could even put the missionaries in danger, as in 
the Cing Empire “few could distinguish between ‘outside countries’ — Japanese or 
Europeans are all the same to the great mass of the people” (586: 14). 
But, after the fall of Lyǔ-shùn-kǒu, the  Monthly Messenger ’s position on this 
was changed. They now said that the War could be a good thing for the Cing 
Empire. The Japanese, making use of Western ways, had got the better of the Cing 
military, and the  Monthly Messenger ’s hope was that this would at last give the 
Cing leaders with an interest in Western ways enough power to make these ways 
more widely used. And this, in turn, would make things better for the Churches. 
The periodical was specially happy at the thought of Lǐ Hóng-jhang’s coming 
back: “His real return to power, with increased influence in Pekin, would 
unquestionably mean more honesty in government, a frank abandonment of 
hostility to western civilisation, and better days for the people — gains to China 
in which Christian missions would certainly share” (589: 83). 
The  Church News gave no opinion at all about the likely effect of the 
Cing-Japanese War on the Cing Church’s futures. It was seen in the discussion of 
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the two periodicals’ views on the Japanese-Táiwanese War that the missionaries, 
like the other writers for the  Monthly Messenger , had the idea that Western ways 
being more common would be good for the Church in Tái-wan; likely, they had 
the same idea about the effect of Western ways’ being more common in the Cing 
Empire. But, nothing was said about this in the  Church News . This is most notable 
through a comparison of events of which accounts were given in the two 
periodicals. 
For example, when Lǐ Hóng-jhang was given his power and position back, 
the  Monthly Messenger said things would be better for the Churches. But about 
this event the  Church News said only that he had his position again, without 
saying anything about the likely effects of this (119: 9). And again, when the 
conditions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki were made public, the  Monthly Messenger 
said that Article VI, which made open a number of cities to Japanese and Western 
business, had made too “a vast emergency of opportunity” for the Cing Churches 
(591: 137-138). But of Article VI the  Church News said only that “All of this article 
has to do with business, so there is no need to give a translation” (122: 46), and 
the periodical said nothing about its likely effect on the Cing Churches’ futures. 
Likely, the reason for this was a same reason that kept them from openly giving 
an opinion on the Japanese: it might be the view of the missionaries that the Cing 
losses would be good for the Churches, but hearing this opinions would not likely 
make the  Church News ’ readers, or the other Táiwanese, very happy. 
The  Monthly Messenger said from the very start that the 
Japanese-Táiwanese War would have a good effect on the Church. Not only was 
this said in 22.9 percent of their writing about the War, no other opinion was 
ever given. One piece of writing gave the reasons for their high hopes: 
Japanese rule will not be unfavourable to the progress of Christian work. 
The Government will be just and firm, and friendly to foreigners. The 
great natural resources of the island will be rapidly developed. The 
intelligence of the people will be quickened. The new conditions will 
further the spread of the Gospel. (591: 127-128) 
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In other words, the Japanese would make Western ways more common in 
Tái-wan, and when this was so, the Church would be able to do its work more 
quickly. There was another reason for their hope too. In the past, there had been 
a number of attacks on the Church and the missionaries. The Cing government 
had done little about these, and at times had even been behind them. But the 
Japanese government did not do these things, and so one of the missionaries said 
in the  Monthly Messenger “all that was desired in Formosa was that the Japanese 
should extend to the missionaries there the same privileges that they had 
extended to the missionaries on the mainland of Japan” (591: 137-138). 
There is no question about the missionaries’ views on the matter: the two 
quotations in the last paragraph came from the writings of missionaries. Once 
again, these opinions were not given openly in the  Church News , but the writers 
were still able to make suggestions to this effect. For example, they made note of 
the changes that the Japanese would make to the island: 
A Japanese officer tells me that when they control southern Tái-wan, they 
will immediately begin building a railway to connect the north and the 
south. 
Japan [sic] ế Do a -goa n  wū gā goà yin nā k i Dāi-lám goàn so-zāi nā ān-zên̄g, 
yin sūi-sī bhêh̄ c o ng he-yān-cia, bhêh̄ ho Dāi-wán Dāi-bak Dāi-lám ế lo wê ̄
tong. (128: 108–109) 
 
The advantage of this would have been clear to readers: under the Cing, going 
between the northern and southern Churches had been a long and hard journey; 
under the Japanese, the Church would far better able to do its work. 
Another way of making these suggestions was making a point of how 
friendly the Japanese were to the Churches. And so the periodical had stories 
about the Japanese military happily giving out Bibles to their soldiers, and 
Churches in the Japanese Empire hoping to have friendly relations with the 
Táiwanese Presbyterian Churches. This, it would have been clear to readers, 
would not have taken place in the Cing Empire. And so, the writers got their 
views across without openly saying anything. Likely, this was for the same reason 
192
as in the other accounts:  they were happy that the Japanese had come, but the 
Churchgoers might not be, and there was no reason to make enemies. 
 
LAST THOUGHTS 
It was noted at the start of this work that while its interests are very narrow, it 
nonetheless makes contributions to a number of other bodies of knowledge. 
Before coming to the end, these will be gone over again, and something more will 
be said about what work is still to be done there. 
It has been seen that the Presbyterian Church of England’s missionaries 
were interested in, and working for, the growth of Western ideas in the Cing 
Empire, and that they saw the Japanese overcoming the Cing — and later the 
Táiwanese — as helping the missionaries with their purpose. This is not a 
surprise: writers of post-colonial history and theory have long said that 
missionaries had an important part in the West’s nineteenth-century 
“colonisation of consciousness.” But what has not been given enough attention, 
is the part that the missionary periodicals had in this. It is clear that, at least in 
the Japanese-Táiwanese War, the missionaries put the  Church News to use making 
the island ready for the Japanese, under whose rule — it was their hope — 
Western ideas would be more freely developed. What is not clear are the ways in 
which the periodical supported this purpose before and after the War. What is 
still necessary, then is a project which takes account of the writings in the  Church 
News over a longer period of time, and how the periodical made Western ideas 
more common in Tái-wan. 
This is true in a sense of the  Monthly Messenger  too. While some attention 
has been given to the ways in which Westerners’ “knowledge” of the 
non-Western was shaped by books, newspapers, and others periodicals — even 
missionary periodicals — no attention has been given to the part of the  Monthly 
Messenger  in this. Yet, as one of the only English-language periodicals regularly 
having first-hand accounts of Tái-wan, its part in shaping Westerners’ knowledge 
of the island was likely very great. Here too, what is necessary is a broader 
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project, which takes account of the  Monthly Messenger  over a greater length of 
time, who was reading it, and how its writings were put to use in making other 
materials on Tái-wan. Material from the  Monthly Messenger could even be put 
through a “discourse analysis,” to see how its accounts of Tái-wan was different 
from the accounts of the Táiwanese themselves, and how their being so was of 
use to Westerners.  
While there are a number of Chinese-language works on the Presbyterian 
Church in Tái-wan, and the South Formosa Mission, there are very few modern 
writings on them in English, and next to none at all on their parent organisation 
— the Presbyterian Church of England. This is strange, given the important part 
that these organisations had in Tái-wan’s history, and the history of Tái-wan in 
the U.K. This work is a start at making this better, but a very small one, and there 
is a great need for a work that gives a detailed history of the Churches and 
mission, and the relations between them. Such a work would not be hard to put 
together: between the mission archives in London, and the Presbyterian Church 
in Tái-wan’s own archives, there is quite enough material. It is simply necessary 
for a writer to put these materials to use. 
The Church’s periodicals are in need of more work too. While the  Church 
News has been given a good amount of attention in Tái-wan, there is very little 
English-language writing about it. Not only would an English-language overview 
of the periodical’s history and material be of great use, there are questions still 
about what it did on the island, how it was put together, what the readers made 
of it, and so on. Things are no better with the  Monthly Messenger . Unlike the 
Church News , the  Monthly Messenger has never been digitised, and maybe for this 
reason knowledge of it is still very limited. Here too, more work is needed on how 
it was put together, who was reading it, the changes in its interests over the 
periodicals’ long history, and in general what sort of effect it had in the 
nineteenth-century U.K. 
The Wars which are of interest here, the Cing-Japanese War and 
Japanese-Táiwanese War, are often said to have been greatly important events in 
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the history of East Asia, marking the start of the Japanese Empire, the end of the 
Cing Empire, and a change in the government of Tái-wan. Yet, they have been 
given very little attention in English: while there are a number of works on the 
the details of the Cing-Japanese War, there are no general histories of it, and 
hardly any histories at all — general or detailed — of the  Japanese-Táiwanese 
War. The three most important modern book-length works on the War — 
Dorwart, Lone, and Paine — are accounts of the War from the American, 
Japanese, and media points of view. This work is an addition in giving to a degree 
the points of view of the Táiwanese. But it is still for some other writer to give 
the points of view of Cing and Táiwanese persons more generally. 
Surprisingly, given how little attention in general the War have been 
given, the part of missionaries in it has been noted. Yet this is as far as it has 
gone: there are no detailed accounts of missionaries’ experiences of the War. As 
this work his made clear, missionaries had great hopes for how the War might 
make things better for them in the Cing Empire, and at least some of them did 
what they could to make certain that this would be so. Next must come works on 
other mission groups, to see if they made use of the War in the same way. In fact, 
one reason for this work’s making use of clear definitions and measurements in 
the way it has, is so that comparisons can be made between it, and any future 
works on what other missionaries did in the Wars — specially with respect to 
publishing. 
But all of the above is for other times, and other writers. Meanwhile, it is 
this writer’s hope that this thesis has done its work well, not only giving 
attention to a piece of history which has for too long had none, but making clear 
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